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Impact of Monetary Policy and Macroeconomic Environment on Islamic 
Banking Operations in a Dual Banking System of Malaysia 
by 
Mohammed Zakkariya Mulkiaman 
Abstract 
The emergence of Islamic banking and finance since 1984 had contributed to the financial 
development leading to economic growth in Malaysia. Since Islamic banks operates 
within the dual banking system in Malaysia, it is inevitable that Islamic banking 
operations have interacted with the monetary policies and outcomes of the existing 
(conventional) system and as a result interact with interest rate related developments as 
well. In addition, macroeconomic interaction in the sense of Islamic banking contributing 
to economic growth will be higher if Islamic banks grow and increase their market share 
in the industry perhaps through applying legitimate Islamic compliance products and 
valid contracts.  
This research, hence, aims to assess the impact of monetary policy as well as 
macroeconomic outcomes on Islamic banking operations and vice versa in the case of 
Malaysia in particular in the post-1990 period. In doing so, each research question is 
examined and answered in three separate yet connected empirical papers. Each 
econometric analysis is based on two steps Engle-Granger tests with different timelines 
and sampling due to availability of the data. The main tests conducted was two steps 
Engle-Granger approach which involved Ordinary Least Square estimation, Residual 
testing, and Cointegration test. Vector Error Correction Model and Granger Casusality 
were also employed for further investigation of the long and short-run relationship 
between variables. 
The finding indicates that the Islamic banks do have long run dynamic relationship with 
economic growth. However, the conventional banks are the dominion due to small market 
share of the Islamic banks which is less than 30 per cent.  
With regards to the interest rate interaction, both conventional and Islamic interbank 
money market rates moving closely in the long run statistically indicates that Islamic 
inter-bank money market is co-integrated in long-run because both conventional and 
Islamic banks are subjected to the same monetary policy. While saving interest rates of 
the conventional banks and profit rates of the Islamic banks are not associated but moving 
parallel need to adjust their return rates in the long short and long run either slightly 
higher or lower to remain competitive in the market.  
The findings on the relationship between Islamic banks saving profit rates spread show 
that they are affected by financial factors such as inflation rate and real interest rate. This 
indicates that Islamic banks are exposed to the interest rates risk, as they operate under 
the dual banking system and reign by the same monetary policies. 
The results indicate that there is a close and inevitable interaction between Islamic 
banking operations and monetary policy outcomes. In particular close operational 
relationship between Islamic banking profit rates and interest rates should be considered 
as a source of worry in the face of the religious positioning of the prohibition of interest 
rate. The outcome reflects that prohibition of riba is only considered as the form nature of 
Islamic law (Shari’ah), while the operations of Islamic banks are vulnerable to interest 
rates risk in everyday life.  However, in dual banking system such interactions will be 
inevitable. 
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ARABIC WORD MEANING 
 
Akhirah Hereafter. Life after death. 
 
Akhlaq Moral or ethics 
 
Al-bay al-dayn Sale of debt in which the creditor sells its payable right 
upon the debtor either to the debtor or to the third 
party.  
 
Al-adalah Justice. Fairness principle. To put something in the 
right perspective. 
 
Al-bay inah A contract, which involves the sale and buyback 
transaction of assets by a seller.  
 
Al-bay bithaman ajil A contract that refers to the sale and purchase for the 
financing of assets on a deferred and an installment 
basis with a pre‐agreed payment period.  
 
Al-bay salam A contract whereby the payment is made in cash at the 
point of contract but the delivery of asset purchased 
will be deferred to a preset time and date.   
 
Al-Maqasid al-Shariah The aim and intention of the Islamic law 
 
Al-Wakala Agency. 
 
‘Aql  
 
human intellect/Intelligence. 
Aqeedah Belief/faith. 
 
Ar-rahnu Islamic pawn system 
 
Bay al-amanah A type of trust sale 
 
Baitul mal Treasury 
 
Bismillahir rahmanir rahim With the name of Allah almighty the most merciful and 
most benevolent 
 
Din  
 
Religion/Way of life. 
Dinar  Islamic Gold money 
 
Dirham Islamic Silver money 
 
Fiqhi Islamic jurisprudence. The Principles of Islamic 
Jurispudence. It covers all aspects of life – religious, 
political, social or economics etc. 
 
Fuqaha Islamic Scholar in Islamic Jurisprudence 
 
Gharar Uncertainty, hazard, chance or risk.  
 
Hadith Narration of saying from the prophet Muhammad 
(peace be upon him).  
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ARABIC WORD MEANING 
 
Halal Lawful, permitted or permissible according to Sharī’ah 
 
Hibah Dividend 
 
Hijri Islamic calendar 
 
Hilal Legal device 
 
Ibadah Practice and activities 
 
Ibra Discount or Rebate 
 
Ijarah A lease agreement. 
 
Ijarah muntahiya bittamlik Leasing ending with ownership 
 
Ijarah thumma al-bay Leasing then buying 
 
Ijarah waiqtina Leasing for a particular of period and ending with 
ownership 
 
Ijtimai Social sector 
 
Islamic Following the principles of Islam 
 
Istihsan Principle of equity 
 
Istisna A contract of sale in which a supplier of the goods or 
services is asked to supply goods of definite 
specifications at agreed rates, place and time of 
delivery.  
 
Jizya Tax to non Muslim 
 
Kali-bi-Kali Swapping one debt with another debt 
 
Kant Prohibition of hoarding of coins 
 
Kurush Silver coin 
 
Maisir Gambling 
 
Mal 
 
Wealth 
Mandub Encouraged 
 
Muamalah  Business dealings 
 
Muassyarah Community or charitable activities 
 
Mubah Permissible 
 
Mudarabah Joint venture contract. One party provide capital, 
another party manage the business.  
 
Mudarib Refers to the partner who provides entrepreneurship 
and management in a mudarabah agreement. 
 
Mufti Islamic Scholar 
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ARABIC WORD MEANING 
 
Murabahah A sale contract between the bank and its client for the 
sale of goods at a price which includes a profit margin 
agree by both parties.  
 
Musharakah, A profit and loss sharing contract. 
 
Mustauriq Customer or client 
 
Musyarakah mutanaqisah Diminishing partnership 
 
Nafs  
 
Human self 
Nasl   
 
Human posterity 
Qardhul Hassan Benevolent loan or an interest-free loan given mainly 
for welfare purposes.  
 
Quran Revealed Knowledge. The Holy Book of the Muslims 
consisting of the revelations made by Allah to the 
Prophet Muhammad (PBUH). The Quran lays down 
the fundamentals of the Islamic faith including beliefs 
and all aspects of the Muslim way of life. 
 
Rab al mal The owner of capital in a mudarabah contract. The 
owner agrees with the working party to give him an 
amount of money to be invested such that the profit is 
distributed among them with known predetermined 
percentages that are not based on the capital but on the 
amount of the realized profit itself. As for the loss (if 
any), is to be borne by the owner of capital alone and 
the working party suffers the loss of his effort and his 
time without any compensation. 
 
Riba Literally means an increase or addition. 
 
Riba al-fadhl Double or multiplying interest or compounding interest 
 
Sadaqah Donation/charity money 
 
Sanadat mudarabah Mudarabah bond 
 
Sharia’h Islamic law.   
 
Shirkat al-aqad, Partnership contract 
 
Shirkat al-milk Co-own partnership 
 
Sukuk An Islamic bond.  
 
Takaful Literally it means guaranteeing each other. It is a 
system of Islamic insurance based on the principle of 
mutual assistance (tawun) and voluntarily (tabbaru) 
where risk is shared collectively by the group 
voluntarily 
 
Tawarruq  
 
It is the method of how an Islamic bank is facilitating 
the demand/supply of cash from/to its customers. The 
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ARABIC WORD MEANING 
 
bank’s customers (mutawarriq) will buy a commodity 
on deferred payment basis from the bank and sells the 
commodity for a cash amount less than the deferred 
price to a third party (authorised commodity trader).  
 
Tawarruq al fardi Classical tawarruq 
 
Tawarruq al munazzam 
 
Organized tawarruq. 
 
Tawheed Oneness of God 
 
Tijari Commercial sector 
 
Umayyah One of the Islamic Caliphate Dynasty from 41 Hijri to 
131 Hijri 
 
Uqudal-mu'awadhat Exchange contracts 
 
Uruf Customary practice 
 
Wadiah Saving 
 
Wajib Compulsory 
 
Waqf Endowment 
 
Zakah Tax in Islam. A tax, which is prescribed by Islam on all 
persons having wealth above a certain amount and that, 
is fixed by the Shariah. According to the Islamic belief 
Zakat purifies wealth and souls.  
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 BACKGROUND 
 
Originally there is no word of ‘Islamic banking’ under the teaching of Islam. In the 
Islamic history, there was no ‘Islamic banks’ during the time of Prophet Muhammad 
(pbuh). However, there were moneylenders, which loaned their monies and charged 
interest or riba
1
 in their money lending activities. Borrowers who failed to pay their 
principal amount or interest rates were charged double or even triple or more than the 
original amount that they owed to the money lenders (As Sadr, 2000). To establish 
justice and avoid oppression in the society, Islam had prohibited the practice of riba. 
Even though, there was no Islamic bank at that time, the non-institutional nature of 
transactions was conducted minus the riba after the prohibitions.  
A modern banking system in the world was established in the 17
th
 century 
(Quinn,1997) and presently became the mainstream in the financial services sector. 
The banking system was established primarily for savings, deposit keeping and 
money lending activities. The money lending activities charges interest rates which is 
prohibited in Islam.  
Therefore, Muslim scholars have developed products that resemble conventional 
banking products, replacing interest rate payments and discounting with fees and 
contingent payment structures (Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Merrouche,2010:p.3). 
When this idea was implemented, it leads to emergence of the Islamic banking 
system.  The principles of Islamic finance are such as: 
 
i) Mudarabah: A joint venture agreement made between two parties one 
which provides 100 percent of the capital for the project and another party 
                                                 
1
  Riba-technically it denotes any increase or advantage obtained and accrued by the lender in 
a loan transaction without giving an equivalent counter-value or recompense in return to the 
borrower. (Nawawi, 1999). Linguistically riba in Islam means to increase, to grow, to exceed, 
to be more than or excess than principal amount (Razi, 2008,18). For further reading on riba 
and its prohibition in Islamic Law (Shari’ah) may also refer to Chapra, (2006), Ahmad, and 
Hassan, (2007), and  Zaman (2008). 
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known as a mudarrib, who manages the project using his entrepreneurial 
skills. Profits are distributed according to a predetermined ratio. Any 
losses accruing are borne by the provider of capital. The provider of 
capital has no control over the management of the project (Aziz, Anjam, 
Fahim and Saleem, 2013). 
 
ii) Murabahah: A contract sale between the bank and its client for the sale of 
goods at a price which includes a profit margin agree by both parties As a 
financing technique, it involves the purchase of goods by the bank as  
requested by the client. The goods are sold to the client with a mark-up. 
Repayment, usually in instalments is specified in the contract. According 
to Mufti Usmani, one of the basic requirements for the validity of 
murabahah is that the commodity is purchased by the financier before 
selling it to the customer. In this case the financier is taking risk and the 
profit made by the financier is the reward for taking the risk (Usmani, 
1998).  
 
iii) Musyarakah: A Partnership contract between two parties who both 
contribute capital towards the financing of a project. Both parties share 
profits on a pre-agreed ratio, but losses are shared on the basis of equity 
participation. Either parties or just one of them may carry out management 
of the project. This is a very flexible partnership arrangement where the 
sharing of the profits and management can be negotiated and pre-agreed 
by all parties. However, each partner is liable to their commitments 
(Arshad and Ismail, 2010). 
 
iv) Ijarah: Generally, ijarah is to give something on rent. Speficially, Ijarah is 
a leasing contract whereby a bank or financier buys an item (like a 
building, equipements etc) for a customer and then leases it to person over 
a specific period, thus earning profits for the owner of the asset by earning 
rental income (Vejzagic, 2014). There are three types of leasing contract 
namely, leasing then buying contract (ijarah thumma al-bay), leasing 
ending with ownership (ijarah muntahiya bittamlik) and  leasing for a 
particular of period and ending with ownership (ijarah waiqtina) (Bank 
Negara Malaysia,2014). 
3 
 
 
v) Al-bay salam: A contract whereby the payment is made in cash at the point 
of contract but the delivery of asset purchased will be deferred to a 
pre‐determined date (Muhammad and Chong, 2007).   
 
vi) Istisna: A contract of sale in which a supplier of the goods or services is 
asked to supply goods of definite specifications at agreed rates, place and 
time of delivery. The price of the goods is paid in advance, but the goods 
are manufactured and delivered at a later date (Bank Negara Malaysia, 
2010). 
 
vii) other Islamic Law (Shari’ah2)  based contractual principles to products of 
the conventional banks (Bank Negara Malaysia, 2010).  
 
This has been possible due to the fact that Islam does not restrict applying principles 
of Islam religion (Islamization) of any activity because the general rule is that, what 
was not prohibited is permitted in Islam. However, in the effort of Islamizing the 
existing conventional products, the main question is that: is it enough to Islamize the 
non-permitted (non-halal) products by applying Islamic finance principles to the 
banking sector to achieve the objective of Islamic Law (al-maqasid al-Shari’ah)3?. 
According to Al-Ghazzali, one of the Islamic Scholars, there are five main objectives 
Shari`ah namely, faith (din), human self (nafs), human intellect (‘aql), human 
posterity (nasl) and wealth (mal).  The objective of these five Shari`ah principals are 
to promote the well-being of all mankind and safeguarding public interest (Dusuki 
and Abdullah, 2007:31). 
 
 Islamic teaching consists of faith and belief (aqeedah), practices and activities 
(ibadah), financial and business dealings (muamalah), social and charitable activities 
(muassyarah) and moral and ethics (akhlaq). There is a link between each of these 
                                                 
2
 In legal terminology, Shari’ah means the law as extracted by the Mujtahids from the sources 
of law. The term Shari’ah can also mean divine guidance as given by the Quran and the 
Sunnah of the Prophet Muhammad (Peace be upon him) and embodies all aspects of the 
Islamic faith, including beliefs and practice. For further reading on Shari’ah please refer to 
book on Shari’ah Law by Kamali, 2008. 
 
3
 For further reading on Al-Maqasid Al-Shariah please refer to Auda, Jasser (2007), Syed Ali 
and Hassan (2014) and Mohammad and Syahwan (2013). 
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principles and it cannot be practice in isolation or on a piecemeal basis. Figure 1.1 
shows the position of Islamic finance and banking under the Islam. 
 
Figure 1.1: Position Islamic Finance and Banking Activities under the Islam 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Asutay, (2014:p.75) 
Note: (---) denotes the missing link between the commercial and non-commercial activities 
with Ethics and Morality. 
 
There have been many studies conducted in the areas of Islamic finance and banking 
particularly on the development of Islamic finance and banking in Malaysia. Most of 
the research in the areas of Islamic finance has been on the risk management, liquidity 
management, profitability, quality management and service management, corporate 
social responsibility and performance of the Islamic banks. However, there is limited 
study regarding Islamic monetary policy and impact of the monetary policy on the 
Islamic banks operations. This research, however, aims to shift the debate on the 
impact of monetary policy on the Islamic bank's operations and vice versa.  
Some of the researchers that had conducted studies on the Islamic monetary policy 
and concluded that Islamic monetary policy are the mainframe of development of the 
Islamic economics. According to Hassan (1998), monetary policy in the Islamic 
framework should play a vital role in establishing stability and growth. Prohibition of 
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interest as one of the fundamental pillars of Islamic economics makes the instruments 
and mechanism of the monetary policy different from the conventional economic.  
According to Asutay (2007), since Islamic economics present an alternative system 
within a political economic framework pragmatist solutions are suggested to 
accommodate the monetary policy aspects of Islamic banking. In line with this, most 
of the scholars were focusing on the instruments of the monetary policy in the 
conventional system and suggesting a similar approach in implementing the Islamic 
monetary policy. The focus has been on utilizing ‘Islamic’ instruments with the 
absence of the interest rate element.  
Siddiqi (2008) opined that the monetary policy is one of the subsets of the Islamic 
economics. The goal of the Islamic monetary policy is to achieve the socio- economic 
justice and distribution of wealth. Monetary policy in a conventional system 
implemented through the Central Banks. Therefore, in Islamic Economics, the Central 
Bank must conduct monetary policy to achieve the Islamic socioeconomic objectives 
(Siddiqui, 2008). 
This study explores the concept of monetary policy in Islam to answer the question as 
to whether is there a concept called monetary policy in Islam? How the Islamic Law 
based (Shari’ah based) principles utilized as the guiding principles of the Islamic 
monetary policy.  
In addition to such conceptual questions, empirical attempts are made to explore the 
interaction areas between Islamic bank operations and the monetary policy outcomes 
and policies in Malaysia. As within the dual banking system, Islamic banks have 
consequences for monetary policy and monetary policy also causes Islamic banks. 
 
1.2 PROBLEM STATEMENT 
 
There are limited studies on monetary policy and its impact on the Islamic banking 
operations. Furthermore, the researcher could not find any comparative studies on the 
conventional policy with the Islamic monetary policy. Moreover, when a first Islamic 
bank was established in Malaysia in 1984, the understanding was that the banks will 
be not charging interest rate and all transaction will be interest free. At that time, 
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business contracts such as cost plus profit (murabahah), profit and loss sharing 
(musharakah), joint venture (mudarabah) and leasing (ijarah) was introduced for the 
Islamic banks.  
 
However, in case of Malaysia, after about 20 years in operation, in 2004, the 
application of murabaha contract was 49.9 per cent, leasing was 24 per cent, 
musyarakah was 0.4 percent and mudarabah was at 0.1 per cent. Murabahah in 
Malaysia is referred to as deferred payment sale (Al-Bay Bithaman Ajil-BBA), (Chong 
and Liu, 2009). This triggered a question whether Islamic banks in Malaysia are 
Islamic?.  
 
From 1987 till 2010, there were about 20 court cases of which majority involved Al-
Bay Bithamin Ajil (BBA) facility (Hassan and Asutay, 2011;43). From  2003 to 2009, 
about 90 per cent of the Islamic finance cases registered related to BBA. In the case of 
Bank Islam Malaysia Berhad v Adnan Omar (1994), the High Court held that the 
defendant was bound to pay the total amount of the selling price because he knew the 
terms of the contract and knowingly entered into the agreement. In the case of Affin 
Bank Berhad v Zulkifli Abdullah (2006) and Malayan Banking Berhad v Marilyn Ho 
Siok Lin (2006) the courts held that the Islamic contract of BBA was similar to a 
conventional loan and therefore the Islamic banks could not claim the unearned 
profits because it was equal to interest computation. In 2008, the High Court ruling in 
the case of Arab Malaysian Finance Bhd v Taman Ihsan Jaya Sdn Bhd & Ors that the 
application of the Al-Bay Bithaman Ajil was contrary to the Islamic Banking Act 
1983 (IBA) and the Banking and Financial Institutions Act 1989 (BAFIA) These 
court rulings adversely affect the image of the Islamic bank in Malaysia (Hassan and 
Asutay, 2011,43-46).  
 
The court judgement was that borrower of Islamic banks are bound to pay the total 
selling price when default, BBA contract is similar to conventional loan and 
application of  the BBA was contrary to Islamic Banking Act (IBA) 1983. This 
judgment further adds confusion to the general public perception that the Islamic 
banks contracts are compliance to the Islamic law (Sha’riah). The Islamic banking 
and finance scholars and academics in Malaysia claimed that all products and services 
of Islamic banking and finance are Sha’riah compliance and interest free. The 
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Malaysian shariah scholar also claimed that the only element that is not Islamic for 
the Islamic banks are the monetary policy where the same monetary policy used by 
the Central bank in Malaysia for the conventional banks as well as for the Islamic 
banks. This motivates the researcher to investigate that how Islamic banks operate 
under the dual banking system in Malaysia. Even if the Islamic banks products are 
shariah compliance there must some effect on Islamic banks operations because the 
banks not only operating in a dual banking system but also subjected to the same 
monetary policy under the supervision of the Central Bank of Malaysia (BNM).  
 
1.3 AIMS AND OBJECTIVES OF THE RESEARCH 
This research aims to describe, explore, examine and analyze the economic impact of 
monetary policy on Islamic banks operation. The aims, hence, are also to explore the 
guiding principles of the Islamic monetary policy, identify differences between the 
conventional and Islamic Monetary Policy, examine the development of Islamic 
banks, explore the relationship between institutional and macroeconomic variables, 
investigate the causal effect between Islamic profit rates and conventional interest 
rates, and examine Islamic banks’ contribution in expanding interest rates spread. 
However, since this research comprises of three different empirical investigating four 
different topics, the research aim and objectives for each essay are discussed 
individually below: 
(i)    The aim of the first essay is to examine and analyze the growth and investment 
function of the Islamic banks in Malaysia. In doing so, the following specific 
objectives are developed: 
a) to examine the relationship between growth of the GDP with growth of 
total financing and investment of the Islamic banks. 
 
b) to identify causality effect between the GDP and the total financing and 
investment of the Islamic banks; 
 
c) to measure the impact of the total Islamic bank financing on investment 
growth of the Islamic banks; and 
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d) to investigate the GDP growth impact on the total financing of the 
conventional banks.  
(ii)   The aim of the second essay is to examine and investigate the association and 
causality effect of the Islamic banks with the conventional inter-bank money 
market, savings and investment.  It also aims to examine the short and long-
term relationship between conventional deposit rates and Islamic investment 
rates. In fulfilling this, the following objectives are developed:  
a) to examine the causality effect between saving rates of interbank money 
market of the Islamic with conventional banks; 
b) to examine the causality effect between fixed deposit rates of interbank 
money market of  the Islamic with conventional banks; 
 
c) to investigate the causality effect between saving rates of interbank money 
market rates of the Islamic and conventional banks; and 
 
d) to investigate the causality effect between investment rates of interbank 
money market rates of the Islamic and conventional banks. 
(iii)    The aim of the third essay is to investigate the market and macroeconomic 
determinant factors which affect the spread of Islamic profit and return on 
investment rates of the Islamic banks in Malaysia. In doing so, the following 
specific objectives are developed: 
a) to analyze the impact of GDP, bank growth and reserve requirement ratio 
on the Islamic profit rate spread of the Islamic banks; 
 
b) to analyze the impact of GDP, Inflation, and Treasury Bill rates on return 
on investment rates spread of the Islamic banks;  
 
c) to examine the causal effect between Islamic profits rates spread and 
interest rates spread of the conventional banks; and 
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d) to examine the causal effect between Islamic investment rates spread and 
fixed deposit rates spread of the conventional banks; 
 
1.4 RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The research aims were to answer the following research questions, which include: 
(i) What are guiding principles of the monetary policy in Islam? 
(ii) What are the differences between the conventional and Islamic monetary 
policy? 
(iii) What are the determining factors of the growth of the Islamic banks for 
the year 1984 until the year 2012? 
 
(iv) Do Islamic banks contribute to the economic growth particularly the 
growth of the GDP? 
(v) Is there any causal relationship between conventional interest rates and 
Islamic profit rates? 
(vi) Do Islamic banks contribute in expanding the interest rate spread? 
Three empirical chapters in this research aim to provide answers to the research 
questions (iv)-(vi). 
 
1.5 SCOPE OF THE STUDY 
The empirical research in this study is designed as a paper-based with three empirical 
papers utilizing the secondary data. The data obtained from the website of the Bank 
Negara Malaysia (BNM) and also from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
database.  
It should be noted that the literature review was limited to the issues of differences 
between the conventional and Islamic monetary policy. With regard to the empirical 
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chapters, the scope of analyses was confined to the Islamic banking industry in 
Malaysia. 
 
1.6. RESEARCH METHOD 
As described above, this research is a quantitative research. The approach is 
deductive, where the analyses were conducted utilizing mathematical modelling to 
investigate correlation, co-integration and to examine the long and short-run 
relationships between variables. 
1.6.1 Data collection 
Data for this study consist of secondary data, which are utilized to examine the impact 
of conventional monetary policy on Islamic banks. The secondary data obtained from 
Malaysian Central Bank, or Bank Negara Malaysia-BNM’s, Monthly Statistical 
Bulletin, starting from the year 1984 until the year 2012. Some of the macroeconomic 
data were obtained from the BNM Annual Reports, BNM Financial Stability Reports 
and Malaysia’s Economic Report published by the Ministry of Finance of Malaysia. 
Data on Malaysia’s money supply was derived from the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) Financial Statistics Database subscribed by the Durham University.  
1.6.2 Data analysis 
This section aims to briefly describe the statistical and econometrics methods used to 
analyse data in fulfilling the aim of the formulated relationship.  By definition, this 
study is constructed within time series analysis. The data are analysed using the 
Econometrics Software, namely E-views
4
 version 7. Among other econometric 
techniques employed include the descriptive statistics corelogram test, unit root test, 
Lag Structure test, two steps Engle Granger procedure which involved estimation of 
the raw data usig OLS test followed by residual testing and test of cointegration by 
applying Johansen Co-integration test. If the data is stationary and the variables are 
cointegrated, then will proceed with the Vector Error Correction Model (VEC) test.  
                                                 
4
 To learn how to use e-views application can refer to Brooks C.(2008) and Asteriou D. and 
Hall SG (2011), It contains e-views tutorials. 
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The Wald test and Granger causality was conducted to identify the short causality 
effect between the variables.  
1.7 SIGNIFICANT CONTRIBUTION OF THE RESEARCH 
This thesis adds value to the existing knowledge particularly in the areas of the 
Islamic banking operation and monetary policy in Islam. This research is first kind of 
venture to compare the monetary policy from conventional and Islamic point of view. 
As of to date, there is no discussion about the monetary policy from the Islamic 
perspective and comparing it with the conventional monetary policy which is 
implemented in the banking system including for the Islamic banks. Through the 
literature review, the reader able to differentiate in terms of definition, philosophy 
including the principles, instruments, similarity and principal differences between 
conventional monetary policy and Islamic monetary policy.  
The literature also indicates that most of the conventional monetary instruments are 
Islamic and some instruments need modifications before applying it for the Islamic 
banks. Furthermore, there is also limited study on how monetary policy is transmitted 
in Islamic banks and its impact on Islamic banking operations. This research 
contributes in the areas of monetary policy impact on Islamic banking which operates 
under the dual banking system in Malaysia. It also describes the Malaysian monetary 
policy pre and post 1978 and elaborates on the development of Islamic banking 
system in Malaysia since year 1984 until the year 2010. The literature review finding 
shows that, despite a small market share, Islamic banks have greater potential to grow 
and increase the market share in future. 
This research also a first time effort to investigates market determinant and 
macroeconomic determinant factors influencing the Islamic banks’ saving and 
investment spread. Based on the literature, even subject of determinants fir interest 
rate spread is still inconclusive for the conventional bank. However, the result has 
shown that Islamic banks spread also affected by the market and macroeconomic 
determinants.  It may provide some inputs and empirical evidence for further research 
in the areas of Islamic monetary policy. This research is a paper based with three 
empirical chapters. Each empirical chapter has its own literature review, methodology 
and analysis. The empirical chapters can be updated and submitted for publication. It 
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may also benefit various groups including the regulators, the Shari’ah scholars, the 
bankers, the academicians and the customer or the general public that are interested in 
this field.  
The findings of the research may provide some inputs to the regulator predominantly 
to the Central Bank. The results of the finding also suggest that Islamic banks are 
affected by the implementation of the conventional monetary policy. Thus it is 
challenging the Shari’ah scholars to come out with the Islamic monetary policy for 
Islamic banks, where interest rates are no longer is the mechanism in transmitting the 
monetary policy.  
The research suggests that the Islamic finance should not only be limited to the 
banking system. The Islamic banking and finance cannot be separated from the 
element of ethics and morality. The research also recommends that the Islamic banks 
cannot operate like conventional banks where profit maximization of the shareholder 
wealth becomes the main objectives. Despite Islamic banking products are Shari’ah 
compliant, the Islamic Banks will not be able to achieve the objective of al-maqasid 
al-Shari’ah if, it is continued to be administered by the conventional monetary policy.  
 
1.8 AN OVERVIEW OF THE RESEARCH 
This thesis is divided into three main parts with eight chapters. The first part is the 
literature review chapters; the second part consists of empirical chapters, while the 
third part presents analysis, contextualization of the findings, recommendations and 
conclusion. 
Chapter 1 describes the aim and objective of the thesis, which also outlines the 
research questions, thesis layout, scope of the study, and contribution to the existing 
knowledge.  
Chapter 2 (Conventional and Islamic Monetary Policy) discusses the definition and 
aspects of monetary policy from the conventional and Islamic perspective. With 
regards to the Islamic monetary policy, it describes the monetary system in the early 
Islamic period, end of bimetallism coinage system, deliberations on Islamic monetary 
policy and links of Islamic monetary policy with ethics and other principles of Islam.  
13 
 
Chapter 3 (Malaysia Monetary Policy) presents an analysis of the Malaysian 
Monetary policy and how the Central Bank implemented the monetary policy. 
Malaysian monetary policy can be divided into two phases. First is prior to the 1978, 
and the second is after the year 1978. The chapter also elaborates on Islamic monetary 
and instruments and Islamic finance instrument used in the Malaysian Islamic banks. 
Chapter 4 (Performance of the Islamic Banks in Malaysia) reviews the past 
performance of the Islamic banks in Malaysia by looking at the total assets, deposits, 
financing and investment, capital and liabilities, and selected financial ratio of the 
Islamic banks. Overall the total assets, financing and deposits of the Islamic banks 
grew at an annual average rate of 23 per cent, 10.8 per cent and 14.3 per cent 
respectively. Overall the market share of the Islamic banks is still about 25 per cent of 
the financial system. The growth pattern provides evidence that the Islamic banks 
have greater prospects compared to conventional banks. 
Chapter 5-Research Methodology- explained the procedures and steps involved in 
analysing the data using the econometric models and tests maily the the two steps of 
Engle-Granger test. The Engle Grager test is the despite having its own weaknesses, 
but it is the simplest way way to identify the cointegration between the variables. 
However, it also involves testing the residual to ensure that the data is stationary and 
the estimation result is not spurious and reliable.  
Chapter 6 (Islamic Banks Macroeconomic Nexus) investigates whether there is a 
relationship between Islamic banks with macroeconomic indicator such as GDP. 
Islamic banks variables are total financing and investment while macroeconomic 
indicators are GDP) as a proxy for economic growth, trade balance as proxy for net 
transfer from abroad, and Gross Fixed Capital Formation (GFCF) as a proxy for 
investment. The result of the finding indicates that the contribution of the Islamic 
banks to the GDP growth relatively very low due to the small market shares of the 
Islamic banks. With regards to the investment model, the finding shows that the 
indirect effect of the Islamic banks on investment is higher than the conventional 
banks.  
Chapter 7 (Causality Effects between Conventional Interest Rates and Islamic Profit 
Rates) explores if there is any causal effect between interest rates and profit rates of 
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Islamic banks. The Granger causality test utilized to examine the causal effect 
between conventional bank interbank rates with Islamic bank interbank profit rates. 
The rates include one year savings deposit rates and fixed deposit rates of one month, 
three months, six months, nine months and twelve months of the Islamic banks. The 
findings indicate that there is a long-run association between Islamic interbank money 
market rates with the conventional bank money market rates. The mean adjustment 
lag result indicates that the Islamic banks took shorter time than the conventional 
banks to adjust their profit rates against the interest rates of the conventional banks.  
Chapter 8 (Islamic Profit Rates Spread), being the last empirical chapter, intends to 
establish the fact that Islamic banks additionally contributing to the spread of interest 
rates. Market determinant variables are tested with macroeconomic variables, which 
include Islamic bank profit rates, investment rates of return and bank development 
ratio, while macroeconomic variables are GDP and the Reserve Requirement Ratio. 
The test result provides evidence that statistically Islamic banks spread of saving and 
investment affected by the statutory reserve requirement of the conventional monetary 
policy. 
Chapter 9 (Summary of Findings, Policy Recommendations and Conclusion) 
summarizes findings of the literature review chapters and empirical chapters. Among 
other findings of literature review chapters include that, there are substantial 
differences in principles between the conventional and Islamic monetary policy. 
There are some conventional monetary policy instruments such as reserve ratio, credit 
ceilings, selective credit control, issues of directives and moral suasion, which are 
suitable to be used as modern Islamic banking monetary policy instruments. Other 
instruments like an open market operation required modification and the bank rate 
policy are not suitable for Islamic bank monetary policy. The econometric test result 
shows some relevant and conclusive findings. For the empirical chapters, the result 
shows that statistically: 
(i)  Conventional bank and Islamic banks do contribute to the economic growth. 
However, the contribution of the conventional banks are more significant due 
to bigger market share compared to the Islamic bank which is controlling less 
than 30 percent of the market share in Malaysia;  
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 (ii)  The findings confirmed that statistically there is long-run association between 
conventional and Islamic interbank money market rates  that Islamic banks 
overnight interbank money market rates and Islamic rates Granger cause 
conventional overnight interbank money market rates and vice versa. The 
result also indicates that there is no significant association between 
conventional bank saving rates with Islamic bank profit rates because the 
Islamic banks profit rates are always lower than the conventional banks; and  
 (iii)  the Islamic banks saving and investment spreads are affected by the market 
and macroeconomic determinant factors including the reserve requirement 
ratio and 12 months Treasury Bill rates  set by the Bank Negara Malaysia.  
 
The findings also indicate that the Islamic banks are sensitive to the adjustment of the 
conventional bank interest rates, and Islamic Banks are exposed to the interest rates 
risk, market risk and liquidity risk under the dual banking system.  
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CHAPTER 2 
 
A SURVEY ON CONVENTIONAL AND 
ISLAMIC MONETARY POLICY 
 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
Monetary policy in conventional terms is often associated with the function of the 
Central Bank. The first Central Bank was established in the 17
th
century. The main 
function of a Central Bank in most of the countries is to act as the monetary authority 
for the monetary policy implementation by using specific monetary policy 
instruments. For example, in the event of a banking crisis, the Central Bank as the 
lender of last resort would bail out the banks using the tax payers’ money or by 
printing additional money. Therefore, the banking system would not collapse and 
would continuously provide loans and financing by creating more debts in the 
financial system. 
The concept of Islamic monetary policy is different from the conventional monetary 
policy. Many modern Muslim scholars define the meaning of Islamic monetary policy 
within the framework and function of the Central Bank. They propose instruments 
which are Islamic Law (Shari’ah) compliant to be used by the Central Banks to 
operate in the economy in a Shari’ah compliant manner.   
This chapter aims to identify the differences between the conventional and Islamic 
monetary policy, and briefly discusses the background and the evolution of the 
monetary system, starting from barter trade to commodity money and implementation 
of gold and silver standard as the currency. After the failure of the gold standard, the 
Breton Wood system was begun to be implemented, according to which the US 
dollars were convertible to gold with the ratio of 1 ounce of gold equal to $US 35. 
The Breton Wood system only survived until 1970, and subsequently fiat money 
(without any asset-based or asset-backed) became the legal tender as currency until 
present. There have been large numbers of research in the areas of monetary policy 
and on how the Central Bank controls the money supply.  
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The second section of this chapter explores the monetary system during the early 
Islamic period when Islamic gold dinar was used as the currency for international 
trade. However, due to various reasons, Islamic Gold dinar failed to sustain and 
ceased to exist as the currency at the end of the Ottoman Empire in the 18
th
 century 
(Pamuk, 2002).  
It should be noted that by definition, there are some differences between monetary 
policy and Islamic monetary policy. It should also be noted that monetary policy in 
generally confined to the activities of the Central Banks in terms of controlling the 
supply of money and inflation (Mathai,2009). The supply of money and inflation is 
controlled through an adjustment of the rates of interest and using monetary policy 
instruments such as open market operations, reserve requirement, discount window 
lending, and currency board.   
In a broader context, monetary policy in Islam is not limited to the scope of the 
Central Bank activities. It falls under the main principles of business dealings 
(muamalah) which comprises the commercial sector (tijari) as well as the social 
sector (ijtimai). While the foremost objective of the capitalist system is the 
maximization of wealth of the shareholders or stakeholders, in Islam, wealth is 
considered to belong to God and human beings are merely vicegerent of the God. As 
manager of the wealth, it is the responsibility of the Muslims to spend and distribute 
wealth according to the teaching of Islam (Chapra, 1985). 
Furthermore, as an essential Islamic jurisprudence (fiqhi) financial principle, interest 
and interest rate is considered riba and prohibited in Islam, which constitutes the 
essential difference between Islamic and conventional monetary policy. Therefore, 
Islamic monetary policy cannot utilise interest rate as the mechanism to control 
inflation and money supply. On the other hand, in conventional monetary policy, 
interest rate is the principal instrument for implementation of the monetary policy. 
Chapra (1985) of the view in Islamic economics, the absence of interest rate, and the 
existence of some institutions like Zakah, would minimize the speculative demand for 
money and make total demand for money in Islamic economics more stable. Chapra 
also opined that the monetary aggregate instruments play the main role for executing 
monetary policy in Islamic economics and this was also echoed by Mohamed Ariff 
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(1982) that monetary policy should be executed through controlling money supply 
without using interest based instruments (Kiae, 2007).  
2.2 AN INTRODUCTION TO MONEY AND MONETARY SYSTEM 
Monetary policy is related to the origin of money and the monetary system. However, 
nobody knows who and when money was invented. According to Davies, cattles were 
probably the oldest form of money from 9000 BC to 6000 BC in a barter dominated 
environment. When the needs to exchange goods expanded, they required a more 
efficient way of exchanging goods and commodity (Davies, 2002). In the beginning, 
the commodity was used as money, as commodities were exchanged to get other 
commodities. Shells and cowries were used before metals were introduced as money 
around 5000 BC. Later, transactions were conducted using money (Toutounchian, 
2009). 
The banking function originated from Babylon, Mesopotamia in the year 3000 BC to 
the year 2000 BC. At that time, palaces and temples provided places for storage of 
valuables (Davies, 2002: 48). By the year 700 BC, Lydians became the first in the 
Western world to make coins. By the year 600 BC, Pythius operated as the merchant 
banker in Asia Minor. But in 550 BC, Lydians produced separate gold and silver 
coins which were the world's foremost bimetallic coinage. In the year 546 BC, the 
Persian used gold coins and silver when they captured Croesus, King of Lydia 
(Davies, 2002: 62-65). From the year 600 to 300 BC, base metal coins were invented 
in China.  
In the meantime, in the year 406-405 BC, Athens issued bronze coins with a silver 
coating because the Athens public were hoarding silver coins. The hoarding caused 
the silver coins to vanish from the currency circulation (Davies, 2002: 77-78). It was 
recorded in the history that among other problems with the metal currency was that it 
was exposed to hoarding and debasement of the content from its value. The shortage 
of copper in China caused the Chinese in the year 806 AD to invent fiat or paper 
money. Subsequently paper money was abandoned in 1455. Instead, paper notes 
appeared for the first time in the middle of the 16
th 
century in Europe and in the 
United States of America on 10 March 1862. 
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Before the implementation of fiat (paper money) monetary system, gold was used as 
the standards for the international monetary system. At that time, the value of coins 
and bank notes of participating nations were specified in terms of quantities of gold 
(Acton, 2001). Under the gold standard, the value of the currencies was fixed as a 
primary reserve asset based on the value of gold. Similarly, the money supply or the 
amount of money issued by the member countries of the gold standard had to be 
directly linked to the value of gold. Some countries were using gold coins as their 
currency. Before 1914, the USA and other countries that were not using gold coins 
were required by law to have a certain percentage of gold to support their currencies 
(Colander, 2008). 
The gold standards had enabled a country to prevent speculation on its currency and 
maintain stability of its exchange rate, as gold was not then a commodity. However, 
the disadvantages were that, when a country was in deficit of the balance of payment, 
it could not offset with expansionary monetary policy because the amount of money 
supplied was tied to the actual reserve of gold. The deficits also often led to recession 
which was among the reasons for abandonment of the gold standards in 1933 
(Colander, 2008:434). 
After the end of the Second World War II, the gold standard collapsed. The failure 
was mainly due to the shortage of money supply which led to deflation. The USA and 
its allies agreed to establish a new International Monetary System known as Bretton 
Wood. Under the new system, fixed exchange rates were maintained and not only 
gold, but the USA currency, namely dollar was convertible to gold. The member 
countries were allowed to request for payment in terms of gold or the US dollars. In 
the case of the USA, they had the distinct privilege of choosing between paying with 
printed US dollars or by using gold from its reserves (Gordon, 1993). 
The principal feature of the Bretton Woods system was that each member country had 
an obligation to maintain the exchange rate of its currency against the US dollars. The 
national authorities were allowed to make small parity adjustments, but large changes 
would require approval from the IMF (Bofinger, 2001) 
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The Bretton Wood system established the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to 
provide short-term loans to member countries and the World Bank was established to 
arrange long-term loans to the developing countries. To ensure that there would be 
enough reserves, the IMF established a stabilization fund that allowed member 
countries to borrow a short-term loan to stabilize their currency. If there was 
disequilibrium in the exchange rates, the member countries must agree to adjust their 
exchange rates up to 10 per cent of one-time adjustment. However, the IMF approval 
was required when the adjustment was greater than one per cent (Colander, 
2008:434). 
The IMF subsequently created a universal money or known as ‘Special Drawing 
Right’ (SDR). However, the effort to establish SDR as an international currency was 
not successful because the US dollars continued to serve as the official reserves for 
individual and member countries. By 1970s, the amount of US Dollars exceeded the 
amount of the USA gold reserves. The member countries that held the US Dollars as 
their reserves started to demand their payment in terms of gold. (Colander, 2008:435). 
Since, the USA was unable to pay in gold as demanded by the other countries, on 15
th
 
of August 1971, the USA unilaterally terminated convertibility of dollars to gold. 
When the US dollars were no longer convertible to the gold, the Bretton Wood 
System collapsed. This created the situation whereby, the USA dollars became the 
sole backing currency and a reserve currency for the IMF member countries. Since 
then, fiat money has become the leading medium of exchange in the IMF until today. 
After the demise of the Gold Standard and Bretton Wood System, fiat money has 
been used as a medium of exchange which is not backed by any asset but by the 
government issuing a currency. The value of the currency in the fiat system is 
determined based through the supply and demand of the currency and exchange rates. 
Table 2.1 shows the summary development the monetary policy since the gold 
standard until the post-Bretton Wood.  
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Table 2.1: Summary Development of the Monetary Policy 
from Gold Standard to Post Bretton Woods 
Period Regime Stability 
Financial Monetary Financial Monetary 
Classical Gold 
Standard 
Liberalized Gold/Credible No Yes 
Intra-war period Liberalized Mixed No Mixed 
Bretton Woods Repressed Increasingly fiat 
non-credible 
over time 
Yes Lost over-
time 
Post-Bretton Woods Liberalized Fiat increasingly 
credible 
No Regained 
over-time 
Source: Borio,2014,p.5. 
According to Issing (2010), the history of monetary policy shows that it money 
evolves from physical entities of scarce goods to either was backed by gold or silver.  
Monetary policy under the gold standard was determined by the evolution of its gold 
reserves and was constrained by the balance of payments. Among other goal of the 
monetary policy conduct at that time was to defend the external value of the currency 
which was based on the gold parity to other currencies. In the 20
th
 century after the 
demise of gold standard and the Bretton wood system, the monetary policy changes 
from gold to paper currency (Issing, 2010). Although the monetary policy instruments 
change over time and period but the ultimate objective to achieve financial and 
monetary stability remain same. 
In sum, the fiat money is accepted as the currency even though it has no intrinsic 
value because it is enforced as the legal tender by the issuing Government. Legal 
tender means the paper money is valid and legal as a means of payment, medium of 
exchange and payment of all public and private debts. In such as system, Central 
Bank remains at the centre of monetary policy using interest rates as the main tool to 
determine monetary outcomes through monetary policy.  
2.3 OBJECTIVES OF THE MONETARY POLICY 
There are two types of policies under the macroeconomic framework, namely fiscal 
and monetary policy. Fiscal policies are related to the government income and 
expenditure while monetary policy is the process by which the government, Central 
Bank, or monetary authority of a country controls the growth and stability of the 
economy. 
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The main objectives of the monetary policy are to control the interest rates, stabilize 
output and inflation. The policy to control the interest rates known is as the interest 
rates targeting policy conducted by increasing or decreasing interest rates. The level 
of the interest rates may influence the cost of financing thus affects the real output 
growth and inflation rate. A set of condition required to effectively using interest rates 
targeting monetary policy. First, the money market has to operate smoothly so that 
changes in the central bank’s short term policy rate can have an effect on the yield 
curve. Second, commercial banks’ funding and liquidity management policies must 
allow a gradual adjustment of lending rates to money market setting. Third, whilst 
allowing the market to develop the risk management instruments that allow more 
active use of an interest rate, the monetary management has to ensure that money 
market conditions is in line with the monetary policy stance (Chailloux,  Durré, Alain, 
and Laurens Bernard J.,2009) 
Another objective of the monetary policy is to control the money supply, which aims 
at stabilizing the value of money known as the monetary targeting strategy. Excessive 
volatility of the exchange rate can disrupt the trade between countries and affect price 
stability, monetary stability and output growth. By controlling the money supply, it 
will also stabilise the exchange rate which is another main objective of the monetary 
policy (Cecchetti, 2000). In addition, a number of studies found that there is a 
relationship between changes of the quantity of money and the price level (see: Lucas, 
1980; Dwyer and Halfer 1988’ Friedman, 1992; Barro, 1993; McCandless and Weber, 
1995; Rolnick and Weber, 1997; Dewald, 1998; Dwyer, 1988; Dwyer and Hafer, 
1999). In a nutshell, the main objectives of the monetary policy can be illustrated as in 
Figure 2.1. 
Figure 2.1: Objectives of the Monetary Policy 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Author’s Illustration 
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The monetary policy is also concern about price stability or known as inflation 
targeting. Price stability is not only to keep the value of money stable but also help in 
reducing inequalities in income and wealth. The monetary policy can influence the 
assets prices and wages by setting the interest rates. Stable prices and steady 
economic growth will make ease for financial planning and an economy with inflation 
will have lower level of output (Cecchetti, 2000).  
 
A line of empirical research focused on the behavior of inflationary expectations and 
employment costs of anti-inflationary policy under an inflation-targeting monetary 
regime. For example, Laubach (1997) examines long-term nominal interest rates and 
finds no evidence that the introduction of inflation targets affects expectations of 
inflation. In most cases inflationary expectations have come down as a result of the 
central bank’s efforts to consistently maintaining low inflation. Mishkin (1999) cited 
the empirical studies by Almeida (1998) and Bernanke et al.(1999) which shows that, 
inflation expectations do not come down immediately after the adoption of an 
inflation-targeting monetary regime. Study by Posen (1995) found little evidence that 
inflation targeting has significantly reduced the employment costs of reducing 
inflation. Similarly study by Debelle (1996) and Blinder (1998) shows that there is 
also no reduction in the output loss associated with anti-inflationary policy targeting 
countries like in Australia, New Zealand and Canada (Epstein,2007).  
 
The liberalization of international financial transactions may cause large amounts of 
capital flow into a country and back out just as quickly, and it would be difficult to 
maintain a stable exchange rate and could jeopardize financial stability. Therefore, the 
monetary policy of exchange rate targeting could influence and minimize currency 
exchange rate risk either through a fixed exchange rate policy or float currency 
regime. Experience shows changing path from a fixed exchange rate policy to a more 
flexible one may cause problems. Study by Eichengreen (1999) found that out of 29 
countries examined, 23 countries abandoned fixed exchange rate regimes in favour of 
more flexible ones, the change was accompanied by a financial crisis 
(Petursson,2000).  
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However, there are advantages and disadvantages of the fixed and float exchange rate 
regime. Among other the advantages are that a fixed exchange rate reduces 
transaction costs and exchange rate uncertainty in international trade, serve as the 
anchor of monetary policy and increase its transparency and an imperfect foreign 
exchange market can cause instability in the economy. The disadvantages of the fixed 
exchange rates are that it deprives the central bank of its ability to use monetary 
policy to respond to domestic eccentric shocks, prone to speculation against their 
currencies and could reduce the flow of information regarding the country’s monetary 
position and the credibility of domestic monetary policy (Petursson,2000).  
In Islam, dealing with interest rates are forbidden and cannot be used as an instrument 
to stabilize the inflation and output growth, as in Islam, interest rates are considered as 
the main culprits in destabilizing output and creating inflation. It is generally known 
that when interest rate is high, the cost of financing also increases. However, most of 
the Islamic scholar agrees with the price stability, exchange rate stability and inflation 
rate targeting as one of the objectives of monetary policy in Islamic economics.  
2.4 THEORY OF THE INTEREST RATE 
Interest rates play a vital role in the implementation of monetary policy. According to 
Fischer (1974), interest is not identical with rates of interest. Interest rate is calculated 
by multiplying its capital value. The rate of interest is defined as the percentage or 
premium paid on money known as the price of money (Fischer, 1974). The original 
Fisher’s model of interest rates theory relates to the nominal interest rate, while the 
real interest rate is the interest rate after the adjustment of inflation. The Fisher theory 
of interest rates is described as below: 
                                       (2.1) 
The above equation can be re-written as follows:  
                               (2.2) 
Based on the equation above, if π increases by 1 per cent, the nominal interest rate 
increases by more than 1 per cent. If the value of r and π are known then the value of i 
can be determined. On the other hand, if the value of i and π are known then the value 
of r can be determined. This can be further explained as below:  
25 
 
                                                  (2.3)   
When the value of π is small, then the value of r is approximately equal to i-π. In the 
event of high rate of inflation, then more accurate relationship must be taken into 
account (Watkins, 2013) 
With regards to the monetary policy, the basic model of interest rate targeting is based 
on the Fischer Model, where It is the nominal interest rates, rt is the real interest rates 
and πt is the inflation rate. 
                           (2.4) 
If the real interest rate is the target, then rt is the real interest rates, πt is the inflation 
rate and πt* is the targeted inflation rate: 
          *                  (2.5) 
Since the real interest rates is nominal interest rate minus inflation, Taylor (1993) 
came out with the principle known as ‘Taylor Rule’ where if the inflation increased 
by 1 per cent, the Central Bank should increase the nominal interest rates by more 
than 1 per cent to stabilize the output (Asso et al., 2010). This means that nominal 
interest rates must respond to the movement of inflation rates from targeted interest 
rates and of actual and targeted output. The equation can be written as follows: 
                                              (2.6) 
The above equation is known as interest rates rules or often referred to as the ‘Taylor 
Rule’, which has become the main feature of macroeconomic models. (Sims, 2013).  
2.5 FUNCTIONS OF THE CENTRAL BANK 
The Central Bank is the monetary authority that provides loans to the government, 
other financial institutions and manages the money supply in a country. It is also 
known as the Banker’s Bank because it governs and supervises operations of the 
Commercial Banks, Merchant Banks, Investment Banks and other private savings and 
financial institutions. It should be noted that the Bank of England which was 
established in the year 1694 is the first Central Bank in the world. 
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The objectives of the Central Bank are to assure financial stability, implementation of 
prudential policy of liquidity, smooth functioning of payment and settlement systems 
and as a lender of last resort (Mersch, 2009). The Central Bank also sets the interest 
rate level that enables banks to limit their debt position in the interbank money 
market. This practice is to avoid insolvency crisis and to ensure the smooth 
functioning of the payment system (Rochon and Rossi, 2007). 
The Central Bank functioning as the lender of last resort refers to emergency 
circumstances, in which the Central Bank will lend out as much as needed to 
guarantee the banks to meet their cash obligations to their depositors. The monetary 
policy implementation process to achieve the targeted goals illustrated in Figure 2.2. 
 
Figure 2.2: Process of the Monetary Policy 
 
Tools   Operating  Intermediate      Goals 
   Target   Target 
Source: Bofinger (2001:125) 
Among other main instruments of monetary policy utilized by the Central Bank are 
the interest rates, open market operations, reserve requirement, discount window 
lending, and currency board. The monetary authority may be able to stabilize price by 
determining interest rates on loans, and savings accounts or other financial assets. The 
types of interest rates used for transmission of monetary policy in the conventional 
economy are described in Figure 2.3. 
 
Figure 2.3: Types of Interest Rate Use as Instrument of Monetary Policy 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Author’s Illustrations 
Types of Interest 
Rates as Instrument 
of the Monetary 
Policy 
Discount Rates 
Saving Deposit 
Rates 
Treasury bill 
Rates 
Fixed 
Deposit 
Rates 
Basic 
Lending 
Rates (BLR) 
27 
 
By increasing or decreasing the interest rate(s), a monetary authority can contract or 
expand the money supply. On the one hand, if the interest rates are higher it will 
encourage savings and discourage borrowing; and on the other hand, if the interest 
rates are lower, it will attract investment borrowing. Both of these effects can either 
reduce or expand the growth of the money supply. 
2.5.1 Open Market Operation 
Open market operation (OMO) is one of the main monetary policy instruments used 
by most Central Banks because it has minimal effects on the interest rates (El-Gamal, 
1999), which consists of buying and selling of government bonds to the commercial 
banks or the general public. When the Central Bank buys government bond from the 
commercial bank, the latter gives up part of the Government Securities that they are 
holding to the Central Bank. The Central Bank will be paying the commercial banks 
and create new reserves in the accounts of the commercial banks with the Central 
Bank, which is depicted in Table 2.2. 
 
Table 2.2: Balance Sheet of Central Banks and Commercial Bank 
after the Open Market Operations 
 
Central Bank 
Assets Liabilities 
+ Securities  + Reserves of Commercial Banks 
(a) (+) Securities (b) (-) Reserves 
Commercial Banks 
Asset Liabilities 
- Securities (a)  
+ Reserves  (b)  
Source: McConnel et al. (2009) 
The effects on the commercial banks’ reserve are similar to when the Central Bank 
purchases securities from the general public. For example, when a Central Bank buys 
£1,000 bonds (security) from the commercial bank, the commercial bank reserves will 
go up to £1,000 (the value sold to the Central Bank). More excess reserves increase 
bank lending ability which increases the total supply of money. The example of a 
balance sheet of the Central Bank and commercial bank is in Table 2.1. The main 
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difference of the Central Bank and Commercial Bank balance sheet as shown in Table 
2.1 is that the reserves considered liabilities for the Central bank while it is considered 
as an asset for the commercial bank. 
The Central Bank as the bankers’ bank can determine the proportion of total assets 
that must be held by the banks in reserve with the Central Bank. This is knownes as 
the reserve requirement ratio. The reserve requirement in the USA was established in 
the year 1863, with the passage of the National Bank Act.  Banks were required by the 
National Charter to keep a minimum of 25 per cent against the note and deposit 
liabilities. However, the amount was reduced successively to as low as zero per cent, 
and it varies from one country to another. It should be mention that the reserve 
requirement ratio affects the total supply of money in the market (GoodFriend and 
Hargraves, 1983). 
By changing the proportion of the total assets to be held as liquid cash, the Central 
bank changes the availability of funds for loans. By increasing the monetary base, the 
commercial banks’ reserves increase and thus enable commercial banks to increase 
their loans and money supply. By decreasing the monetary base, the Central Bank can 
indirectly influence the loans disbursed by the commercial banks (Kennedy, 2001). 
Typically the Central Banks do not change the reserve requirements frequently 
because often changes will affect the volatility of the money supply due to the lending 
multiplier effect. 
2.5.2 The Reserve Requirement 
The reserve requirement ratio or also known as the fractional reserve requirement 
ratio is one of the powerful monetary control tools, of which calculation is based on 
the money multiplier. The money multiplier is essentially a relationship between 
deposits and reserves, which is depicted as follows: 
Money multiplier = D = m (R) 
where: 
D: Deposit 
R: Reserves 
m: Money multiplier 
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There are three main reasons for the imposition of reserve requirement (RR): 
prudential measures, monetary control and liquidity management. Holding of RR 
provides some measures against the risk of insolvency, to control monetary growth 
and as a short-term liquidity management (Gray, 2011).  
Traditionally, RR is viewed as an integral part of the monetary control process by 
setting the upper limit on deposit creation and facilitating and controlling the growth 
of money and credit. However, in many countries, RR is no longer used to control the 
money stock but to facilitate control of short term interest rates (Weiner, 1992). 
Some scholars propose the abolishment of the RR as it is not utilized to regulate the 
monetary stock anymore. In fact, some countries like Switzerland, New Zealand, 
Australia and Canada have already implemented zero reserve requirements. In 
addition, the Federal Reserve of the USA has eliminated reserve requirement on time 
deposit and lowered transaction deposit (Weiner, 1992).   
The proponents of the fractional reserve requirement argue that the rationales for 
implementing fractional reserve system are for liquidity provision, credit policy and 
monetary control. As one of the proponents of 100 per cent reserve requirement, 
Friedman (1948) suggested that private creation money and discretionary control of 
the quantity of money by the Central Bank could be eliminated by separating 
depository and lending functions of the banking system. 
Those who prefer fractional reserve system argue that traditional thinking about bank 
operations based on currency withdrawal is no longer the case. In the modern banking 
system, larger withdrawals are typically in the form of electronic payments of inside 
money which will not deplete reserves from the banking system (Skeie, 2008). 
Palley (2004) who proposes for the development of a new financial system regulation 
based on Asset-Based Reserve Requirement (ABRR) highlights that the regulation of 
ABRR should be applied to all financial intermediaries. The advantages of ABRR are 
to provide policy makers with additional policy instruments and to discourage 
excessive risk taking by the financial intermediaries (Palley, 2004). The view is in 
line with the essence of Islamic finance where all transactions must be based on 
underlying assets: asset based or asset backed. 
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In short, there is an inconclusive debate on a fractional reserve system. While some 
scholars propose 100 per cent reserve requirements where banks are required by law 
to hold 100 per cent of depositors’ money in the vault, others prefer the fractional 
reserve requirement system. 
2.5.3 Discount Window Lending 
Discount window lending refers to a situation in which any central banks or a 
financial institution has the authority to lend funds to financial bodies within their 
country. By calling in existing loans or extending new loans, the monetary authority 
can directly change the size of the money supply. 
2.5.4 Currency Board 
A currency board is a monetary arrangement that pegs the monetary base of one 
country to that of another. The currency board operates as a rigid fixed exchange rate 
in which the local currency in circulation is backed against the foreign anchor 
currency at a fixed rate. To grow the local monetary base, an equivalent amount of 
foreign currency must be held in reserves with the currency board. This limits the 
possibility of the local monetary authority to inflate or pursue other objectives. 
2.6 TRANSMISSION OF THE MONETARY POLICY 
There are four main monetary transmission channels. The first channel of the 
monetary policy is the interest rate channel. It can be use for expansionary as well as 
contractionary policy. The expansionary policy leads to reduction the real interest rate 
in the long-term. It can influence investment, property price and consumer 
expenditures. This can also affects the aggregate demand and will be reflected in the 
output and prices.  
The second monetary policy transmissions channel is the asset price channel. The 
asset price channel is also explain by Tobin’s (1969) q theory of investment and Ando 
and Modiagliani (1963), life theory of consumption whereby in an expansion 
monetary policy, it will entails to higher equity prices which may cause investment 
more attractive. Higher equity prices will also lead to increase wealth raises spending 
and raises aggregate demand. Hence, during the contraction of the monetary policy, 
need to re-establish equilibrium to avoid fall in the equity prices (Ireland, 2005).   
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The third channel is the exchange rate channel which may influence both namely 
supply and demand aggregate. In an expansionary monetary policy when the domestic 
real interest rates is lower,  through interest parity condition may cause real 
depreciation of the local currency which will result in increase of net exports and 
stronger aggregate demand. The depreriation of the local currency also may result in 
increase of the import goods. High price of imported goods may cotrract aggergate 
supply, reduce output and increase inflation.   
The fourth channel of monetary policy transmission known as monetary and credit 
channel. The classial monetarist view is that money either narrow money or broad 
money aggeregates play an important role in determining the price of assets, goods 
and its relation with long run inflation. While Bernanker and Getler (1995) believes 
that credit channel could effect on price and ouput level (Loayza and Hebbel,2002).   
The monetary channel is related to the role of the Central Bank in the monetary 
transmission process. Studies by Meltzer (1969, 1970, 2001), Brunner and Meltzer 
(1972, 1988, 1990), Dotsey and Otrok (1994), McCallum (1990, 1999, 2001, 2004), 
Christiano and Rostagno (2001) Nelson (2003a, 2003b) and McCallum and Nelson 
(2004) show that money channel secures a significant role in the monetary policy 
transmission (Kassim and Shabri, 2009:38). 
Credit channel is related to the bank balance sheet and supply of loan by the 
intermediaries like commercial banks, merchant banks, finance companies and other 
private institutions that provide credits. Empirical studies by Friedman (1984), 
Bernanke and Blinder (1988, 1992), Gertler and Gilchrist (1993), Hubbard (1994), 
Kasyap and Stein (1994, 1995, 1997a, 1997b), Bernanke and Gertler (1995), Walsh 
and Wilcox (1995), Garretsen and Swank (1997), Kakes (1998), Bernanke and Mihov 
(1998), Guender (1998), Hallsten (1999), Suzuki (2001), Ehrman (2001), Kuppers 
(2002), Mateut et al., (2003), Driscoll (2004), Jansen and Chan (2005), highlight the 
importance of the banking sector channel in monetary policy transmission process 
(Kassim, 2006: 2). A similar study features the impact of disturbances in the banking 
sector on the macroeconomic variables such as interest rate, inflation, unemployment, 
and output (Kassim and Shabri, 2009:39). 
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The monetarists postulate that money channel is more influential than credit channel 
in the transmission of monetary policy. Studies conducted by Haug and Dewald 
(2004), on major industrial countries from 1880 to 2001 found that in the long run, 
there was a correlation between money growth and real output growth. 
Kormendi and Meguire (1985) by using data from 1950 to 1977 for 47 countries and 
found that there was a negative relationship between M1 and real GDP growth. In 
addition, Geweke (1986) claimed that money was superneutral, and there was no 
relationship between M1, M2 with GNP and the Industrial Production Index for the 
period of 1870 to 1978. Furthermore, Dwyer and Hafer (1988) supported the 
argument that there was a negative correlation between money supply (M1) with the 
real GDP Money supply. Poirer (1991) found that money is neutral in some countries 
and not in other countries (McCandless (Jr) and Weber, 1995). According to Tobin 
(1965), money was not superneutral
5
 because an increase in the expected growth of 
the actual money supply reduces the real interest rate and increases the long-run 
capital-output ratio (Ploeg and Alogoskoufis, (1994). 
A number of studies have been conducted to identify the relationship between money 
supply and output, interest rates and prices/inflation. However, the discussion is still 
inconclusive whereby some researchers like Sims (1970, 1980a), Thornton and Batten 
(1985) King (1986), Stock and Watson (1989), Romer and Romer (1990) claimed that 
there was an impact of the money supply on output, interest rate and prices. 
Meanwhile others like Fiege and Pearce (1979), Sims (1980b) Litterman and Weiss 
(1985), Geweke (1986), Friedman and Kuttner (1993), Cochrane (1994) proposed that 
money was neutral (Tan and Baharumshah, 1999). In a nutshell, the monetary policy 
can be transmitted to various channels and it is also exposed to many challenges 
including external challenges such as changes in the global economy, environment, 
exchange rate depreciation, drop of the commodities prices, changes in the capital and 
shock beyond control of the Central bank as illustrated in figure 2.4 below.  
 
 
 
                                                 
5
 There are also many other studies found that money is non-neutral. For further reading 
please refer to articles by Fischer (1979), Minsky (1992/93), Fontana (2000) and William 
(2005).  
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Figure 2.4 Flow of the Monetary Policy Transmission and Its channels 
 
Source: European Central Bank (www.ecb.europa.eu) 
 
2.7 MONETARY SYSTEMS IN THE EARLY ISLAMIC PERIOD 
The monetary system in the early Islamic period is discussed in this section to identify 
the nature of monetary paradigm produced within Islamic history within the 
framework, norms and principles provided by Islam. 
2.7.1 History of the Islamic Coinage 
The Arabs did not have coinage of their own before the Islam. They used the existing 
monetary systems of the Sassanid (Persian Empire) and the Byzantine (Roman 
Empire) predecessors and maintained these parallel systems for over 50 years until the 
first Islamic coinage was minted by the ‘Abd al-Maliki bin Marwan, Caliphate of 
Umayyah in 77-79 AH (696-698 AD). The principal coinage of Sassanid was a silver 
drachm (later known as Dirham) depicting the Emperor Khusraw II on the front of the 
coin with the inscription “May his splendour increase” in Persian and on the reverse 
showed a Zoroastrian fire altar with two attendants. The first Islamic coins, on the 
other hand, were made of gold known as dinar dated to 77H/696 CE and minted under 
‘Abdul Al Maliki bin Marwan in the Umayyah dynasty with an Arabic “There is no 
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God except Allah, He has no association” inscription on the front of the coin (Middle 
East Resources, 1999). On the reverse of the coin it read: “God is one, God is Eternal, 
He does not beget nor is He begotten, and none is like unto Him”. 
This inscription was retained until the end of the Caliphate of the Umayyah in 
132H/750 CE. The Silver Drachm (Dirham) was introduced two years later 
(79H/701CE), and it also did not bear the image and the name of the ruler compared 
to the earlier Drachm of the Sassanid Empire (Middle East Resources, 1999). When 
the Islamic coins were introduced, the image of the ruler or idol was removed and 
replaced with the Quranic inscriptions. This indicates that there was a link between 
tawheed and muamalat. The society at that time expressed their belief to Allah and 
not to the ruler or idol.  
In 750 CE, the Abbasid Caliphate made one initial change in the coinage by adding 
the words “Muhammad is the Messenger of Allah” at the reverse side of Dinars and 
Dirhams of the Umayyad. In 762 CE, the tradition was broken by adding the name of 
the ruler of Abbasid. It appeared on the coins of Al Mahdi (775-785 CE) and 
thereafter became the standards of all coins until the 12
th
century (Middle East 
Resources, 1999) 
2.7.2 Supply and Demand of Money 
In the early days of Islam, gold and silver performed all the functions of money. 
Currencies were made of gold and silver with a known intrinsic value (the amount of 
gold or silver contained in it). Such currencies were universally acceptable as a means 
of exchange, accounting for a large chunk of transactions (Obaidullah, 1999). 
In Medina, during the time of Prophet Muhammad (pbuh) money was not supplied by 
the Muslim Treasury. The gold dinar was imported from Rome and the silver coins 
from Persia. There were no restrictions or impositions of any tariffs and customs duty 
for importing currencies. In that period, there was no shortage of money supply. 
When the demand for money increased, money in the form of gold dinar and silver 
coins were imported; in the case of decreased demand, commodities (gold and silver) 
were imported to make jewellery and ornaments. This indicates that the money supply 
was elastic, and there was no excess of supply or demand of gold and silver coins and 
the market remained in equilibrium (As Sadr, 2000). In fact, there was no money 
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creation in the system as the volume of the money supply was equal to the value of 
goods produced. 
2.7.3 Exchange Rates 
The exchange rate was relatively stable during the early Islamic period in Medina 
because the value of gold Dinar and silver Dirham was equal to the face value of the 
currency. The exchange rate ratio of the gold Dinar against the silver Dirham is 
shown in Table 2.3. 
 
Table 2.3: Ratio of Gold against Silver Dirham in the Early Islamic Period 
 
Period Ratio of Gold Dinar Against 
Silver Dirham 
The time of Prophet (S.A.W) until the first 
four Caliphs (1
st
Hijri – year of 40 Hijri) 
 
1:10 
The Umayyad Period (41 Hijri to 131Hijri) 1:12 
 
The Abbasid Period (132 Hijri to 656 Hijri) 1:15 
 
After 656 Hijri Fluctuated up to1:35 
Source: Chapra (1996) 
The Muslim Treasury was in-charge to ensure the quality of imported coins and 
supervised the money supply that was minted (As Sadr, 2000: 204). The exchange 
rate was determined based on hadith
6
 as narrated by Ahmad and Al-Bukhary that the 
Prophet (pbuh) said:  
Gold for gold, silver for silver, wheat for wheat, barley for barley and salt for 
salt, in equal weight and hand to hand, whoever increases or asks for an 
increase falls in riba; the taker and the giver alike. (Saadalla, 1994) 
 
The hadith asserts that when the commodity money is exchanged, it shall be of equal 
amount and the transaction shall be completed on the spot. Transaction of future, 
                                                 
6
 Hadith is referring to the tradition or collection of traditions attributed to the Prophet 
Muhammad (PBUH) that includes his saying, acts, and approval or disapproval of things. 
Hadith is valued by Muslims as a major source of religious law and moral guidance. The 
phycisal appearance of the prophet is not inluded in the definition (Phillips,2007).  Hadith is 
valued by Muslims as a second  source of religious law and moral guidance after Al-Quran.   
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forward and swaps of the currency market are forbidden due to the elements of 
speculation and gambling which is permitted in the conventional transactions (see: 
Table 2.4) (Ahmed, 2001). 
 
Table 2.4: Agents and Transaction of Currency Market 
 
Agents Spot Forward Future Swaps 
Traders   X       
Investors   X       
Speculators          
Notes: () Transaction in conventional economies;  
(X) Transactions accepted by Shari’ah,   
Source: (Ahmed, 2001:28) 
 
2.7.4 Stability of the Value of Money 
The stability of the value of money is particularly crucial in any economies. It is an 
indispensable goal in Islamic economics as the principle of honesty and fairness in 
measuring the value as stated in the Qur’an (7:85, 11:84-85; 17:35 and 26; 181) to be 
upheld. The verses highlight the importance to give full measure and weight with 
justice. Most scholars agree that this also applies to money, as one of the functions is 
to measure value (Chapra, 1985). 
It should be noted that the value of the Dinar and Dirham was determined by their 
weight and fineness. The standard weight for dinar was 4.25grams, and fineness was 
fixed at 96 per cent of pure gold alloy. With regards to Dirham, it was fixed at 2.97 
grams and fineness at 99 per cent of silver content. To ensure the stability of the 
value, during the Umayyah period, a few initiatives was taken including (Brill, 1977). 
 
(i) production of gold coinage in the Muslim Empire;  
(ii) reforming of the silver coinage to ensure standards of weight; and 
(iii) circulation of fineness and uniformity of the coinage in the market  
According to the numismatic evidence, the standard of fineness of the dinar during the 
Umayyah period was maintained at 96 to 98 per cent and the standard of Abbasid 
dinars did not differ from the standard of Umayyah dinars. However, in the final 
decades of the Abbasid period, the standard of fineness fluctuated between 91 to 94 
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per cent. During the first half of the 10
th 
century, the dinar in Palestine was set at 93  
per cent of fineness (Brill, 1959). 
2.7.5 Facilitating the Velocity of Money 
The policies and measures adopted during the early Islamic era had a significant 
impact on the velocity of money. These include the prohibition of hoarding of coins 
(Kant) and swapping one debt with another (Kali-bi-Kali), uncertainty (gharar) and 
gambling (maisir) (As Sadr; 2000). Velocity of money is also known as velocity of 
circulation of money. It is defined as ratio of the nominal Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP) over broad money either including or excluding foreign currency deposits 
(Broeck, Krajnyak and Lorie, 1997:6) 
2.7.5.1 Prohibition of Hoarding of Coins (Kant) 
Hoarding is forbidden in Islam as it is clearly stated in the Holy Quran (Qur’an, 9: 
35). The rationale for this is that hoarding is considered reducing the circulation of 
money in the market and creating artificial demand for it. The prohibition of hoarding 
affects the velocity and stabilizes the value of money (As Sadr; 2000: 212). Zakah on 
gold, silver and saving was levied to prevent hoarding of wealth and to motivate 
owners in investing and circulating their wealth. 
2.7.5.2 Elimination of Riba 
Interest rate is the main mechanism in the conventional monetary policy, but in the 
Islamic monetary policy riba or interest rate is the main source of injustice. Before 
Islam, most customary use of saving was for earnings riba, or usury loan either for 
trading or consumption. The moneylender would demand loan to be repaid with an 
extra amount. Another type of usury was transaction usury, where an exchange of 
goods or commodity was done for more than its original amount (As Sadr, 2000: 
212).  
This practice was eliminated gradually through the revelation of the four verses in the 
Qur’an. The first verse in (Qur’an, 30: 39) emphasizes that contributing to charity is 
better than practicing riba. This indicates the objective of providing loans in Islam is 
not to gain profit although it is allowed and legitimate. The emphasis is to do charity 
which will not only help the poor and needy but the reward of good deeds as an 
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investment for life in the hereafter (akhirah). In the subsequent verse in the Qur’an (4: 
161), it is mentioned that those taking usury will receive severe punishment. 
The types of punishments for practicing riba are also mentioned in various hadith 
mainly in the Shahih Bukhari and Shahih Muslim. The third revelation in (Qur’an, 3: 
132) commands the prohibition of practicing riba al-fadhl (doubling and multiplying). 
The fourth and final revelation states (Qur’an, 3: 275-280) that riba is forbidden, trade 
is permissible, and those still practicing riba will be deprived of the blessing and 
rewards that otherwise given for charity activities. The practitioners of riba are 
considered as declaring war against Allah unless they repent. The final revelation on 
riba also visualizes the punishment for the person practicing riba in the hereafter, 
permissibility of trading and the importance of doing charity.  The essence of the 
prohibition of riba is to avoid oppression (zulm) and to ensure justice in the society. 
2.7.5.3 Prohibition of Swapping Debt with another Debt (Kali-bi-Kali), Uncertainty 
(Gharar) and Gambling (Maisir) 
Kali-bi-Kali is neither money nor commodity delivered at the time of contract. This 
practice is prohibited because a portion of the savings can be used for speculation in 
the markets. By preventing it, savings can be diverted to production of tangible 
commodities and services and reduce speculation for gold, silver and other valuable 
assets (As Sadr, 2000: 214). The prohibition of Gharar is stated in the Al-Quran as: 
O you who believe! Eat not up your property among yourselves unjustly except it be a 
trade amongst you, by mutual consent. And do not kill yourselves (nor kill one 
another). Surely, Allah is Most Merciful to you (Qur’an, 4: 29)  
It is also mentioned in a number of hadiths narrated by Muslim, Ahmad, Abu Dawud, 
Al-Tirmidhı, Al-Nasa’i, Al-Darami and ’Ibn Majah. The hadith particularly narrated 
by Abu Hurayra highlights that the Prophet (pbuh) prohibits the “pebble sale and the 
gharar sale”(El Gamal, 2001: 2). 
There are a number of other hadith that forbid gharar either by name, or by 
specifying one or more of its instances for example, selling ‘the birds in the sky or 
fish in the water’, ‘the catch of the diver’, ‘unborn calf in its mother’s womb’, ‘the 
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sperm and/or unfertilized eggs of camels’, etc. Gharar is a sophisticated concept that 
covers certain types of  non-permissible uncertainty in a contract. It is an exchange in 
which one or more parties stand to be deceived through ignorance of an essential 
element of the exchange. The concept of gharar in the modern economy can also be 
interpreted as zero sum game (El-Gamal, 2001:2). Gharar is divided into three types, 
namely excessive (gharar al-kathir) which vitiates the transaction, minor (gharar  
yasir) which is tolerated and (moderate), gharar mutawassit) which falls between the 
other two categories. Any transaction of excessive risk, can be classified as forbidden 
gharar (Razali,2012).  
Besides gharar, the prohibition of gambling is also mentioned in the Qur’an (2: 219; 
5: 91). Gambling is prohibited because it is based on luck, and it creates a win-lose 
situation, which also involves uncertainty and high risk. Although in capitalism, high 
risk gives a high return, it may not necessarily be true. Even banks are also not willing 
to lend money for any extraordinary risky projects despite that in theory high risk is 
associated with high return. 
2.8 END OF THE BIMETALLISM COINAGE SYSTEM 
Since the early period of the Islamic history, the Islamic coinage had been widely 
used as a medium of exchange and to finance the international trade. However, 
between the 17
th
and 18
th 
Century, the monetary system became unstable, which led to 
the end of bi-metalism coinage system during the Ottoman Empire.  
Among other factors that contribute to the failure of coinage monetary system 
includes demonetization of the kurush coin silver content. For example, in 1700 CE, 
the silver content was 79 per cent, while in 1850 CE, it was only 5 per cent silver 
content of the kurush coin (Pamuk, 2002). 
During the Ottoman Empire, there was a dual monetary system which used foreign 
and domestic currencies, and the regulation of exchange rates was dominated by the 
European currencies. This led to the acceptance of foreign currencies compared to the 
local currencies.  
The Ottoman Empire faced a deficit on the balance of trade. There was a sizable 
monetary inflow of silver from the Ottoman Empire to Egypt but a scarcity of mint 
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and supply of precious metals to finance the international trade. The scarcity resulted 
from the lack of metal coinage in the currency circulation and in turn, the high price 
of gold and silver had led to higher cost of minting the gold and silver coins. 
The bad quality of coinage had made it uncompetitive compared to the European 
mints and incurred extra costs to the government. Three factors were believed to 
dissociate the values of the coins namely the intrinsic value of the coins, legal value 
set by the state and market value based on the exchange rate. The gap between legal 
and market value was between 10 to 15 per cent on average. It was about 100 per cent 
when there was a speculation. This made the monetary system unstable. 
The lack of smaller coins also affected business transactions. Coins were based on 
weight, and they did not come in small sizes.  Gold and silver were exceedingly heavy 
and it was difficult to transport, carry and store. The proportional increase in the costs 
of production and rise of foreign currency rates resulted from the lack of stable 
monetary standard. Hoarding of gold and silver coins was the consequence of the lack 
of coin supply to finance the growing international trade. In 1860, among the 
European countries, Britain was the first to abandon the bimetallism system. As an 
alternative to the gold and silver money, paper money was proposed as a medium of 
exchange (Alleaume, 2002) 
Several measures were taken to restore confidence in the market during the end of the 
Ottoman Empire. This was to ensure the costs and improve the production of gold and 
silver coins. The measures taken were (Alleaume, 2002:213): 
 
(i) setting the tariff calculated on internal costs of coinage;  
(ii) choosing most of the economical method separating gold from silver coin; 
(iii) using most accurate process in testing materials; 
(iv) improving weight and weighing equipment or methods; 
(v) making alloys at the required value without silver being put in gold coin and 
gold being put in silver coin; 
(vi) coining economically and accurately; 
(vii) retaining control over issuing; and  
(viii) re-melting to get rid of the substandard coins from the market. 
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Despite taking several measures, the system failed to sustain, and the Islamic dinar 
was driven out from the circulation and as the international currency at that time.  
2.9 DELIBERATIONS ON ISLAMIC MONETARY POLICY 
The modern Muslim scholars who contributed to the discussion on monetary policy in 
Islam include Siddiqi (1981), Ariff (1981), Khaf (1981), Chapra (1981, 1985, 1996), 
Uzair (1981) and Ahmad (1981), Al Jarhi (1981), Ahmad (1983), Khan and Mirakhor 
(1987, 1994), Choudry (1997), Choudry and Mirakhor (1997), Anjum (2007), 
Toutounchian (2009) and Sari and Mirakhor (2012). 
Ahmed (2008) outlined the functions of the Central Banks in Islamic economics 
which remained the same as in the modern economy and supported the role of 
fractional reserve system as well as credit creation under the Islamic economics. 
Among other conventional instruments suitable for Islamic economy are outlined in 
Table 2.4. 
While Chapra (1985) agreed that the functions of the Central Bank remained the same 
as in the conventional system, he added another function of the bank in Islamic 
economics. It was the need to ensure socioeconomic justice and equitable distribution 
of income and wealth (Chapra, 1985:34). Chapra adopted the existing quantitative 
instrument such as statutory reserve requirement, credit ceilings, moral suasion, but 
proposed equity based instruments for open market operations and profit and loss 
sharing ratio to replace the bank rate policy (Chapra: 1996:23). 
 
Table 2.5: Suitability of Conventional Instruments to the Islamic Economics 
 
 Method of Credit Control Suitability to Islamic Economics  
Legal Reserve Ratio Suitable 
Bank Rate Policy Unsuitable 
Open Market Operations Modification Necessary 
Credit Ceilings Suitable
 
Selective Credit Control Suitable 
Lender of Last Resort Modification Necessary 
Issue of Directives Suitable 
Moral Suasion Suitable 
Source: Ahmed (2008) 
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Choudhry and Mirakhor (1997) proposed using the equity-based government 
securities as the indirect instruments of monetary control with imposition of the bank 
credit ceiling, and statutory liquidity ratios. In addition, Toutounchian (2009) 
suggested the integration of money and banking based on Islamic principles into the 
capitalism system.  
Sari and Mirakhor (2012) postulated using risk sharing instruments
7
 namely the 
equity instruments  as a substitute of monetary policy in Malaysia such as equity 
papers to add to household deposit, government issuing equity papers to raise 
financing and the Central Bank to issuing equity papers to conduct open market 
operations. The suggestion was not to make major structural changes or infrastructural 
changes or to reform the conventional system but to provide an alternative of Shari’ah 
compliance monetary policy framework for Malaysia (Sari and Mirakhor, 2012). 
However, it may be workable in the banking system but may not be suitable for non-
bank financial institutions. In a nutshell, the debate is still on-going in this field and 
no exact model has been followed. The issue of credit creation and fractional reserve 
has remained as it is even after the Islamization of the financial system. 
Most contemporary scholars deliberated about the alternative interest free banking 
system including the functions of the Central Banks in the Islamic economics. 
However, the suggestions were within the existing framework of the commercial 
banks and the Central Bank in the capitalist system. One approach was the 
Islamization of the banking and financial system through utilizing the existing 
instruments of the conventional system monetary policy.  
The thinking and model proposed were still within the framework of the banking 
system. Most of the contemporary Islamic scholars recommended some modifications 
to the existing structure because their understanding on the definition and concept of 
the monetary policy covered the roles, functions, tools and instruments of the Central 
Banks. On the other hand, the Islamic monetary policy shall not be limited to the 
function of the central banks and its definition, concept, and meaning in broader 
context including the financial and non-bank financial institutions.  
                                                 
7
 Equity based instruments is to promote for Islamic finance product to be priced 
independently from conventional system.  While Equity Papers is to complement households 
deposit. The Central Bank could issue Equity Papers to conduct open market operations 
(OMO) or Government to issuing Equity Papers to raise financing (Sari and Mirakhor, 2013). 
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Most literature on Islamic finance and banking is mainly on Shari’ah compliant 
products and the development of new products according to the Shari’ah principle. 
There is still lack of research interest in the field of Islamic monetary policy from the 
Islamic point of view, mainly in the monetary transmission mechanism (Al-Wosabi 
and Abdul Majid, 2009) 
Currently, none of the modern scholars deliberate on the guiding principles of 
monetary policy in Islam and how the monetary policy was implemented during the 
time of Prophet Muhammad (pbuh) during whose time the Central Bank and 
commercial bank did not exist. The only monetary institution at the time of the 
Prophet was the Treasury (baitul mal) which executed three main functions. The 
functions were to collect taxes such as jizya for the government expenditures, to 
distribute zakah money as payment to people under the poverty line and to build 
infrastructure using waqf property. Regardless of the fact that the system was not 
complicated as the modern economy, it worked during that time. There was no issue 
of credit creation and the fractional reserve ratio because money itself was the 
commodity money, i.e. gold where the value of the money was based on weight and 
content of the gold rather than its face value. 
2.10 CONCLUSION 
There are differences between the conventional monetary policy and Islamic 
monetary policy. While the former is based on the capitalist ideology to maximize the 
wealth of shareholders and relate to functions of the central bank, the latter is based 
on revealed knowledge of Islam. The Islamic monetary policy, hence, is divided into 
two sectors: namely the commercial and social sectors. The conventional monetary 
policy is silent about its function on the social sector. However, it is explicitly 
mentioned under the principles of the Islamic monetary policy, as Islamic monetary 
policy cannot be implemented in isolation, and is tremendously linked and related to 
other principles of Shari’ah. We will achieve the objective of al-maqasid al-shari’ah 
if both the commercial and social sectors are implemented hand in hand. Table 2.5 
shows the summary of the differences between the conventional and Islamic monetary 
policy. 
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Table 2.6: Summary of the Differences between Monetary 
and Islamic Monetary Policy 
 
Item Monetary  Policy Islamic Monetary Policy 
 
Definition The activities of the Central Bank 
in monitoring money supply and 
inflation through adjusting the 
interest rates 
 
The guiding principles for economic 
and business activities (muamalah) 
plus the activities of the Islamic 
banks 
Origin Capitalism Al-Quran and Al-Hadith 
 
Philosophy 
 
To maximize wealth of the 
shareholders 
Wealth belongs to God, and human 
beings are vicegerent of God to 
manage wealth 
 
 
Objectives 
 
Price stability, monetary stability, 
full employment and optimum 
rate of economic growth. 
Price stability, monetary stability, 
full employment and optimum rate of 
economic growth plus elimination of 
riba (interest), gharar (doubt) and 
maisir (gambling and speculation); 
Socioeconomic justice and equitable 
distribution of income. 
 
Instruments Open Market Operation 
Reserve Requirement 
Credit Ceilings 
Selective Credit Control 
Currency Board 
Moral Suasion 
 
Modified Open Market Operation  
Reserve Requirement 
Credit Ceilings 
Selective Credit Control 
Currency Board 
Moral Suasion 
Shari’ah Compliant Not required Required 
 
Source: Author’s own. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
MALAYSIAN MONETARY POLICY AND ISLAMIC FINANCIAL 
INSTRUMENTS AND OPERATIONS: AN INTRODUCTION 
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
Malaysia is relatively a small open economy. In the early 1970s, the government 
implemented the New Economic Policy (NEP) to distribute income and wealth among 
the major races in Malaysia, namely the Malay, Chinese and Indian. The policy was 
implemented from 1971 to 1990. The main objectives of the NEP were to eradicate 
poverty and ensure equal distribution of wealth and income among the societies, 
within which 30 per cent of the equity was targeted for Bumiputra or indigenous 
people mainly the Malays at the end of the policy period (Tori,1997).  
Within the NEP policies, rapid economic growth in line with industrial transformation 
took place in early 1970s and in 1980. At that time, Malaysia shifted its policy from 
an agro-based economy to the manufacturing industry. The manufacturing sector was 
focused on industrial activity mainly in the area of electric and electronic (E&E), 
chemical and petrochemical and automotive. Consequently, Malaysia’s GDP grew at 
an annual average rate of 10.9 per cent from 1970 to 2011, while the annual GDP 
growth had been positive except for the year 1971, 1975, 1985-86, and 2001. The 
progressive economic growth indicated that Malaysia was able to develop its 
economy progressively (Choong, 2003).  
The other policies that contributed to the economic growth included prudent monetary 
policy, and control on the growth of its money supply and inflation. Previous studies 
conducted by Schumpeter (1912), Robinson (1952), Romer (1990), Levine (1997) and 
Luintel and Khan (1999) reveal that there is a significant relationship between 
financial development and economic growth (Choong, 2003). Undoubtedly, the 
financial sector is also the backbone of the economic growth in Malaysia. However, 
one important area in the financial sector is the monetary policy. Prudent measures 
and effective way of conducting monetary policy may bring better results in achieving 
its objectives.  
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This chapter, hence, briefly describes the monetary policy in Malaysia from 1970 
until 2011, which will also examine the controllability and reliability of the monetary 
policy in a dual banking system.  The chapter also provides a discussion on the 
Islamic financing instruments. Altogether, the material presented and discussed in this 
chapter is expected to provide a better contextualisation for the empirical chapters. 
 
3.2 MALAYSIAN FINANCIAL SYSTEM 
As regards to Malaysian financial environment, it should be noted that in 2012, 
Malaysia ranked 18
th
 out of 60 countries in the Financial Development Index. 
Malaysia ranked 3
rd
 for currency stability and 10
th
 for banking stability.  Malaysia 
also ranked no 2
nd 
for ease of access to credit, 6
th
 for financing through equity market 
and 7
th
 for ease of access to loans (World Economic Forum, 2012).   
Malaysia is the leader and at the highest rank (1
st
) for local currency corporate bond 
issuance to GDP and for domestic financial sector liberalization (World Economic 
Forum, 2012).With regards to ease of access to loans Malaysia ranked 7
th
 and 2
nd
 for 
ease of credit. This indicates that the transmission of monetary policy is done 
primarily through the lending channel followed by the credit channel.  
Before discussing the Malaysian monetary policy, it is important to understand the 
structure of the Malaysian financial system. It is divided into three sections namely 
financial markets, the banking sector and non-bank financial intermediaries. The 
financial markets consist of money market and foreign exchange market, capital 
markets, derivatives markets and offshore markets. While BNM is in-charge of the 
money matters, foreign exchange, Malaysian Government Securities and Labuan 
International Offshore Centre, the Securities Commission in collaboration with BNM 
is mutually responsible for monitoring private debts.  
The banking system comprises the Bank Negara Malaysia (BNM) or the Central Bank 
of Malaysia, banking institutions and financial organisations which include discount 
houses, the representative offices of foreign banks and offshore banks in the Labuan 
Offshore Financial Centre (LOFC). The non-bank financial intermediaries, on the 
other hand, comprises the Provident and Pension Funds, Insurance and Takaful 
companies, development financial institutions, savings institutions, unit trusts and 
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property trusts, and other non-financial institutions. Table 3.1 shows the breakdown of 
the financial institutions in Malaysia as of 2011. 
 
Table 3.1: The Number of Financial Institutions 
 
Institutions Local  Foreign Total Percentage of  
Local Banks (per cent) 
 
Commercial Banks 6 19 25 24 
Investment Banks 15 - 15 100 
Islamic Banks 10 6 16 63 
Total  31 25 56 55 
Source: Bank Negara Malaysia Monthly Statistical Bulletin (2012) 
Figure 3.1 shows the structure of the financial markets in Malaysia and Figure 3.2 
shows the banking and non-bank financial institutions in Malaysia. Commercial 
banks, merchant banks, investment banks, finance companies, discount houses and the 
Islamic banks are regulated by BNM. As of 2011, there were 56 financial institutions, 
31 local and 25 were foreign owned banks.  
3.3 ROLE AND FUNCTIONS OF THE BANK NEGARA MALAYSIA (BNM) 
BNM is governed by the Central Bank of Malaysia Act 1958. The Act has been 
amended many times and repelled by the Central Bank Banking of Malaysia Act 
2009. There are four core functions of the BNM as described by the Central Bank 
Act: to maintain price stability, to promote high and stable growth rate, to promote a 
stable monetary system and to ensure stability of profit and exchange rate (Ismail, 
2010). 
The governing law of BNM includes the Exchange Control Act 1959, Islamic 
Banking Act 1983, Takaful Act 1984, Money Changing Act 1988, Banking and 
Financial Act (BAFIA) 1989, Anti-Money Laundering and Anti-Terrorism Financing 
Act 2001, Development Financial Institutions Act 2002, Payment Systems Act 2003 
and the Central Bank Banking of Malaysia Act 2009 (Amended from 1958 Act). 
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Figure 3.1: The Financial Markets of Malaysia 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.2: The Banking and Non-Bank Financial Institutions in Malaysia  
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Non-Bank Financial Institutions 
 
 
 
 
Notes: (*) Regulated by the Central Bank of Malaysia; (#) In 2006, Finance companies absorbed by Commercial Banks. 
Source: Azali (2000:19)
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It should be noted that monetary policy in Malaysia is implemented by the BNM, 
which was established on 26
th
January, 1959. In 1960, the Malaysia Stock Exchange 
(equity market) and Malaysian Government Securities were formed. In 1963, several 
discount houses were incorporated and in 1972, Malaysia adopted the US dollar as the 
intervention currency.  
In 1973, Malaysia and Singapore agreed to terminate the Currency Inter-changeability 
Arrangement (CIA) and the Stock Exchange Market (Monetary Authority of 
Singapore, 2000). In the same year there was a conversion from a fixed to a flexible 
exchange rate regime. In 1978, Malaysia deregulated the domestic interest rate 
wherein the Commercial banks were allowed to determine their lending and deposit 
rates (Ahmad, 2008, p. 406). As part of the continuous institutional development, in 
1980s, private debt securities market was established. Figure 3.3 provides a summary 
of the Central Bank’s roles and functions. 
 
Figure 3.3: Role and Functions of the Bank Negara Malaysia 
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Source: Author’s Illustration based on ‘The Bank Negara Malaysia and 
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Monetary 
Stability 
Financial 
Stability 
Financial  
Sector 
Develop-
ment 
Foreign 
Exchange 
Control 
Payment 
System 
 
Regulation 
and   
Supervision 
 
Central 
Bank of 
Malaysia 
Act 2009 
IBA1983 
Takaful  Act 
1984 
Insurance  
Act 1996 
Anti-Money 
Laundering 
and Anti-
Terrorism 
Financing 
Act 2001 
Payment 
Systems 
Act 2003 
Exchange 
Control  
Act 1953 
 
Money-
Changing 
Act 1998
  
Development 
Financial  
Institutions 
Act 2002 
 
Banking and 
Financial 
Institutions 
Act 1989 
(BAFIA) 
 
BANK NEGARA MALAYSIA (BNM) 
50 
 
In 1984, the first Islamic Bank of Malaysia was established under the Islamic Bank 
Act (IBA) 1983. In the same year, Base Lending Rate (BLR) was introduced for the 
conventional and Islamic Bank. In 1989, there was an actual splitting of Malaysia 
Stock Exchange and the Singapore Stock Exchange and the International Offshore 
Financial Centre was established in Labuan in Sabah, East Malaysia. In the following 
year, the BLR requirement was abolished, and as a result, each bank was allowed to 
determine its own BLR (Abdul Majid, 2004).  
After ten years of establishing the Islamic banks, in 2004, foreign and domestic 
commercial banks, merchant banks and investment banks were allowed to open up a 
‘window’ (branch/subsidiary/unit) of the Islamic banking scheme. The reasons for 
allowing the conventional banks to offer Islamic windows were to increase the 
number of players and competition, establish the fastest way to disseminate the 
Islamic banking operations nationwide, optimise existing banking infrastructure, 
resources and network, ensure high level of sophistication in terms of products and 
services and to achieve high economic of scales (Mokhtar and Al-Habsi, 2008).  
As regards to the operations of the central bank, in theory, the Central Bank’s 
monetary policy could affect the growth of inflation and economic activity because 
the Central bank controls the supply of money and liquidity by setting the short-term 
interest rate in the money market and determining the level of statutory reserve 
requirement (see: Figure 3.4) 
 
Figure 3.4: How Bank Negara Malaysia Monetary Policy Affects the Economy 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: BNM (2003)  
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BNM, therefore, could influence the activity of the economy by expanding or 
contracting the monetary policy. When BNM wants to stimulate the economy, it may 
increase the bank reserves and reduce the short-term interest rates. As depicted in 
Figure 3.5, this would stimulate the economy where more credit will be available in 
the money market. 
 
Figure 3.5: When Bank Negara Wants to Stimulate the Economy 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: BNM (2003)  
When Bank Negara wants to contract the economy, it may increase the short term 
interest rate and reduce the bank reserves. As can be seen in Figure 3.6, this will result 
in contraction of loan supply in the money market and can reduce economic activities. 
 
Figure 3.6: When Bank Negara Wants to CONSTRAIN the Economy 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: BNM (2003)  
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3.4 AN OVERVIEW OF MALAYSIA MONETARY POLICY  
As mentioned earlier in 1978, Malaysia liberalized its domestic interest rates where 
each bank was permitted to determine their own interest rate (commercial rates). Prior 
to 1987, each financial institution computed their cost of funds and determined the 
Base Lending Rate (BLR) after BNM decided the amount of the Reserve 
Requirements, Liquidity of Assets and Overhead. Starting from the 1
st 
September 
1987, computation of the BLR was set based on the BLR of the 2 lead banks with an 
additional 0.5 per cent.  
Effective from the 1
st
 February 1991, the BLR rates were calculated after taking into 
account the costs of funding, staff, overhead and profit margin of 0.25 per cent. The 
computation of BLR at that time was reasonable because it was realistic and based on 
the actual cost of funds: it was not set merely based on interest rates in the market or 
used by the other banks. After 1995, the BNM interbank rates were added in the 
formula average three months of and in September of 1998, BNM interbank rates 
were replaced with the BNM intervention rate. Table 3.2 shows the computation of 
the BLR from year 1983 to 1998.  
 
Table 3.2: Computation of Commercial Banks’ Base Lending Rate (BLR) 
 
Date Computation of BLR for Commercial Banks 
 
1 Nov 1983 Cost of Funds minus Statutory Reserve, liquid assets and overhead 
1 Sept 1987 BLR of the two lead banks + 0.5 per cent 
1 Feb 1991 Funding costs + Staff Cost + Overheads + Profit Margin (0.25 per cent) 
Nov 1995 Average 3 month interbank x 0.8)
 2
 + 2.5 per cent
 
                           1-SSR 
Sept 1998 Intervention rate  x 0.8)
 2
 + 2.5 per cent
 
                           1-SSR 
Source: BNM (1999)  
Before 1978, the Malaysian monetary policy strategy was towards monetary targeting 
in which monetary base was used to control money supply and the ultimate target was 
to control the level of output, unemployment and prices. Basically, Malaysia’s 
monetary policy evolved from the monetary targeting prior to 1990 to interest rates 
targeting after mid-year of 1990s. After the Asian financial crisis in 1997, the 
monetary policy changed towards a more market based monetary policy 
implementation procedures (BNM, 1999). 
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3.4.1 From Monetary Targeting to Interest Rates Targeting 
Since 1970s and prior to 1987, M1 was used as the policy target. As can be seen in 
Figure 3.7, after the financial liberalization in the early 1980s, the annual growth of 
the M1 sharply declined due to the world oil crisis and in 1984 during the commodity 
crisis. Moreover, due to high volatility in the growth of M1, BNM shifted its policy 
from using M1 to M3 as the policy target.  
 
Figure 3.7: Annual Growth of the M1 from 1970s to 1990 
 
Source: Compiled from the Bank Negara Malaysia Monthly Statistical Bulletin, 2012 
In 1987, as shown in Figure 3.8, there was a sharp reduction in the monetary growth 
and again during the financial crisis in 1998 and post crisis in 2001. In mid-1990s, 
due to extreme volatility of the money supply as indicated by the growth of M3, 
reliability on monetary aggregates became less and BNM shifted the policy of 
monetary targeting towards interest rate targeting policy.  
 
Figure 3.8: Annual Growth of M3 from 1974 to 2012 
 
Source: Compiled from the Bank Negara Malaysia Monthly Statistical Bulletin, 2013 
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The reason that interest rates became the main targeting policy was the globalisation 
of the financial services which had influenced the economies to shift their policy 
towards using interest rates as one of the targeted strategy of the monetary policy. It 
should be noted that globalisation in the financial sector eroded the power of the 
monetary authority to formulate monetary policy based on domestic factors. Besides, 
it was difficult to predict money demand, and in 1992 and 1993 there was a large 
capital outflow from Malaysia. However, in the following year, a huge capital inflow 
streamed into Malaysia. After the Asian financial crisis, the monetary targeting 
strategy was not suitable due extreme volatility of money supply growth of the M3, 
which made the strategy of monetary targeting unreliable (Cheong, 2005). 
Monetary aggregates were also not suitable as the monetary policy intermediate target 
due to lagging indicator and lower quantitative predictor effect to predict inflation, 
consumption and investment. Subsequently, the authority opted for the interest rate 
targeting policy and Taylor rule was utilized to monitor the interest rate and inflation 
rate. Malaysia utilized the Overnight Policy Rate (ONR) as the monetary policy 
indicator of the banking system (Al-Wosabi and Abdul Majid, 2009).  
Furthermore, there was a fundamental change in the structure of the economy and 
financing, where Malaysia became a hub for manufacturing activity. This had shifted 
the financing pattern from the Government Securities market to the Capital Market. 
Government securities market before this was seen as an inelastic market where the 
interest rates were fixed for funding. Meanwhile, the capital market and bank credit 
were sensitive to the movement of the interest rates.  
The policy at that time was to reduce the size of the civil service where many of the 
agencies were privatised and handed over to the private sector in line with 
government privatization policy and the private sector as the main engine of growth. 
Nonetheless, BNM was still observing the movement of monetary growth, financing 
and credit growth besides setting the interest rate as the targeting policy (Bank Negara 
Malaysia, 1999).  
Even though riba or interest rate is prohibited in Islam, due to globalisation and 
deregulation of the financial services in most of the economies in the world, interest 
rates became the prominent target in conducting the monetary policy. Indeed, it 
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became the main instrument not just in the Malaysian monetary policy but in many 
other countries.  
Interest rate was preferred against the monetary aggregates, because monetary data 
were only available monthly while the interest rate data could be obtained daily. 
Meanwhile, other instruments such as reserve requirement was not preferred as an 
important measure because of the difficulty in forecasting the supply and demand of 
banks’ liquidity and high volatility of capital flows (Bank Negara Malaysia, 1999).  
3.4.2 Towards Market Based Monetary Policy 
To enhance the monetary policy implementation, BNM outlined three main strategies 
which were to improve transparency, to increase trading, payment and settlement 
system and to provide sound rules of the banking institutions. Subsequently, two 
pronged strategies were employed to improve transparency through effective 
communication and systematic dissemination of information.  
Since there was a risk involved in the financial sector, many market players were 
cautious and often affected by the policy changes. To avoid disruption in the market, 
BNM chose to be more transparent in providing information so the market players 
were more certain about the policy and could respond effectively when there was a 
change (Bank Negara Malaysia, 1999).  
After the implementation of the selective exchange rate and capital control, the 
Malaysian economy was able to recover and BNM had the greater autonomy since the 
value of the Ringgit was fixed at RM3.80 against the US dollar. Before the crisis, 
BNM used three months interbank rates to reflect the stance of the monetary policy. 
However, there was uncertainty in the market that the changes in the rates were not 
due to the market forces but through government intervention.  
In the early 1998, BNM, used three months intervention rates to reflect the direction 
of the monetary policy. For the first time, public was informed on a daily basis about 
the result of the daily liquidity forecast and tender operation. Before this, the 
information was not disseminated to the public on a regular basis (Bank Negara 
Malaysia, 1999).  
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Malaysia also subscribed to IMF Special Data Dissemination Standard which 
enhanced the time lag of releasing information. With the timely disclosure of the 
information, market players were able to respond fast and correctly to the policy 
direction. By doing this, BNM had decreased the issuance time of monthly statistical 
bulletin from six to four weeks.  
To improve trading, payment and settlement system, measures taken included using 
scriptless trading and Real Time Gross Settlement System. To enhance the soundness 
of the banking institutions, a new liquidity framework to replace the liquidity 
requirement of the banks was introduced (Bank Negara Malaysia, 1999).  
3.4.3 Monetary Policy and Money Supply 
Money supply is one important tool to control prices and inflation and to ensure the 
stability of the economy. The money supply includes M1, M2 and M3. The M1
8
 is 
defined as currency in circulation as well as demand deposits, which refers to the 
notes and coins issued by BNM, which is less than the amount held by the 
commercial and Islamic banks. In addition, M2 refers to M1 and Total Narrow Quasi 
money (includes savings deposits, fixed deposits, negotiable instruments of deposits 
or NIDs), repos, foreign currency deposits and other deposits). Furthermore, M3 
refers to M2 and the deposits placed with other institutions. These deposits denote the 
sum of deposits/interest bearing instruments (including SPI deposits and instruments) 
placed by the non-bank private sector with finance companies, merchant 
banks/investment banks and discount houses (excluding inter-placements among these 
institutions) (Bank Negara Malaysia, 2008). 
3.4.4 Monetary Policy and Interest Rates 
The Malaysian monetary policy is based on the conventional monetary procedure 
where interest rates and the money supply are used as one of the implementation 
                                                 
8
  According to the Bank Negara Malaysia (Malaysian Central Bank), the M1 defined as 
currency in circulation and demand deposits of the non-bank private sector while M2 as M1 
plus quasi money. Quasi money is specified as savings and term deposits only. This definition 
is extended also towards Islamic intermediate aggregates namely Islamic M1. Where Islamic 
(M1) is defined as currency in circulation plus Islamic demand deposit, while Islamic M2 as 
M1 plus Islamic quasi-money (investment plus savings deposits held under Islamic banking 
scheme) (Kaleem and Isa, 2006,p.279-280). 
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instruments. Figure 3.9 shows that the interest rate of the conventional banks was 
relatively below 5 per cent from 1993 to 2012.  
An Islamic bank was offering higher profit rates for saving account from 1993 until 
2001. However, from 2002 onwards, profit rates of the Islamic banks were following 
the conventional banks’ interest rates. As indicated in Figure 3.9, this was also 
supported by previous research that Islamic bank profit rates were pegged closely to 
the conventional deposit rates. 
Figure 3.9:  Annual Growth Rates of Conventional Bank Interest Rate  
and Islamic Banks Profit Rates 
 
Source: Compiled from the Bank Negara Malaysia Monthly Statistical Bulletin, 2013 
3.4.5 Monetary Policy and Inflation Rates 
One goal of the monetary policy is to keep the inflation rate as low as possible. BNM 
through its monetary operations could affect the economic growth and inflation level 
by increasing or decreasing the bank’s reserves which could in turn alter the bank's 
liquidity and money supply. Figure 3.10 shows that the inflation rate was higher than 
15 per cent during the mid-1970s due to the oil crisis period. Furthermore, the 
inflation rate was below 10 per cent during the early 1980s when there was a 
downturn in commodity prices. Other than that, the inflation rates remained an 
average level of below 5 per cent.  
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Figure 3.10: Malaysia’s Inflation Rate from 1970 to 2012 
 
Source: Compiled from the Bank Negara Malaysia Monthly Statistical Bulletin, 2013 
3.4.6 Monetary Policy and Exchange Rate  
Malaysia’s monetary policy before 1990’s centred on monetary targeting, which 
aimed at maintaining price stability including the value of money. However, BNM did 
not directly use the exchange rate targeting policy to maintain the value of the Ringgit 
against other major currencies in the world. Instead, the strategy was to ensure fair 
value of Ringgit and avoid sharp reduction and high volatility of the exchange rates 
(Bank Negara Malaysia, 1999).  
In 1997-1998, Malaysia was affected by the large capital outflows from the country 
and there was correspondingly high speculation in the Malaysian Ringgit market 
where the price of the Ringgit depreciated from $1 USD against RM2.50 to $1 USD 
against RM 4.20. As a result, even though interest rates were seen as the best targeted 
policy during the crisis, BNM was unable to influence the domestic interest rates 
(Bank Negara Malaysia, 1999). 
To control the depreciation of the Ringgit, BNM made the right decision by setting 
the selective exchange control on 1st September 1998. The Ringgit value was fixed at 
RM3.80 against the $1 US Dollar. And, to reduce speculation of the Ringgit market, 
BNM likewise set the capital control policy where Ringgit was not allowed to be 
traded in the overseas currency exchange market and only a maximum of RM10, 000 
was permitted to be brought overseas.  
The policy option was able to suppress instability in the Ringgit market and as the 
control mechanism of large outflow of the capital. It was not the interest rates that 
were able to stabilize the value of the Ringgit but rather the selective exchange rate 
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control. In fact, at that time, BNM was unable to reduce the interest rates to avoid 
further contraction in the Malaysian economy (Bank Negara Malaysia, 1999).  
 
3.5 MONETARY POLICY INSTRUMENTS 
In Malaysia, as the experience showed, the BNM used five policy instruments to 
control money supply and bank credit creation process prior to 1978, which is 
summarised in Figure 3.11. The traditional conventional monetary policy instruments 
used included the Statutory Reserve Requirement (SSR), Minimum Liquidity Ratio 
(MLR), Volume and Direction of Credit (VDC), Interest Rate Ceilings (IRC), 
Discount Operations (DO) and Moral Suasion (Azali, 2000).  
 
Figure 3.11: Monetary Policy Pre-1978 
 
Policy Instruments Indicators  Intermediate  Final 
      Targets  Targets 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Azali (2000) 
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The monetary policy instruments, indicators and targets after 1978 are shown in the 
Figure 3.12. The differences between the pre and post 1978 monetary policy were the 
inclusion of the open market operations (OMO) as a policy instrument and the use of 
interest rates as a policy indicator, which was used to change the size of the monetary 
base or high powered money or to change the structure of the public debt without 
changing the monetary base or to influence market interest rates (Azali, 2000). 
Reserve requirement, moral suasion and discount rate were retained as the policy 
instruments. Lending to the priority sector was also included as one of the policy 
instruments after 1978.  
 
 
Figure 3.12: Monetary Policy Post-1978 
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3.6 ISLAMIC MONETARY POLICY INSTRUMENTS IN MALAYSIA 
The Islamic Interbank Money Market (IIMM) was established on 3
rd
January 1994, as 
a short-term intermediary to provide a ready source of investment outlet based on 
Shari’ah-compliance principles (Bacha, 2008). The instruments in the Islamic 
Interbank Money Market include Mudarabah Interbank Investment (MII), Wadiah 
Acceptance, Government Investment Issue (GII), Bank Negara Monetary Notes-i 
(BNMN-i), Sell and Buy Back Agreement (SBBA), Cagamas Mudharabah Bonds 
(SMC), When Issue (WI), Islamic Accepted Bills (IAB), Islamic Negotiable 
Instruments (i-NI), Islamic Private Debt Securities (i-PDS), Ar-Rahnu Agreement-i 
(RA-i) and Sukuk
9
 BNM Ijarah (SBNMI) (Dusuki,2005). 
The ‘Mudharabah Interbank Investment’ (MII) refers to a mechanism whereby a 
deficit Islamic banking institution can obtain investment from a surplus Islamic 
banking institution based on mudharabah principle. The period of investment is from 
overnight to 12 months. With regards to the rate of return, it is based on 1-year gross 
profit rate of investment. The profit sharing ratio is negotiable among both parties  
(Bank Negara Malaysia, 2010). 
‘Wadiah Acceptance’ (WA) refers to a mechanism where Islamic banking institutions 
put their surplus fund with the Central bank of Malaysia based on the concept of al- 
wadiah. Nevertheless, the acceptor of funds is not obliged to pay any return on the 
account but may give a dividend paid or perceived as 'hibah' (gift) (Shaikh,2009). 
‘Government Investment Issue’ (GII) has been introduced because Islamic bank could 
not purchase or trade in the Malaysian Government Securities (MGS), Malaysian 
Treasury Bills (MTB) or other interest-bearing instruments. There has been a need for 
the Islamic banks to hold such liquid papers to meet the statutory liquidity 
requirements. To satisfy these requirements, a non-interest bearing certificate known 
                                                 
9
  Sukuk is an Arabic word which literally means certificate. The word Sukuk translated as 
“Islamic bonds” and the nearest translation is “Islamic Investment Certificates” (Tahmoures, 
2013). The Accounting and Auditing Organization for Islamic Financial Institutions 
(AAOIFI) defined Sukuk as certificates of equal value representing undivided shares in 
ownership of tangible assets, usufruct and services (El-Mosaid and Butti, 2014). Sukuk also 
defined as an asset-backed certificate which is structured in accordance with the Shari’ah and 
may be traded in the market. A sukuk represents the proportionate beneficial ownership in the 
underlying asset, which can be leased to a client to yield the return on the sukuk (Jobst,2007). 
For further understanding on Sukuk please refer to Chapter 1-the Origin of Sukuk in Islamic 
Finance in Dubai International Financial Centre Sukuk Guideline (2009).  
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as Government Investment Issues (GII) was introduced (Bank Negara Malaysia, 
2012).  
‘Bank Negara Monetary Notes-i’ (BNMN-i) is the Islamic securities issued by Bank 
Negara Malaysia as replacements to the Bank Negara Negotiable Notes (BNNN) to 
manage liquidity in the Islamic finance market. The maturity of these issuances has 
been lengthened from one year to three years. Further issuances of BNMN-i may be 
issued either on a discounted or a coupon-bearing basis depending on investors' 
demand  (Bank Negara Malaysia, 2010). 
‘Sell and Buy Back Agreement’ (SBBA) refers to an Islamic money market 
transaction entered by two parties in which the SBBA seller (seller) offers assets to 
the SBBA buyer (Buyer) at an agreed price. Subsequently, both parties enter into a 
separate agreement in which the buyer promises to sell back the said asset to the seller 
at the fixed price  (Bank Negara Malaysia, 2010). 
‘Cagamas Mudharabah Bonds’ (Sanadat Mudarabah Cagamas-SMC issued by 
Cagamas Berhad) was introduced on 1
st 
March 1994 by the Cagamas Berhad to 
finance the purchase of Islamic housing debts from the financial institutions that 
provided Islamic home financing to the public. The SMC Bond structure has been 
adopting the concept of mudharabah, that is the bondholders and the Cagamas will be 
sharing the profits according to the agreed profit-sharing ratios  (Bank Negara 
Malaysia, 2010). 
‘When Issue’ (WI) is a transaction of sale and purchase of debt securities before the 
securities issued. The National Shari’ah Advisory Council in its meeting on 26th of 
February 2006, suggested that the WI, transaction must be allowed based on the 
permissibility of promise for sale and purchase transactions (Bank Negara Malaysia, 
2010). 
‘Islamic Accepted Bill’ (IAB) known as Interest-Free Accepted Bill (IAB), has been 
introduced to encourage and promote both domestic and foreign trade, by providing 
Malaysian traders with an attractive Islamic financing product. The IAB is formulated 
on the Islamic principles of al-murabahah (deferred lump-sum sale or cost-plus) and 
debt-trading (bay al-dayn) (Billah,2006).  
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‘Islamic Negotiable Instruments’ (i-NI) covers two instruments namely Islamic 
‘Negotiable Instruments of Deposit’ (i-NID) which refers to a sum of money 
deposited with the Islamic banking institutions and repayable to the bearer on a 
specified future date at the nominal value of i-NID and the declared dividend. The 
other instrument is known as the ‘Negotiable Islamic Debt Certificate’ (N-iDC). The 
transaction involves the sale of banking institution's assets to the customer at an 
agreed price on a cash basis. Subsequently the assets are purchased back from the 
customer at a principal value plus a profit and to be settled on an agreed future date.  
‘Ar-Rahnu Agreement-i’ (RA-i) is where the lender provides a loan to the borrower 
based on the concept of qardul hasan. The borrower will pledge its securities as 
collateral for the loan granted. However, in the event where the borrower fails to 
repay the loan on the maturity date, the lender has the right to sell the pledged 
securities and use the proceeds from the sale of the securities to settle the loan. If 
there is surplus money, the lender will return it to the borrower (Shaik,2009). 
 ‘Sukuk Bank Negara Malaysia Ijarah’ (SBNMI) is based on ijarah or ‘sale and lease 
back’ concept. The proceeds from the issuance will be used to purchase Bank Negara 
Malaysia assets. The assets will then be leased to Bank Negara Malaysia for rental 
payment consideration, which is distributed to investors as a return to a semi-annual 
basis. Upon maturity of the lease tenure, BNM Sukuk Berhad will then sell the assets 
back to Bank Negara Malaysia at a predetermined price (Bank Negara Malaysia and 
Security Comission of Malaysia,2009) 
Last but not least is the ‘Islamic Private Debt Securities’ (iPDS) are outstanding in the 
market issued based on the Shari’ah compliant concept of al-bay bithaman ajil, 
murabahah and mudharabah.   
Figure 3.13 show the accumulated value of the Islamic Securities issued utilizing the 
instruments of modern Islamic monetary policy from 2001 to 2011. The highest 
amount issued was the GII, which amounted to RM642.5 million. The lowest value 
was SMC valued at RM 302.9 million.   
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Figure 3.13: Accumulated value of the Islamic Instrument (2001-2011) 
 
Notes : i-BONDS=Islamic Bonds, i-MTN=Islamic Medium Term Notes, BNNN-
bank Negara Negotiable Notes, GII=Government investment Issues, ICP=Islamic 
Commercial Papers, SMC=Sanadat Mudharabah Cagamas 
Source: http://iimm.bnm.gov.my 
 
3.7 APPLICATION OF ISLAMIC FINANCE INSTRUMENTS IN MALAYSIA 
This section aims to describe how in practice Islamic financial instruments are applied 
by the Islamic banks in Malaysia. Some instruments like al-bay bithaman ajil is only 
applicable and implemented in Malaysia but not in others countries. This has created 
chaos in the system and many court cases were filed against the bank. The following 
section will describe theory and practice of the Islamic finance instruments in 
Malaysia and how some instruments are used as legal device (hilah) to justify that 
there are element of sale and purchase and not debt based contract although there are 
some element of gharar, customers sign the contract before they need cash, banks 
transfer the risk to the customers and in some cases, there is no change of ownership 
of the property to the customers.    
3.7.1 Al-Bay Bithaman Ajil (BBA) 
Al-bay bithaman ajil  (BBA) is a contract of sale and purchase for the financing of 
assets on a deferred and an installment basis with a pre‐agreed payment period. The 
transaction price will include a profit margin. This contract is valid if the date of 
payment is set clearly.  BBA is also known as al-bay mua’jjal and widely applied by 
the Islamic banks in Malaysia (Wahid, 2014). 
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The BBA is an extension of the cost plus profit (murabahah) contract, according to 
which buyers are provided with the benefit of deferred payment and the seller gets 
additional profit due to the sales of deferred price. Murabahah (which is normally for 
a short-term period) and BBA are mainly used in Malaysia for home financing 
(Mydin & Abdul Razak, 2005). However, musharakah mutanaqisah has become an 
alternative sales contract for home financing in Malaysia. In most cases, profit rates of 
the BBA of home financing and other long-term credit sales of the Islamic banks are 
higher than the conventional banks. 
When a customer applies for a housing loan from the Islamic banks, often the Islamic 
banks benchmark the profit rates against the conventional bank interest rates. This 
move is endorsed by the Shari’ah scholars by justifying on the ground that the BBA 
contract does not involve riba because it is a sale contract and there will be no 
increment of the deferred payment price because the selling price is already fixed at a 
certain rate of return.  
In theory, the sales concept is better than debt and loan, as it provides transparency in 
the contract. There is no element of gharar (uncertainty) when the customers know 
about the total paying price compared to buying through the conventional banks. 
However, the Islamic banks are not doing justice by determining the profit rate based 
on the conventional interest rates. If any customers call some Islamic banks in 
Malaysia and request for the home financing, they will be informed of the rate or 
return and the amount required as payment depends on the amount of the loan. 
Rama (2010) conducted a study in comparing between interest rate mortgage and 
home financing based on diminishing partnership (musharakah mutanaqisah) 
principle in Malaysia. The result of the findings suggests that rental rates are lower 
than interest rates and vary according to the type and location of the properties. The 
study also found that there is a weak positive correlation between rental rates and 
interest rates and it was stable even during the financial crisis in year 1997 and 1998. 
The study also found that single story and condominium types of property have a 
strong correlation with interest rates. However, the study suggests that rental rate is 
used as an alternative to interest rate benchmarking for home financing because it 
reflects the market value of the property (Rama, 2010). 
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In Islam, there is no maximum amount of profit fixed for the seller. However, the 
selling prices should be fair, and it should be based on the market rate rather than 
calculation based on the conventional rates of interest. 
3.7.2 Ijarah 
In Malaysia, the application of ijarah includes ijarah financing, sukuk al ijarah, 
musyarakah mutanaqisah and al-ijarah thumma al-bay. The basic feature of ijarah is 
that it is an exchange of contract between parties, but it does not involve the transfer 
of ownership from the lessor to the lessee. However, there are two categories of 
ijarah; operating ijarah and finance ijarah. The former is that, at the end of the 
leasing period, the assets will not be transferred to the lessee, and it will still belong to 
the lessor. The latter is where at the end of the leasing period, the asset will be sold to 
customers at nominal prices (Othman, 2010). 
In the context of Islamic banking, ijarah is defined as the process where the usufruct 
of the particular goods/product or property is transferred to another person in 
exchange of rental claim or payment. The distinguishing feature of the contract is that 
the lessor remains as the owner of the property at the end of the leasing period, where 
leasing period and renewal terms must be clearly stated. The lessor is also still liable 
on the leasing assets, the maintenance cost, damage and the premium cost (Mohd 
Shariff and Abdul Rahman, 2003). 
In Malaysia, although ijarah is one of the modes of financing in Islam, in terms of 
legality, it is based on the Contract Act 1950 and Hire Purchase Act (HPA) 1967. For 
example, in the case of ‘Tinta Press Sdn. Bhd. versus Bank Islam Malaysia Berhad’, 
the decision was held by the Civil Court on the principles that even though the case 
was in relation to ijarah transaction, it was still applicable to the common law (Abdul 
Halim, 2012). This implies that even though the HPA 1967 is contrary to the 
principles of Shari’ah and silent about the Shari’ah matter, the law applied will be the 
English law by virtue of Civil Law Act 1956 (Hassan et al., 2012) 
Al-ijarah thumma al-bay (AITAB) or known as ijarah waiqtina is one of the 
financing modes, which is widely used in Malaysia. There are two types of Islamic 
hire purchase contracts namely al-ijarah thumma al-bay (leasing ending with a sale) 
or al-ijarah muntahiya bittamlik (leasing ending with ownership). AITAB is used for 
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motor vehicle financing and ijarah muntahiyya bittamlik for corporate financing by 
some banks (Abdullah and Dusuki, 2004). 
AITAB involves two types of contract: al-ijarah contract (leasing) and al-bay (sales) 
contract, where the financial institution appoints the customers as agents to purchase 
the vehicle required by the customers. The customer will be paying a deposit to the 
vehicle agent. Then the customer’s application will be submitted by the car dealer to 
the financial institution for approval. Once the customers fulfil the eligibility, and the 
application is approved, the financial institution will pay the total selling price of the 
vehicle (excluding the deposit paid by customers) to the car dealers.  
Subsequently, the financial institutions will lease back the vehicle to customers for a 
specific period of time with a fixed amount of monthly rental/leasing payment. At the 
end of the leasing period, the customers have the option to purchase the vehicle, and if 
the customers opted to purchase the ownership will be transferred to the buyer. In 
practice, lease and sale contracts will be signed up front as the financial institution 
does not want to take the risk and customers at an early stage needs to sign an 
agreement for buying the vehicle at the of the leasing period. 
Basically, in Malaysia, AITAB is gaining popularity because only a few people can 
afford to buy cars on cash terms basis (Tag El-Din & Abdullah, 2007). Although there 
is some similarities with the hire and purchase contract under the Hire-Purchase Act 
1967, there are some distinguishing elements in AITAB. The Shari’ah Advisory 
Council (SAC) in July 1997 decided that AITAB be allowed with certain conditions 
(Bank Negara Malaysia, 2010): 
 
(i) It shall consist of two contracts; 
 
(ii) The sale price at the end of the leasing period should be equivalent to the last 
rental amount of leasing; 
 
(iii) The customer must be appointed as an agent by the financial institution; 
 
(iv) The agreement shall include a clause on ’will purchase the vehicle’ by the lessee 
at the end of the leasing period and the clause on redemption; 
 
(v) The payment of deposit for a vehicle by customers to the car dealer does not 
form a sale contract; 
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(vi) The financial institution will be the owner of the assets and will bear ownership 
risk; and 
 
(vii) The lessee shall terminate the contract before entering into a new AITAB 
contract. 
Again, in theory, the financial institution will be the owner of the asset but in practice 
the financial institution bears the risk because they hold the beneficial ownership but 
the asset or property is use by the lessor. For example, in the case of the motor 
vehicle, the customers will be paying road tax and insurance and bear the maintenance 
cost. However, in practice, banks will hold the beneficial ownership and the customer 
as the legal owner. The SAC meeting in September 2002 decided that the lessor is the 
owner of the ijarah asset although the lessor’s name is not registered in the title and 
the lessee is only entitled to the usufruct of the asset. Since there is no separate law 
governing AITAB, it falls under the ambit of the Hire-Purchase Act (HPA) of 1967.  
From the Shari’ah point of view, the lessor is the owner of the assets; nevertheless the 
cost of insurance, road tax and maintenance should be borne by the owner. However, 
in practice, AITAB agreement is bound to follow the HPA, 1967, where for the case 
of insurance, Section 26 (1), (a) and (b), (2), (4) and (7) of the HPA 1967 clearly 
states that the lessee has to bear the cost of insurance for the second year and onward 
although lessor is the owner of the assets. 
3.7.3 Murabahah 
Murabahah is one of the most prominent debt-based structured instruments, which is 
based on cost and principle, in which the financial institutions will buy goods or 
products and sell to the customer at a price, which includes a negotiated profit margin. 
In theory, the selling price must be negotiated and agreed by both parties. However, in 
reality, the selling price and calculation of the profit margin is determined by the 
financial institutions. 
There are two types of murabahah that involves a sale: one is the sale-repurchase of 
the borrower’s asset (short sale) or the purchase of the tangible asset by the financial 
institution from the third party on behalf of the customers and reselling it to the 
customer with the original cost price and a mark-up profit. Commodity murabahah is 
commonly used for issuing an Islamic credit card in Malaysia and for financing 
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contracts. It falls under the same generic category of bay al-amanah and comes from 
the main category of uqudal-mu'awadhat (exchange contracts) that covers all types of 
transactions including sukuk (Al Sayyed, 2010). 
In murabahah sale, the profit margin is implicitly included in the selling price. This 
means that the profit margin is benchmarked against the interest rates. A criticism of 
murabahah is that when used excessively, it gives a fixed rate of return to the 
financial institution (Ayub, 2007). It should be noted that most financial institutions 
prefer murabahah financing because the rate of return is pre-determined, as it does 
not require much effort to evaluate and monitor compared to investment based 
financing, and the relative risk of default is low (Rosly, 2005). Murabaha is 
defference with Al-Bay Bithaman Ajil although both are deferred sales contract plus 
mark-up with profit margin. Among other main difference between Murabaha and 
BBA is that Murabaha is applicable on spot and deferred basis but BBA is only 
applied on deferred payment basis (BNM, 2010). 
3.7.4 Musharakah 
Musharakah is a partnership or joint venture agreement where the lender not only 
provides the capital but also jointly contributes to managing a business project. All 
parties need to agree on the distribution of the profit ratio generated from the business 
activity. The partnership agreement can be terminated after a certain time of the 
period upon fulfilment of certain conditions. In the event of losses, all parties bear the 
loss in proportion of their shares in the project (Haron, Ahmad, & Planisek, 1994). 
There are three types of musharakah contracts: partnership contract (shirkat al-aqad), 
co-own (shirkat al-milk) and diminishing partnership or joint venture (musharakah 
mutanaqisah). Shirkat al-aqad is the riskiest contract because there is no guarantee of 
the capital repayment or profit payment (Yaakub, 2009). However, in practice, a 
profit in musharakah agreement is guaranteed, which eliminates the risk, where lower 
risk, lower liabilities and no responsibilities are preferred by the financial institutions 
in Malaysia. 
3.7.5 Mudarabah 
Mudarabah is a profit sharing contract where financial institutions provide the capital 
as rabb al-mal and customers/entrepreneurs or mudarib provide the necessary 
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expertise and skills.  Any distribution of profit is determined beforehand and in the 
case of losses, it is borne by the rab al-mal. However the mudarib has a defect 
(Nagaoka, 2010). Obviously, this type of contract is non-preferable to the financial 
institutions, and in Malaysia the total financing of mudarabah in the Islamic financial 
sector was 0.2 per cent in 2006, which decreased to 0.1 per cent in 2012. As 
mentioned above, both conventional and Islamic banks will avoid high risk and will 
reduce their liabilities and responsibilities. 
3.7.6 Istisna’ 
Istisna’ is an order to manufacture or to be manufactured or constructed where the 
manufacturer or contractor will deliver to the customer upon completion according to 
the agreed specification and price (either to be paid in advance or upon completion) 
between both parties (Muhammad & Chong, 2007). Although the goods or products 
are non-existent at the time of agreement of the contract, the contract is considered 
valid based on the principle of equity (istihsan) and the customary practice (uruf) 
(Nawawi, 1999). Among other conditions for istisna’ include: 
 
(i) It is an obligation of the manufacturer or contractor to manufacture the goods or 
products or to construct and start the works. Any of the parties can cancel the 
contract after giving notice. However, once the works have started the contract 
cannot be cancelled without the agreement of both parties (Usmani (Mufti), 
2005); 
 
(ii) The price is already determined at the time of conclusion of the contract, and it 
cannot be increased or decreased due to escalation of raw materials price or 
commodity price to avoid uncertainty (gharar); 
 
(iii) The manufacturer or contractor is not permitted to exclude liability of defects 
because istisna is a sale of goods or products to be delivered in the future, where 
the specifications are already clearly explained in the contract (Muhammad Al-
Amine, 2001); and 
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(iv) Quality, quantity, and specifications must be clearly defined without ambiguity. 
Otherwise, the contract may lead to a legal dispute (Haron & Shanmugam, 
2001). 
Istisna’ in Malaysia amounted to RM 1.5 billion or about 0.7 per cent of total 
financing in the Islamic banking sector in 2011. However, in terms of value it 
increased about 187 per cent compared to total RM 509.3 million in 2006.  
In addition to the above mentioned financial contracts, in Table 6.1, there are also 
other types of financing which include qardhul hassan, al-bay inah, al-bay dayn and 
tawarruq valued at RM 39.2 million or about 20 per cent of the total financing in 
2011. There is no breakdown of the statistic regarding the percentage of this financing 
by the Islamic banks, but individually it appears in the annual report of the each 
Islamic bank. 
3.7.7 Qardhul Hassan 
Qardhul Hassan is a financing to help the customers with financial hardship by 
providing rebates to reduce the burden of repayment by the customers, which, in 
Islamic banking, refers to the zero-interest loan. The borrower is only requires to pay 
back the amount borrowed. In some cases, a minimum administrative fee may also be 
charged to the borrower (Abidin, Alwi and Ariffin,2011). It refers to a loan for people 
to Allah, where the reward for giving to loan to others will be compensated with good 
deeds by Allah in the hereafter (Anwar, 2003). In Malaysia, qardhul hassan financing 
is accepted by customers because of ’attitude’, subjective norm and pricing (Amin et 
al., 2010).  
Qardul Hasan is a benevolence loan that customers are required to pay the principal 
amount without any obligations to pay additional amount (Zainal Abidin, Mohd Alwi 
and Mohd Arifin, 2011). However, in practice some Islamic banks do offer qardhul 
hassan loan but includes their profit rates for qardhul hassan loan to cover for the risk 
of default in payment by the customers. Below is a true case when researcher applied 
personal loan under the scheme of qardhul hassan from one of the Islamic banks in 
Malaysia with an amount of loan of RM50,000.00. The contract states that final 
payment will be about RM90,000,00 for a period of 10 years. The profit rates charge 
is 7 per cent annually.  If the customers do not default in payment then the customers 
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will be paying only 70,000 at the end of the loan period. The difference of RM 
20,000.00 will be considered as ibra (discount pr rebate) by the banks for the qardhul 
hassan loan if the customers do not default in payment. In the event that, the 
customers have defaulted the payment, then they have to pay RM90,000.00 as the full 
amount the qardhul hassan loan. This example shows that although in theory qardhul 
hassan is a benevolence loan to pay principal amount without paying any additional 
amount but in practice bank was offering something else using the name of qardhul 
hassan. This was practice by one of the Islamic bank in Malaysia in 2003 and this 
type of contract was taken out from market in 2013.    
To lower the risk of default in payment by the customer, the Islamic bank will add 
another condition to the customers. They will have to open an account with the 
Islamic banks and their income or salary or monthly earning need to be credited into 
that account. The Islamic bank will debit that amount for the monthly payment of 
qardhul hassan loan. This is practiced by one Islamic bank in Malaysia not only to 
secure payment, avoid default in payment by the customer but lower the risk to bear 
by the bank. In a nutshell, Islamic banks are not willing to take risk even for the 
qardhul hassan loan. 
3.7.8 Al-Bay Inah 
 
Al bay inah is the immediate sale contract of an asset or property by the first party to a 
second party. A seller will sell the asset to a buyer on a cash basis. The seller will later 
buy back the same asset on a deferred payment, where the price is higher than the 
cash price. It can also be applied when a seller sells an asset to a buyer on a deferred 
basis. A seller will subsequently buy back the same asset on a cash basis at a price 
lower than the deferred payment price (Shaharuddin, 2012). For example, if a 
customer wants to apply a personal loan for RM10, 000, it will appear in the contract 
that Islamic banks sell a piece land with the mark-up price of RM 15,000. Then the 
customer will agree to buy that piece of land with a mark-up price of RM15,000. This 
means he has to pay RM 15,000 to the bank. In this case, since the customer wants 
cash and does not want to buy a piece of land, he will then immediately resell the 
piece of land to the bank with a discounted price of RM10,000.00. 
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After the buying back process, the bank will credit money to the customer’s account 
with an amount of RM10,000.00. Since the customer has earlier agreed to buy the 
piece of land at a price of RM15,000.00, he or she now owes the bank RM 15,000.00 
and the amount will be paid on instalment for a time period agreed by both parties. 
This type of transaction (selling of a same piece of land) is repeated for other 
customers who want cash from the Islamic banks. The transaction is not considered 
riba because it involves selling and buying. However, there is an element of 
uncertainty (gharar), where the same assets are utilized for the purpose of selling and 
buying back in order to provide cash to the customer. It should be noted that al-bay 
inah is widely used in personal finance in Malaysia.  
3.7.9 Al- Bay Al-Dayn 
Al bay al-dayn is a sale of payable right either to the debtor or to any third party for 
deferred payment or immediate payment (Rosly & Sanusi, 1999), which is only 
acceptable in Malaysia, and not by the jurists and practitioners in the Middle East. 
The SAC of Malaysia on 21st August 1996 passed a resolution to accept al-bay al-
dayn as one approach to develop capital market instruments. The justification was that 
al-bay al-dayn fulfils the requirements of the sale contract. There is an offer and 
acceptance, contracting parties, commodity and price. Al-bay al-dayn used in 
Malaysia for a sale and purchase of trade documents such as bill of exchange and 
Bankers’ Acceptance (Amin, 2007). 
3.7.10 Tawarruq 
Tawarruq is a sale contract when someone needing cash buys an item on credit and 
re-sells the same item or assets or property to a third party at a price lower than the 
original buying price (Hosen and Nahrawi, 2012). Basically, tawarruq mechanism is 
similar to al-bay inah. The main difference is that al-bay inah involves two parties 
while tawarruq involves third parties.  
There are two types of tawarruq namely classical tawarruq (al-tawarruq al-fardi) and 
organized tawarruq (tawarruq al-munazzam). Classical tawarruq is the purchase of a 
commodity owned by the seller for deferred payment, and the buyer resells the 
commodity to another party to acquire cash (al-wariq). On the other hand, the 
organized tawarruq is a transaction when a customer (mustauriq) buys commodities 
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from the local or international market at deferred price. Subsequently, the mustauriq 
will appoint a financier, or through an agent, the mustauriq rearranges the sale 
transaction usually at a lower price (Mihajat, 2010). The example of organized 
tawarruq transaction is illustrated in Figure 3.14 below. 
 
Figure 3.14: Example of Organized Tawarruq 
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Source: International Islamic Financial Market, IIFM, 2010, p.20 in Kahf and Hamadi, 
2014;p.115. 
In April 2009, the Organization of Islamic Countries (OIC) Council of Fiqh Academy 
decided that organized tawarruq and reverse tawarruq were not permissible because 
they are deceptive and deceitful way to get cash for deferred price payment (Khan S. 
H., 2009). Except for qardhul hassan, the bay inah, bay al-dayn, and tawwaruq are 
controversial contracts practiced by the Islamic banks in Malaysia. Out of 17 banks in 
Malaysia in 2010, about 15 banks offered personal financing based on the principle of 
al-bay inah and tawarruq (Ab Rahman, Mohammad, & Mohd Salleh, 2010). 
Organised tawarruq was also widely used for the application of Islamic credit card in 
Malaysia. 
 
3.8 SUMMARY 
This chapter aimed at summarising and providing a brief on the monetary policy and 
outcomes with the objectives of locating context of the empirical analyses of the 
following chapters. The chapter, therefore, provided an overview of the monetary 
policy mechanism and operations in relations to policy, application of the Islamic 
finance instruments in theory and practice. In doing so, it describes the 
implementation and changes of monetary policy in Malaysia, issues in application of 
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the Islamic finance instruments by the Islamic banking system in Malaysia to render 
an initial understanding in the nexus between monetary policy (in an conventional 
sense) and Islamic financing instruments. The following chapter builds on this chapter 
by discussing the developments and trends in Malaysian Islamic banking by 
presenting various aspects including its performance. 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
MALAYSIAN ISLAMIC BANKING: 
DEVELOPMENTS AND TRENDS 
 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
  Malaysia is one the countries that support the development of modern Islamic 
banking system through specific government policies, which as a sector, has shown an 
unprecedented performance since the establishment of first Islamic bank in 1984. This 
chapter, hence, describes the performance of Islamic banking industry in Malaysia, 
from 1984 to 2012. It should be noted that Malaysia is one of the countries that 
practice a dual banking system, where Islamic banks and conventional banks operate 
together under same monetary policy and regulation.  
As part of the institutional development, it should be stated that as of December 2012, 
16 Islamic banks were registered in Malaysia. Table 4.1 summarises the longevity and 
status of the existing Islamic banks in Malaysia as of 2012. 
 
Table 4.1: List of the Local and Foreign Islamic Banks in Malaysia 
Islamic Banks 
 
Status Year of 
Establishment 
Bank Islam Malaysia Local 1983 
Bank Muamalat Malaysia Local 1999 
CIMB Islamic Bank Local 2003 
Hong Leong Islamic Bank  Local 2005 
Kuwait Finance House (Malaysia) Foreign 2005 
RHB Islamic Bank  Local 2005 
Affin Islamic Bank Local 2006 
Al Rajhi Banking & Investment Corp. (Malaysia) Foreign 2006 
AmIslamic Bank Local 2006 
Asian Finance Bank Foreign 2007 
Alliance Islamic Bank Local 2008 
HSBC Amanah Malaysia  Foreign 2008 
Maybank Islamic  Local 2008 
OCBC Al-Amin Bank  Foreign 2008 
Public Islamic Bank  Local 2009 
Standard Chartered Saadiq  Foreign 2009 
Source: Compiled from Bank Negara Malaysia website (www.bnm.gov.my) 
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Of the total number of banks, 10 banks were local and the remaining 6 were foreign. 
Out of these 16 Islamic banks, only 2 are full-fledged, namely Bank Islam Malaysia 
Berhad (BIMB) and Bank Muamalat Malaysia. The remaining banks are either 
‘windows’ or subsidiaries of the local and foreign conventional banks operating under 
the concept of the Islamic Banking Scheme (IBS) or ‘Skim Perbankan Islam’ (SPI) 
which was introduced in 1994.  
 
The first Islamic bank, the Bank Islam Malaysia Berhad (BIMB), was established in 
1983, which had been the only full-fledged Islamic Bank for 16 years until the second 
Islamic bank known as the Bank Muamalat Malaysia in the year 1999 was instituted. 
However, to encourage competition in the market and to increase the number of 
players without establishing new Islamic banks, Bank Negara Malaysia (BNM) 
allowed the conventional banks to offer Islamic banking products and services 
through a subsidiary or branch under the concept of IBS.  
This chapter, hence, discusses the trajectories of developments in Islamic banking in 
Malaysia over the years and also presents initial empirical findings in relations to its 
performance. 
 
4.2 MILESTONES OF ISLAMIC BANKING IN MALAYSIA 
The principles of Islamic finance were implemented for the first time in Malaysia 
through the establishment of the Pilgrims Saving Account Corporation in 1963. In 
1969, it was renamed the Pilgrims Management and Fund Board or Lembaga Urusan 
Tabung Haji (LUTH). Among other objectives of LUTH was to keep saving for 
Muslims who intend to perform hajj at Mecca. (J.D. Perry and Rehman, 2011).  
Once they had enough saving, arrangements would be made for the depositors to 
perform hajj for the year they had been selected. The LUTH did not pay any interest 
rates to the depositors but invested some of their money and return them as hibah or 
dividend at the end of the year. It should be noted that LUTH has not been 
functioning as a bank, even though it is similar to the extent that they need to keep 
saving and managing the depositors’ money. Thus, it should be considered as a 
socially responsible investment institution or as a saving agency. 
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Muslims in Malaysia did not only require saving keeping function without interest 
payment, but also financing and loans for activities such as business setup, business 
expansion, mortgage loans, car loans, and personal loans. Since LUTH activity is 
limited to saving keeping function for the purpose of performing hajj, there has 
always been a high demand in Malaysia for a financing and loan without charging 
interest or riba. 
In 1980, the Bumiputera National Congress highlighted to the Government the need 
to establish an Islamic bank, which could provide financing and loans without riba. 
Subsequently, in July 1981, the Malaysian government formed a National Steering 
Committee to study the feasibility of setting up an Islamic bank in Malaysia. In March 
1983, Bank Islam Malaysia Berhad (BIMB) was established with an authorised 
capital of RM500 million under the Islamic Banking Act 1983. Among other facilities 
provided by the Islamic banks at that time were deposits, financing and investment 
and other services. 
With regards to deposit, the current account and savings account were based on the 
principles of al-wadiah, without payment of interest rate. The investment account 
deposits adopted the principles of mudharabah, which allows the payment period 
from one (1) month to more than five (5) years. Moreover, banks were not obliged to 
pay any fixed amount of profit on money invested by the depositors. In terms of 
financing and investment, the principles of mudarabah, musharakah, al-bay bithaman 
ajil and ijarah were implemented in project financing, while al-wakalah
10
, al-
murabahah and al-musharakah were used in trade financing. Other services provided 
by the Bank Islam included remittances and transfers, transactions in foreign 
currencies and the sale of travellers’ cheques which were also provided by other 
conventional banks in Malaysia (Bank Islam Malaysia Berhad, 1994: 22). 
Since the activity of Bank Islam Malaysia (BIMB) was limited to banking, in 1984, it 
was allowed to offer products and services of Islamic Insurance (takaful) through the 
establishment of its subsidiary company known as Syarikat Takaful Malaysia. The 
BIMB launched two other subsidiary companies for leasing and operating as an 
                                                 
10
 Al-Wakala refers to agency or a elegation of a duty to another party or agency for specific 
purposes and specific conditions. Under this concept, the bank acts as the customers’ agent in 
completing the financial transaction. As an agent, the bank will be paid a certain amount of 
fee for their services (Bank Negara Malaysia, 2013). 
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agency, namely Al-Ijarah Sendirian Berhad with RM1 million paid capital and Al-
Wakalah Nominees Sendirian Berhad with paid up capital of RM25, 000.00.  
The establishment of the first Islamic insurance company, leasing (ijarah) and agency 
(wakalah) companies was another move to complement the products and services 
offered by the modern Islamic finance industry in Malaysia. For about 16 years, there 
was only one Islamic bank even though initially BIMB made some losses; 
subsequently it made a substantial amount of profit after zakah and tax (Table 4.2). 
 
Table: 4.2: Profit and Loss After Zakah and Tax  
of Bank Islam Malaysia Berhad from 1984 to 1993 
Year Profit and Loss of Bank Islam Malaysia 
Berhad(RM million) 
Change 
(per cent)* 
1984 (1,770,368) - 
1985 148,741 -108.4
 
1986 2,186,000 1370.0 
1987 942,718 -56.8 
1988 2,971,000 215.2 
1989 5,184,000 74.4 
1990 6,896,000 33.0 
1991 8,377,000 21.5 
1992 9,145,000 9.2 
1993 17,535,000 91.7 
Note: (*) Author’s calculation 
Source: Compiled from Annual Report of Bank Islam Malaysia Berhad (1984-1993) 
The profit made by the single Islamic bank became a benchmark for the contemporary 
Islamic banking industry and this motivated the conventional banks to persuade the 
government to allow conventional banks to offer Islamic banking products and 
services.  
In March 1993, the Government through the Central Bank of Malaysia (Bank Negara 
Malaysia-BNM) introduced ‘Interest Free Banking Scheme’ (IFBS) through the local 
conventional banks. Three banks namely Malayan Banking Berhad (Maybank), Bank 
Bumiputra Malaysia Berhad (BBMB) and the United Malayan Banking Corporation 
(UMBC), known as the Sime Bank and later RHB Bank were selected as the pioneers 
to offer products and services under the scheme.  
The decision to permit IFBS in the conventional banks was to increase competition in 
the market and progressively liberalize the industry. However, it posed a challenge 
and a threat to the single Islamic bank. From the regulatory point of view, it was the 
80 
 
most efficient and effective policy to increase the number players in the industry 
within a short period of time at low cost (Bank Negara Malaysia, 1994). From the 
industry perspective, the Government’s decision was a right move to break the 
monopoly in the industry and increase competition. However, from the Islamic 
banker's point of view, it created confusion among the general public. People felt that 
when the conventional banks were allowed to offer products and services of the 
Islamic banking, then there was no point, as there were no differences between 
Islamic and conventional banks. 
The immediate effect of the decision was that BIMB’s cost of funding increased due 
to stiff competition from the conventional banks and the depositors’ changing 
behaviour. They preferred to transfer their deposits to conventional banks when Bank 
Islam offered the lowest rate of return for saving and investment accounts. The 
Islamic bank’s operation was affected as depositors were influenced by the economic 
and financial variables rather than by their religious belief. The Islamic bank and the 
windows became sensitive to the movement of the interest rates offered by the 
conventional banks as claimed by Haron and Wan Azmi (2006). 
Similarly, the Islamic banking scheme could not cater for the lower income groups, 
particularly those who are not credit worthy. In order to help them to gain access to 
the Islamic financing, in August 1993, the government introduced the first Islamic 
pawning scheme (ar-rahnu) under the Cooperative Bank of Malaysia or Bank 
Kerjasama Rakyat Malaysia (Bank Rakyat). 
To facilitate the Islamic banking industry, in January 1994, the government launched 
the first Islamic Interbank Money-Market (IIMM). The main objectives of IIMM were 
to provide short-term funding to Islamic financial institutions and as outlets for 
Shari’ah-based investment, to serve as a channel of monetary policy transmission and 
to match the funding requirements more efficiently and effectively 
(http://iimm.bnmgov.my). 
In 1995, the Association of Islamic Banking Institutions (AIBIM) was formed as the 
sole body to channel views and feedbacks from the industry players and practitioners 
to the government. As part of the institutional developments, in May 1996, Shari’ah 
Advisory Council (SAC) of the Securities Commission was established to explore the 
feasibility of developing an Islamic Capital Market in Malaysia. In May 1997, 
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National Shari’ah Advisory Council (SAC) was recognised as the highest authority in 
Malaysia to formulate Islamic law pertaining to the governance of the Islamic 
banking, takaful, and any other Islamic financial business and services which were 
under the jurisdiction of the Bank Negara Malaysia (BNM).  
The functions and role of SAC were strengthened through the amendment of Central 
Bank of Malaysia Act (CBM), 2009. SAC was granted power as the sole authoritative 
body over individual Shari’ah Advisory Board at the banks and other institutions. In 
the event of any contrary, SAC decision would prevail; and therefore, the Court and 
arbitrators were  required to refer to the ruling of the SAC for any proceeding related 
to Islamic finance, Islamic banking and any other Islamic financial business 
proceeding and such decision of the SAC should be binding (www.bnm.gov.my). 
The decision to establish SAC at the national level was the right move to streamline 
the Islamic laws and fatwas and to avoid banks applying different fatwas. The 
intention was to facilitate the industry players to refer any contradiction or confusion 
among the Shari’ah Advisory Board directly to the SAC. To avoid confusion among 
the industry players and the general public, in December 1998, the term Interest Free 
Banking Scheme was replaced with the term of Islamic Banking. In January 1999, 
Islamic Banking Unit (IBU) was upgraded to an Islamic Banking Division. 
Furthermore, to enhance competition in the industry, in April 1999, the second full-
fledged Islamic Bank was established known as Bank Muamalat Malaysia Berhad. 
In 2000, Bank Negara Malaysia (BNM) introduced ‘Tradable Government Investment 
Issue’, ‘Wadiah Acceptance’ and ‘BNM Negotiable Notes’ as Shari’ah compliant 
instruments to facilitate Islamic Inter-Money Market (IMM). To ensure adequate 
skills and human resources in Islamic finance and banking, BIMB Institute of 
Research and Training was upgraded as the Islamic Banking and Finance Institute of 
Malaysia (IBFIM) in 2001.  
In November 2002, Islamic Financial Services Board (IFSB) was established and 
Malaysia became the Secretariat. The primary objective of the IFSB was to issue 
global prudential standards and guidelines for the Islamic finance and banking, capital 
market and Takaful industry. IFSB was also expected to undertake research and 
coordinate initiatives on industry related issues including organising seminar and 
conferences for the industry players particularly the regulators and stakeholders. 
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In 2003, the first Islamic asset-backed bond was issued based on the al-bay bithaman 
ajil principle (BBA) valued at RM986 million. After about 20 years of the Islamic 
banks establishment, in 2004, the Government liberalized the Islamic financial 
industry by issuing three new licences to the foreign Islamic banks: Kuwait Finance 
House, Al Rajhi Investment Bank and Saudi and Qatar Investment Group and allowed 
them to operate in Malaysia. This move was to enhance competition in the market by 
providing indigenous players the opportunity to operate within the same playing field 
with international players. 
In 2005, BNM introduced Product Approval Repository System (PARS). The 
objectives were to mitigate risk during the product development, improve the time-to 
market for financial institutions, introducing new products and to ensure that products 
were developed, targeted for the right market and consumer segment 
(www.bnm.gov.my). In the same year, Kuwait Finance House started its operation as 
the first foreign Islamic bank in Malaysia.  
To allow for a healthy competition in the takaful industry, in 2006, BNM issued four 
new licences for takaful operation. Two conventional banks namely Affin Islamic 
Bank and EONCAP Islamic Banks started their operations in 2006. A year later, 
Asian Finance Banks started their operation as one of the foreign Islamic banks. In 
2008, four conventional banks started Islamic banking operation through their 
subsidiaries namely, the Alliance Islamic Bank, HSBC Amanah Malaysia, Maybank 
Islamic and OCBC Al-Amin. In 2009, two conventional banks commenced their 
Islamic banks operation namely Public Islamic Bank and Standard Chartered Saadiq. 
From 1963, after the establishment of the LUTH, the Islamic finance industry 
direction was moving towards to the commercial sector by applying principles of 
Islamic finance to the banking sector including takaful business. However, in a critical 
perspective, the focus and policy measures has been more on tijari sector 
(commercial), namely banking sector and not much effort and measures was 
formulated to enhance the ijtimai’ sector (social) non-bank financial institutions.  
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4.3 ISLAMIC BANKS ASSETS 
In 1984, the total asset of the Islamic banks was RM 326 million, where there was 
only one Islamic bank. In 2012, there were 16 Islamic banks and the total assets were 
valued at RM 381,429.2 million with an annual average growth rate of 23 per cent. 
Despite the fact that growth rates of the assets of Islamic banks were exceedingly high 
in 1986 and 1994, it could not be compared to the total industry growth rate because 
there was only one bank at that time.  
Even though, the total assets of Islamic banks increased throughout 1984 to 2012, the 
average growth rate of the Islamic banks aggregate assets was growing slightly more 
or less than 20 per cent over 2000, as depicted in Figure 4.1. It should be noted that 
the assets of Islamic banks increased after the decision of the Bank Negara Malaysia 
in 1994 to permit the conventional banks to offer products and services of Islamic 
banks through their subsidiary or branch. 
 
Figure 4.1: Total Assets and Percentage Change 
of Islamic Banks from 1984 to 2012 
 
Source: Compiled from Bank Negara Malaysia Monthly Statistical Bulletin,2013. 
The comprehensive data of the Islamic banking industry was accessible only from 
2006 onwards. Therefore, the following discussion is based on data from 2006 to 
2012. As can be seen in Table 4.3, in 2012, financing and advances comprised 61 per 
cent of the total assets of the Islamic banking industry compared to 55.6 per cent in 
2006. The annual average growth rate was 23.6 per cent. The second higher amount 
of assets in 2012 was in the form of Government Securities (17.3 per cent) followed 
by amounts payable by other banks in Malaysia. 
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Table 4.3: List of the Total Assets of the Islamic Banks from 2006 to 2012 
Assets 2006 
(RM  
million) 
  
Percentage  
of Total Assets 
in 2006 
2012 
(RM 
million) 
  
Percentage  
of Total Assets 
in 2012 
Annual Average 
Growth Rate (per 
cent)* 
 
Financing                    
and advances
 2
 
73,368.10 55.6 232,805.40 61.0 14.10 
Amounts due from 
other banks in 
Malaysia 
34,934.51 26.5 50,423.52 13.2 3.00 
Malaysian 
Securities  
14,928.90 11.3 65,922.40 17.3 4.00 
Statutory reserves 
with Bank Negara 
Malaysia 
2,616.70 2.0 9,251.50 2.4 0.60 
Outside Malaysia 1,890.70 1.4 6,245.00 1.6 0.40 
In Malaysia 
3
 1,594.10 1.2 4,112.00 1.1 0.20 
Negotiable 
instruments of 
deposit held 
1,560.20 1.2 8,442.20 2.2 0.50 
Fixed assets 500.50 0.4 1,378.00 0.4 0.10 
Cash  359.20 0.3 944.10 0.2 0.10 
Outside Malaysia 79.00 0.1 1,803.70 0.5 0.10 
Balances with Bank 
Negara Malaysia 
72.00 0.1 100.80 0.0 - 
Other deposits 
placed and reverse 
repos
1
 
4.70 0.0 0.50 0.0 - 
Total  Assets 131,908.60 100.0 381,429.20 100.0 23.00 
Notes: (*) Author’s calculation; 1 excludes financing sold to Cagamas with recourse; 2 
comprises RM fixed deposits placed with domestic banking institution and domestic non-
bank financial institution, Islamic banking scheme RM deposits placed with domestic banking 
institution and RM reverse repo. 
Source: Compiled from Bank Negara Malaysia, Monthly Statistical Bulletin, 2013. 
 
4.4 ISLAMIC BANKS’ CONSTITUENTS OF CAPITAL 
In 2006, the total constituents of the Islamic banks amounted to RM27.7 million. As 
depicted in Table 4.4, the total capital of the Islamic banks grew at a negative annual 
growth rate of 15.8 per cent from 2006 to 2012. The core capital and capital base 
increased at an annual average growth rate of 17.7 per cent and 15.4 per cent 
respectively. The negative annual growth rate of the risk weighted capital ratio, and 
core capital ratio indicated that the Islamic banks were able to manage their risk 
portfolios.  
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Table 4.4: Constituents of Capital of Islamic Banking from 2006 to 2012 
Constituents  
of Capital 
2006 
(RM Million) 
2012 
(RM million) 
Annual Average 
Growth Rate 
(per cent) * 
Core Capital 10,569.50 23,640.4 17.7 
Tier-2 Capital 3,309.50 5,824.1 10.9 
Capital Base 13,856.60 28,815.0 15.4 
Investment in subsidiaries and 
holdings in other banking 
22.5 103.16743 51.2 
Total Capital 27,757.90 58,382.67 15.8 
Total Risk Weighted Assets
1
 80,835.60 202,123.7 21.4 
Risk-Weighted Capital Ratio 
(per cent) 
17.1 14.3 -2.3 
Core Capital Ratio (per cent) 13.1 11.7 -1.5 
Notes: (*) Author’s calculation; 1 Total Risk-Weighted Assets, Risk-Weighted Capital Ratio 
and Core Capital Ratio include market risk factor  
Source: Compiled from Bank Negara Malaysia, Monthly Statistical Bulletin, 2013. 
 
4.5 THE CAPITAL AND LIABILITIES OF ISLAMIC BANKS 
The total capital and liabilities of the banking industry amounted to RM1.9 billion in 
2012 compared to RM1.09 billion in 2006. The amount of aggregate capital and 
liabilities of the banking industry grew at an annual growth rate of 9.5 per cent from 
2006 to 2012. At the same time, the total capital and liabilities of conventional bank 
grew at an annual average rate of 7.2 per cent.  
 
Table 4.5: Total Capital and Liabilities in the Banking Industry in 2012 
Capital and Liabilities 2006 2012 Annual Average 
Growth Rate 
RM million RM million (per cent)* 
Commercial Banks 954,011.1 1,473,818.3 7.8 
Investment Banks 65,101.80 62,246.6 -0.6 
Total Conventional Bank 1,019,112.87 1,536,064.9 7.2 
Islamic Banks  73,801.60 373,159.3 57.9 
Islamic Banking Scheme (IBS) 58,107.00 8,269.8 -12.3 
Total Islamic Banking 131,908.60 381,429.2 27.0 
TOTAL BANKING SYSTEM 1,151,021.47 1,917,494.10 9.5 
Note: (*) Author’s calculation 
Source: Compiled from Bank Negara Malaysia, Monthly Statistical Bulletin, 2013. 
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However, the rate was lower than the Islamic banking system which grew at a rate of 
27 per cent for the past five years. As can be seen in Table 4.5, the highest amount of 
growth rate was for Islamic banks which grew at an annual average rate of 57.9 per 
cent, even though the IBS grew at a negative rate of 12.3 per cent. This also indicates 
that full-fledged Islamic banks in Malaysia were more popular than IBS despite the 
fact that IBS had a greater number. 
 
Table 4.6: Capital and Liabilities of the Islamic Banking in 2006 and 2012 
Capital & Liabilities 2006 2012 Annual 
Average 
Growth 
Rate  
(per 
cent)* 
Islamic 
Banks 
IBS Total 
Islamic 
Banking 
Islamic 
Banks 
IBS Total 
Islamic 
Banking 
Total deposits 58,470.30 40,713.40 99,183.70 301,537.30 4,919.20 306,456.50 29.9 
Deposits under the 
New Investment 
Fund2 
58.20 269.80 328.00 820.00 - 820.00 21.4 
Special Deposits  
Account 
0.20 0.60 0.80 0.20 - 0.20 -10.7 
Capital and 
reserves1 
5,992.50 5,567.00 11,559.50 24,912.40 1,757.50 26,669.90 18.7 
Amount due to 
banks in Malaysia 
1,545.80 3,055.30 4,601.20 19,203.10 938.60 20,141.70 48.2 
Total Miscellaneous 
Borrowing, Debt 
and Liabilities 
7,118.10 8,769.00 15,887.00 21,600.10 653.70 22,253.80 5.7 
Amount Due 
Outside Malaysia 
674.90 2.30 677.20 6,055.30 0.90 6,056.20 113.5 
Bankers 
acceptances 
outstanding 
970.80 264.10 1,234.90 1,470.60 - 1,470.60 2.7 
Bill Payable in 
Malaysia 
155.10 101.80 256.90 717.20 50.70 767.90 28.4 
Total Capital and 
Liabilities** 
73,801.60 58,107.00 131,908.60 373,159.30 8,269.80 381,429.20 27 
Notes: (*) Author’s calculation; 1 From December 1996 onwards includes current unaudited 
unadjusted profit/loss; 
2
 Total deposits include government deposits placed with the 
commercial banks for the purpose of financing new projects (manufacturing, agriculture, 
mining and tourism) and under the New Investment Fund which includes deposits for loans to 
hawkers and petty traders. As of April 1997, also include Housing Development Account 
deposits and other RM Eligible-Liabilities-Exempt deposits; (**) Total Capital and Liabilities 
amount excluding the value of Deposit under the New Investment Fund, Special Deposit 
Account, Bankers Acceptance outstanding and bill payable in Malaysia 
Source: Compiled from Bank Negara Malaysia, Monthly Statistical Bulletin, 2013. 
Of total capital and liabilities of the Islamic banking industry, aggregate deposit was 
the highest in terms of value of the liabilities. As depicted in Table 4.6, the amount 
due outside Malaysia grew at an annual rate of 113.5 per cent. In terms of value, the 
amount due outside Malaysia was relatively low compared to the amount due in 
Malaysia. The higher annual average growth rate of the amount due outside Malaysia 
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indicates a growing number of demand deposits, general investment deposit, special 
investment deposit and savings deposits in foreign currency managed by the Islamic 
banks. 
 
4.6 FINANCING OF THE ISLAMIC BANKS 
As for the financing of Islamic banks, the total financing of Islamic banks grew at an 
annual average rate of 7.2 per cent from 1984 to 2012.  
Table 4.7: Financing of Islamic Banking against Banking System in 2006 and 2012 
Financing 2006 
(RM millions) 
2012 
(RM millions) 
Annual Average 
Growth Rate (per 
cent)* 
Commercial Banks 546,024.6 865,353.2 8.4 
Investment/Merchant Banks 7,507.9 6,420.9 -2.1 
Total Conventional 553,532.5 871,774.2 8.2 
Islamic banks 39,481.5 236,230.6 71.2 
Islamic banking scheme (IBS) 38,832.6 399.8 -14.1 
Total Islamic Banking 78,314.1 236,630.4 28.9 
TOTAL BANKING SYSTEM 631,846.6 1,108,404.6 10.8 
Notes: (*) Author’s calculation 
Source: Compiled from Monthly Statistical Bulletin, Bank Negara Malaysia, 2013 
As can be seen in Table 4.7, in overall, the total financing of the banking system grew 
at an annual growth rate of 10.8 per cent and conventional banks’ total financing grew 
at an annual rate of 8.2 per cent from 2006 to 2012. The total financing of the Islamic 
banking industry grew at an annual growth rate of 28.9 per cent. From 1984 until 
2012, financing of Islamic banks grew at an annual average rate of 71.2 per cent. 
However, the Islamic banks’ market share of financing was under 22 per cent in 2012 
compared to the conventional banks. Despite the fact that the Islamic banks grew at a 
higher rate, the conventional banks remained dominant in the industry due to various 
reasons. Figure 4.2 shows that the percentage change of the total financing of Islamic 
banks was high in 1985 and 1997 because in 1985 there was a commodity crisis and 
in 1997 a currency crisis. During the time of crisis more financing was required to 
boost the economic growth. Overall, the financing of the Islamic banks was 50 per 
cent since 2000 until 2012. 
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Figure 4.2: Total Financing and Annual Growth Rate from 1984 to 2012 
 
 
Source: Compiled from Bank Negara Malaysia, Monthly Statistical Bulletin, 2013. 
Figure 4.3 shows that in 2012, the total loans in the banking industry amounted to 
RM1.108 billion. The conventional bank's market share amounted to RM871.7 
million (79 per cent) and total loan by the Islamic banks amounted to RM 236.6 
million (213 per cent).  
Figure 4.3: Total Loans by the Banking Sector in 2012 
 
Source: Compiled from Bank Negara Malaysia, Monthly Statistical Bulletin, 2013 
As regards to the breakdown of the financing areas, as can be seen in Table 4.8, the 
highest amount of financing of the Islamic banks was for purchasing of other than 
passenger cars valued at 58.8 million in 2012. The financing for purchasing of 
passenger cars was at 23.6 per cent. However, the percentage shares for purchasing of 
passenger cars decreased by 10.4 per cent from 34.0 per cent in 2006 to 23.6 per cent 
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in 2012. The Working capital financing decreased by 1 per cent from 22.8 per cent in 
2006 to 21.8 per cent in 2012. 
As depicted in Table 4.8, financing of personal loan grew by 4.7 per cent followed by 
financing of purchasing securities by 4.5 per cent. Despite the fact that financing of 
purchasing vehicles other than passengers cars increased by 25 per cent, in terms of 
value it was still small compared to financing for purchasing passenger cars, working 
capital and purchase of residential property. 
 
Table 4.8: Financing and Investment of Islamic Banks  
by Purpose from 2006 and 2012 
Purpose of Financing 
  
2006 
(RM 
millions) 
  
Percentage  
of Total 
Financing 
2006 
2012 
(RM 
millions) 
  
Percentage  
of Total 
Financing 
in 2012 
Annual 
Average 
Growth 
Rate 
(per 
cent)* 
Purchase of passenger cars 26,607.00 34 55,887.4 23.6 3.4 
Working capital 17,834.90 22.8 51,586.2 21.8 3.1 
Purchase of residential property 17,110.60 21.8 48,349.0 20.4 2.9 
Personal use 5,327.30 6.8 27,181.4 11.5 1.6 
Other purpose 3,918.10 5 12,256.3 5.2 0.7 
Purchase of non-residential 
property 
2,970.50 3.8 13,766.8 5.8 0.8 
Construction 1,682.40 2.1 7,371.8 3.1 0.4 
Purchase of fixed assets other than 
land and building 
885.4 1.1 2,433.0 1.0 0.1 
Purchase of securities 790.9 1 13,049.8 5.5 0.8 
Purchase  vehicles other than 
passenger cars 
620 0.8 58,839.1 24.9 3.6 
Credit card 549.2 0.7 1,780.9 0.8 0.1 
Purchase of consumer durables 17.8 0 16.2 0.0 0.0 
Total Financing 78,314.10 100 236,630.4 100 14.3 
Note: (*) Author’s calculation 
Source: Compiled from Monthly Statistical Bulletin, Bank Negara Malaysia, 2013 
 
With regards to the financing of Islamic banks by sectors, as depicted in Table 4.9, in 
2012, financing and investment on the households recorded the highest value and the 
percentage share was more than 62 per cent, followed by the agro-based 
manufacturing, and education and health related sectors valued at RM14 million. The 
financing of mining and quarrying activities recorded the highest annual average 
growth rate of 359.9 per cent, followed by education, health and others (256.6 per 
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cent), and real estate (101.4 per cent) However, in terms of value, financing value of 
mining and quarrying activity remained small compared to other sectors. 
 
Table 4.9: Financing of Islamic Banking by Sectors in 2012 
Financing by Sectors 2006 
(RM 
millions)  
  
Percentage  
of Total 
Financing 
in 2006  
2012 
(RM 
millions)  
  
Percentage  
of Total 
Financing 
in 2012  
Annual 
Average 
Growth Rate 
(per cent)* 
 
Household sector 50,339.60 64.3 147,120.6 62.2 27.5 
Manufacturing (including 
agro-based) 
8,379.50 10.7 14,691.9 6.2 10.8 
Wholesale & retail trade, 
and hotels & restaurants 
3,885.30 5 9,768.6 4.1 21.6 
Construction 3,362.40 4.3 10,240.1 4.3 29.2 
Finance, insurance and 
business activities 
3,105.90 4 12,881.8 5.4 45.0 
Primary agriculture 
2,996.50 3.8 5,099.4 2.2 10.0 
Other sector n.e.c. 
2,320.00 3 2,607.4 1.1 1.8 
Transport, storage and 
communications 
1,585.30 2 6,700.2 2.8 46.1 
Real estate 
1,250.60 1.6 10,130.5 4.3 101.4 
Education, health and others 
740.6 0.9 14,045.8 5.9 256.6 
Electricity, gas and water 
supply 
300.5 0.4 2,089.6 0.9 85.1 
Mining and quarrying 
47.9 0.1 1,254.6 0.5 359.9 
Total financing 
78,314.10 100 236,630.42 100.0 28.9 
Note: (*) Author’s calculation 
Source: Compiled from Monthly Statistical Bulletin, Bank Negara Malaysia, 2013 
In furthering the analysis, Table 4.10 demonstrates the distribution of Islamic bank 
financing according to the Islamic financial instruments As can be seen, in 2012, al-
bay bithaman ajil was the most popular mode of financing which amounted to 
RM74.2 million, followed by ijarah thumma al bay’ amounted to RM54.5 million, 
Others (RM50.1 million) and murabahah (RM40 million). Musharakah grew at the 
highest annual average growth rate (484.9 per cent) for the past seven years, but, the 
value of financing remained small compared to the al-bay bithaman ajil and ijarah 
thumma al-bay. As can be seen in Table 4.10, murabahah mode of financing 
increased from 6.8 per cent in 2006 to 16.9 per cent in 2012. 
Table 4.10: Financing of Islamic Banking by Concept in Year 2006 and 2012 
Financing Instrument 2006 
(RM 
millions) 
  
Percentage  
of Total 
Financing 
in 2006 
2012 
(RM 
millions) 
  
Percentage  
of Total 
Financing 
in 2012 
Annual 
Average  
Growth Rate 
(per cent)* 
Al-Bay Bithaman Ajil 29,845.00 38.1 74,280.6 31.4 16 
Ijarah Thumma Al-Bay 21,470.40 27.4 54,574.7 23.1 20.5 
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Financing Instrument 2006 
(RM 
millions) 
  
Percentage  
of Total 
Financing 
in 2006 
2012 
(RM 
millions) 
  
Percentage  
of Total 
Financing 
in 2012 
Annual 
Average  
Growth Rate 
(per cent)* 
Others
1
 20,120.80 25.7 50,157.3 21.2 11.6 
Murabahah 5,300.90 6.8 40,018.4 16.9 67.9 
Ijarah 762.9 1 4,635.7 2.0 83.3 
Istisna' 509.4 0.7 989.3 0.4 43.6 
Musharakah 156.8 0.2 11,832.2 5.0 484.9 
Mudharabah 147.9 0.2 142.2 0.1 17.3 
Total Financing 78,314.10 100 236,630.42 100.0 21.4 
Note: (*) Author’s calculation; 1 Other financing includes credit cards, staff financing, share 
margin financing Source: Compiled from Monthly Statistical Bulletin, Bank Negara 
Malaysia, 2013 
 
4.7 ISLAMIC BANK DEPOSITS 
As regards to the trends in the total deposit of Islamic banks, as can be seen in Figure 
4.4, it increased tremendously from 1984 to 2012. The highest percentage change was 
in 1986 and 1994. The lowest changes were in 1984, 1987 and 1991. The annual 
growth change was more volatile before 2002 and became relatively more stable after 
2002 until 2012. The total deposits of the Islamic banking industry grew at an annual 
average rate of 37 per cent per year. 
 
Figure 4.4: Total Deposit and Annual Growth from Year 1984 to 2012 
 
Source: Compiled from Bank Negara Malaysia, Monthly Statistical Bulletin, 2013 
In detailing the total deposits held in the Islamic banks, Table 4.11 shows that in 
2012, the total deposit of the Islamic banking industry was valued at RM 612.9 
million.  
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Table 4.11: Deposits of Islamic Banking by Holders in 2006 and 2012 
Deposits by Holders 2006 
(RM millions) 
Percentage  
of Total 
Deposits 
in 2006 
2012 
(RM millions) 
Percentage  
of Total 
Deposits 2012 
Annual Average  
Growth Rate 
(per cent)* 
Business enterprises 34,487.20 34.8 208,445.46 34.0 4.9 
Financial  
Institutions 
23,936.00 24.1 154,785.33 25.3 3.6 
Individuals
2
 22,192.50 22.4 150,045.04 24.5 3.5 
Government
1
 18,568.00 18.7 99,637.09 16.3 2.3 
Total Deposits 99,183.70 100 612,912.92 100.0 14.3 
Note: (*) Author’s calculation 
Source: Compiled from Monthly Statistical Bulletin, Bank Negara Malaysia, 2013 
 
In 2006, the highest amount of deposits came from business enterprises amounted to 
RM 34.4 million (34.8 per cent) followed by financial institutions (24.1 per cent) and 
individuals (22.4 per cent). In 2006 and 2012, deposits from the government sector 
were the lowest, valued at RM18.5 million 18.7 per cent) and RM 99.6 million (16.3 
per cent) respectively. In 2012, the highest percentage of annual growth was the 
deposit from the business enterprises (4.9 per cent) followed by financial institutions 
(3.6 per cent) and individuals (3.5 per cent) as shown in Table 4.11. This indicates 
that the main contributors to the deposits of the Islamic banks were business 
enterprises, financial institutions, individuals. However, in terms of value, in 2012, 
the amount of deposits from individuals and financial institutions increased by 2.1 per 
cent and 1.2 per cent respectively. 
With regards to the types of deposits held by the Malaysian Islamic banks, Table 4.12 
shows that in 2012, in terms of deposits by holders, the highest types of deposits were 
RM Others (29.3 per cent) followed by RM General Investment Deposit (27.1 per 
cent), and RM Demand Deposit (17.8 per cent). The highest annual average growth 
rate was for FX General Investment Deposit (11,872 per cent) but in terms of value it 
was still inconsequential compared to RM General Investment Deposit. 
 
Table 4.12: Types of Deposits of Islamic Banking in 2006 and 2012 
Types of Deposits 2006 
(RM 
millions)  
Percentage 
of Total 
Deposits  
2012 
(RM 
millions)  
Percentage 
of Total 
Deposits  
Annual Average 
Growth  
Rate (per cent) * 
RM General ID 37,303.50 37.6 83,076.28 27.1 17.5 
RM Demand Deposit 20,430.80 20.6 54,660.38 17.8 23.9 
NIDs** Issued 14,961.80 15.1 22,524.84 7.4 7.2 
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Types of Deposits 2006 
(RM 
millions)  
Percentage 
of Total 
Deposits  
2012 
(RM 
millions)  
Percentage 
of Total 
Deposits  
Annual Average 
Growth  
Rate (per cent) * 
RM Special ID 11,876.10 12 23,788.15 7.8 14.3 
RM Saving Deposit 11,096.00 11.2 26,988.07 8.8 20.5 
RM Others  3,017.70 3 89,933.44 29.3 411.5 
FX Others  401.3 0.4 3,207.06 1.0 99.9 
FX Demand Deposit 94.4 0.1 793.42 0.3 105.8 
FX General ID 1.3 0 1,081.66 0.4 11,872.1 
FX Special ID 0 0 347.32 0.1 NA 
FX Saving Deposit 0 0 55.85 0.0 NA 
TOTAL DEPOSITS 99,183.00 100 306,456.46 100 29.9 
Notes:(*)Author’s calculation; (**) NID-Negotiable Instrument Deposit, ID-Investment Deposit.  
Source: Compiled from Monthly Statistical Bulletin, Bank Negara Malaysia, 2013 
 
4.8 RATE OF FINANCING AND RATE OF RETURN TO DEPOSITORS 
In providing further understanding as to the developments and trends in the Malaysian 
Islamic banking, this section presents analysis on the rate of financing and rate of 
return to depositors.   
 
Table 4.13: Financing Rates and Return Rates by Islamic Commercial Banks 
for Investment and Saving Account from 2002 to 2012 
Year Investment Account 
Average Rate of Return during the 
Period (in months) 
Savings 
Deposit 
Rate 
Base 
Financing 
Rate 
1
 
Average 
Financing 
Rate
1
 
 
1 3 6 9 12 
2002 2.84 2.94 3.15 3.3 3.52 2.09 - - 
2003 2.69 2.77 3.04 3.22 3.48 2.05 - - 
2004 2.65 2.7 2.93 3.14 3.23 1.8 - - 
2005 2.54 2.65 2.84 3.03 3.28 1.57 - - 
2006 2.88 2.95 3.13 3.28 3.52 1.33 - - 
2007 2.88 3.07 3.24 3.41 3.7 1.25 - - 
2008 2.78 2.89 3.1 3.23 3.45 1.19 - - 
2009 2.24 2.34 2.51 2.63 3.01 0.95 5.68 6.64 
2010 2.54 2.69 2.7 2.77 2.93 0.94 6.07 6.41 
2011 3.00 3.05 3.12 3.22 3.25 1.02 6.52 6.31 
2012 2.93 3.08 3.15 3.31 3.31 0.96 6.62 6.01 
Note:
 1 
Data only available from January 2009 
Source: Compiled from Monthly Statistical Bulletin, Bank Negara Malaysia, 2013. 
As can be seen in Table 4.13, the highest rate of return for one year (twelve months) 
investment account in Islamic banks was in year 2007 (3.7 per cent) followed by 2002 
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(3.52 per cent) and 2006 (3.52 per cent ) respectively. The lowest rate of return of the 
investment account was 2.24 per cent in 2010. For saving deposit, the highest rate was 
2.09 per cent in 2002 while the lowest was 0.94 per cent in 2010. The base financing 
rate increased by 0.94 per cent from 5.68 per cent in 2009 to 6.62 per cent in 2012. 
This indicates that the Islamic banks profit rate spread increased, which means the 
higher spread of Islamic banks reflects higher cost of funds and inefficiency of the 
Islamic banks. 
As for the rate of return of the investment account, Table 4.14 shows that it was 
marginally lower than that offered by the Islamic commercial banks. The highest rate 
of return was at 3.48 per cent in 2006, 2007 and 2008. On the other hand, the lowest 
rate of return was in 2002 (1.08 per cent). Table 4.14 shows the rates of returns of the 
investment account offered by the Islamic investment banks from 2002 to 2012. 
 
Table 4.14: Rates of Return of Investment Account of the Islamic Investment Banks 
from 2002 to 2012 
Year Investment Account Period (in months) 
1 3 6 9 12 
2002 1.08 2.95 2.93 3.40 2.16 
2003 2.82 2.35 2.14 N/A N/A 
2004 2.89 2.81 2.59 0.25 1.79 
2005 2.78 2.37 2.84 3.02 3.14 
2006 3.39 3.14 3.41 3.36 3.48 
2007 3.35 3.41 3.48 0.92 1.94 
2008 3.48 3.48 3.39 2.33 1.81 
2009 2.27 2.30 2.23 2.44 2.27 
2010 2.61 2.64 2.66 2.72 2.77 
2011 3.15 3.22 3.27 3.23 3.33 
2012 3.08 3.09 3.12 3.17 3.34 
Note: N/A = Not Available 
Source: Compiled from Monthly Statistical Bulletin, Bank Negara Malaysia, 2013. 
 
4.9 ESTIMATING THE PERFORMANCE OF MALAYSIAN ISLAMIC 
BANKS THROUGH FINANCIAL RATIOS  
In presenting further analysis on the development trajectories of Islamic banks in 
Malaysia, this section aims to present that analysis on the performance of Malaysian 
Islamic banks through ratio analysis. As part of financial ratio analysis, Risk 
Weighted Capital Ratio (RWCR) is an important component of capital ratio and the 
key indicator to measure bank’s solvency and resilience (Le Lesle & Avramova, 
95 
 
2012: 4). The banks can increase their capital adequacy ratio by increasing the amount 
of regulatory capital held or decreasing the risk weighted assets (Das & Amadou, 
2012: 3) 
In Malaysia, RWCR was introduced in 1989 based on the Basel Committee on 
Banking Supervision (BASEL 1) Capital Adequacy Framework. The computation of 
the RWCR is as below: 
    
 
           
                                                     
                                    
 
 
Notes: 
1
 For Investment Banks, the Credit RWA shall include Counterparty Risk 
RWA and Large Exposure Risk RWA for a single counterparty; 
2
Large Exposure 
Risk RWA for Equity Holdings is as specified in the Bank’s Guidelines on ‘Risk-
weighted Capital Adequacy Framework (Basel I–Risk-weighted Assets 
Computation)’ 
In June 2004, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision issued the revised 
standards of the capital adequacy known as BASEL II. With regards to the Islamic 
banks, the capital adequacy framework was developed based on the BASEL II 
standards for institutions offering Islamic financial services and issued by the Islamic 
Financial Services Board (IFSB) in December 2005. It was implemented in the year 
2008. The computation of the RWCR under the Basel II standard is as below:  
     
           
                                                     
                                                  
 
 
Notes: 
1
For Investment Banks, the Credit RWA shall include Counterparty Risk RWA 
and Large Exposure Risk RWA for a single counterparty; 
2
Large Exposure Risk RWA 
for Equity Holdings is as specified in the Bank’s Guidelines on “Risk-weighted Capital 
Adequacy Framework (Basel II – Risk-weighted Assets Computation)” and “Capital 
Adequacy Framework for the Islamic banks 
For the banking institutions licensed under the Banking and the Financial Institutions 
Act, 1989 (BAFIA) with Islamic banking operations in Malaysia, the minimum 
RWCR was set at 8 per cent. The calculation of the RWCR as below:  
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The funds deposited under the profit and sharing investment account (PSIA) were 
eligible for recognition as a risk absorbent for credit and market. However, the 
eligibility was not extended as a risk absorbent for operational risk. The risk had to 
borne by the Islamic banks. The RWCR calculation of the Islamic banks licenced 
under the BAFIA with Islamic banking operations is as follows: 
     
                     
                                 
    
                                                           
     
                                                               
 
Notes: 
1 
Total RWA is the sum of Credit, Market, Operational RWA and Large 
Exposure Risk RWA for Equity Holdings
; 2 
(1-a) represents the quantum of PSIA that 
is recognised as a risk absorbent for RWCR computation purposes
; 3
 PSIA balances 
include Profit Equalisation Reserves. 
Source: Bank Negara Malaysia 
Table 4.15 shows the calculated RWCR and other financial ratios of the Islamic banks 
for 2008 to the year 2012. The RWCR of the Islamic banks slightly increased by 0.3 
per cent from 14 per cent in 2008 to 14.3 per cent in 2012. The RWCR of the Islamic 
banks was set higher to cushion the Islamic banks from the financial crisis. The core 
capital ratio was set above 10 per cent from year 2008 to 2012. The ratio of the return 
on assets increased by 0.4 per cent from 1.0 per cent in 2008 to 1.4 per cent in 2012. 
The net impaired financing ratio decreased by 1.1 per cent from 2.3 per cent in 2008 
to 1.2 in 2012. 
Table 4.15: Financial Ratios of the Islamic banks from Year 2008 to 2012 
Ratio/Year 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012* 
Risk Weighted Capital Ratio 14.0 15.6 15.5 15.0 14.3 
Core Capital Ratio 11.8 13.2 13.3 12.1 11.7 
Return on Assets 1.0 1.3 1.3 1.0 1.4 
Net Impaired Financing Ratio 2.3 2.2 2.1 1.6 1.2 
Note: (*) Preliminary Data 
Source: BNM Financial Stability and Payment Report 2012, (Table A2) 
 
97 
 
4.10 CONCLUSION 
Islamic banking is relatively a young industry in Malaysia. The development of 
Islamic banking in Malaysia can be divided into three phases. The initial phase was 
known as ‘familiarisation’ phase from 1983 to 1992. The second phase was from 
1993 to 2003, which encouraged competition in the market by allowing the 
conventional banks to offer Islamic banking products and services under the Islamic 
Banking Scheme (IBS). The third phase started in 2004, when the industry was 
liberalized by issuing additional licence to the foreign Islamic banks to operate in 
Malaysia (Mokhtar et al., 2006). 
In summary, as can be seen in Table 4.16, in 2012, the total deposits and financing of 
Islamic banking exceeded 25 per cent but the amount of total assets was below 25 per 
cent. Despite the fact that the conventional banks were charging interest rates and 
their products were not Shari’ah compliant, they controlled the major market shares. 
Furthermore, as an performance indicator, the total financing to deposit ratio 
increased by 4.2 per cent from 77.4 in 2006 to 81.6 per cent in 2012. 
 
Table 4.16: Summary of the Key Financial Indicator of Islamic Banks, 2008-2012 
Items 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012** 
 
Total Assets 250,988.1 303,224.1 351,195.0 434,665.5 494,585.7 
per cent of total assets 
against the banking system 
17.4 19.6 20.7 22.4 23.8 
Total Deposits 194,385.5 235,938.1 277,549.8 340,695.8 386,196.8 
per cent of total Deposits 
against the banking system 
18.8 20.7 22.6 24.4 25.6 
Total Financing 150,499.0 186,864.3 222,214.3 268,251.5 314,980.9 
per cent of total Financing 
against the banking system 
18.9 21.6 22.7 24.3 25.8 
Financing Deposit Ratio* 77.4 79.2 80.1 78.7 81.6 
Number of Islamic Banks*  15 17 17 16 16 
Notes: (*) Author’s calculation; (**) Preliminary data 
Source: Bank Negara Malaysia, 2012 
Table 4.16 shows that the total financing deposit ratio of Islamic banking was close to 
the ratio of the conventional banks. This indicates that the Islamic banks were moving 
towards a similar pattern and contributing to the debt creation in the financial system. 
98 
 
Despite the fact that the Government of Malaysia supported the development of the 
Islamic banking industry, the growth was very much dependant on trust and supports 
from the business enterprises, financial institutions and individuals. This was evident 
as the highest amount of deposits came from business enterprises, financial 
institutions and individuals, but not from the government sector. 
 
In conclusion, after discussing the developments, trends and performance of Islamic 
banking industry in Malaysia, the following chapters aim at providing empirical 
studies through econometric modelling by focusing particular aspects of monetary 
policy, instruments and outcomes in relation with Islamic banking operations and the 
interaction between the two to shed a greater light on the operations of Islamic banks 
within the dual banking system and conventional monetary policy framework. 
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CHAPTER 5 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter briefly explained the research methodology applied for conducting the 
study. Among other method used for analysing the data include descriptive statistics 
test and advance statistical analyses. Descriptive analysis includes normality test by 
plotting the histogram, or scatter plot to see the distribution of the data.  The advanced 
analysis includes two steps of the Engle-Granger test. This include estimating the 
model using the ordinary least square test and proceed with checking the unit root of 
the residual in the model to identify the weather the residual is stationary or non-
stationary by conducting the unit root test in particular the Dickey Fuller and Phillip-
Perron test. Co-integration test mainly the Johansen co-integration test to investigate 
co-integration between the variables in the model. Vector Error Correction Model 
(VECM) was conducted to investigate the speed of adjustment in the model and 
minimize effect of the error term in the model. The Granger causality test was 
conducted to analyse any causality effect between the variables. The Ordinary Least 
Square method was used to identify linear relationship between the variables. Among 
other steps taken before conducting the analysis were describe as below.  
 
5.2 Descriptive Statistics-Normality Test-Histogram and Scatter Plot  
 
Normality test was conducted with the assumption that the error term was normally 
distributed. There are three ways to conduct normality tests: plotting a histogram of 
residuals, normal probability plot or scatter plot and the Jarque-Bera. The histogram 
charts show the pattern and the distribution of the data; the scatter plot shows the 
distribution of the data along the regression line, while the Jarque-Bera test identifies 
departures of the ordinary square residuals from the normal distribution by looking at 
the kurtosis and skewness of the distribution. 
 
 
100 
 
5.3 Two Steps of Engle Granger Test 
 
Engle Granger test involved estimation of the data using the ordinary least square test, 
followed by checking the unit root in the residual. Residual testing need to be done to 
ensure that there is no unit root in the residual. Otherwise the model is spurious and 
not good for estimation and analysis. The next step is to identify cointengration 
between the variables by conducting Johansen cointegration test. If the data is 
stationary and cointegrated then can proceed with the error correction model test. The 
granger causality test also was conducted to identify causality effects between the 
variables. Below are the explanation about various tests involved in conducting two 
steps of Engle Granger Test, namely ordinary least square estimation, residual testing, 
johansen cointegration test, vector error corretion test and granger causality test.  
5.4 Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) Test 
The classic OLS model is as below (Ezell & Land, 2005: 943): 
                                                (5.1) 
 
where â = (â0, â1, ……….âp) is a vector of  p + 1 parameters explaining the 
relationship between variable of  X = (1, X1, X2, …………Xp) (a constant one and p 
variables and an error term åi. OLS method minimizes the sum squared of the error 
terms, i.e. it minimizes   ei
2
. = e1
2
 + e2
2
 + e3
2
 +.........+ en
2
, where n is the sample 
size, which is the residual of the Sum Squared Error (SSE) (Hoyt, 2003: 2) 
 
According to Faraway (2004), there are three reasons for using the OLS test. First, 
there are a number of attractive geometric properties if the error terms are 
independently distributed. The least square estimate is similar to the maximum 
likelihood estimate and the Gauss-Markov theorem explains that the    is the Best 
Linear Unbiased Estimator (Hewson & Whalley, 2009).  
 
According to Brooks, (2008), to get the best result, there are a few assumptions of the 
OLS model that needs to be fulfilled namely. Among other the assumptions are that 
first that average value of the errors is zero, E (ut) = 0 econd the variance of the 
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error term is constant, Var (ut) = σ
2  
<
 ∞. This is known as homoscedascity. If the 
error term is not constant, then it is known as heteroscedasticity. Third the covariance 
between the error term is zero, cov(ui, uj) = 0 for i_= j; Means that the error term are 
uncorrelated and if it is correlated then there will be a problem of autocorrelation. 
Last but not least is that the OLS estimator is constant and unbiased, the  xt  are non-
stochastic (Brooks,2008:131-160).  
 
5.5 Unit Root Test  
 
There are several ways to identify whether the data are stationary or non-stationary. 
One of the tests is the unit root test. The hypothesis in conducting the unit root test is 
that time series data are non-stationary when the coefficient value is zero. Two well-
known unit root tests are the Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) and the Phillip-Perron 
(PP) test. If the result of testing shows that the coefficient value is higher than the 
critical value of the ADF and PP test value, then the data are stationary. The unit root 
test conducted using the Augmented Dickey Fuller Test (ADF) and Phillip-Perron 
method to ascertain whether the data is stationary at level, first difference or second 
difference (Mahadeva and Robinson, 2004). The null and alternative hypothesis is as 
follow. If the probability value (p-value) is less than 0.05 means that can reject H0 and 
accept Ha.  
 
H0: There is no unit root in the data  
Ha: There is unit root in the data   
 
The Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test is the basic test to identify order of integration. It 
is also known as t-test. The null hyphothesis is always that there is a unit root in the 
data and the alternative hyphothesis is that the data is stationary or no unit root in the 
data. The objective is to identify the null hyphothesis that =1 and the alternative 
hypothesis is  <1 in the following 
yt =  yt-1 + ut                (5.2) 
 
102 
 
In practice the following equation is employed because the test of =1 is equivalent to 
test of  = 0 (since  -1 = ) 
 yt =  yt-1 + ut                                                                                                                           (5.3) 
 
The Unit root test can be conducted in three ways by allowing for an intercept, or an 
intercept ad deterministic tred or none of it and the equation for the uit root test for 
each case is as below: 
 yt =  yt-1 + ut + t + ut                                                                                                            (5.4) 
 
By substracting yt-1 the test can be written as below (Brooks,2013,327-328). 
 
 yt =  yt-1 + ut + t + ut                                                                                                            (5.5) 
 
The Augmented Dickey Fuller test includes higher order terms and more complicated 
than the autoregression (1) process. While another approach was suggested by Phillip 
(1987) and extended by Perron (1988) by adding the non-parametric correction to the 
t-test statistics to take in account that the auto correlation that will exist when the 
underlying parameters is not AR(1) (Harris and Solis, 2005) 
 
The Phillips and Perron’s test statistics can be view as advancement of the Dickey–
Fuller serial correlation statistics by using the Newey–West (1987) heteroskedasticity 
and autocorrelation-consistent covariance matrix estimator. Under the null hypothesis 
that ρ = 0, the PP Zt and Zπ statistics have the same asymptotic distributions as the 
ADF t-statistic and normalized bias statistics. One of the advantage of the PP tests is 
that the PP tests are vigorous to general forms of heteroskedasticity in the error term.  
 
5.6 Residual Testing  
 
Among others ways to examine that there is no spurious regression or auto correlation 
in the model is to check whether there is unit root or not in the residual of the model. 
If there is unit root means the model is suffering with auto correlation and the result 
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may be spurious. In this case, one period lag of the residual has been created through 
the following steps in the e-views: 
 
Proc                 make residual              then save the new residual 
 
The null hypothesis is that there is unit root in the residual and alternative hypothesis 
is that there is no unit root in the residuals. If the probability value is significant less 
than 5 per cent then can reject the null hypothesis.      
 
5.7 Lag Structure Test 
 
To determine the period of lag the lag structure test was conducted. If data is non-
stationary and not co-integrated then need to run unrestricted VAR test. If the data are 
stationary and variables are co-integrated then can run the Vector Error Correction 
(VEC) test. Before conducting VEC test it is important to know the lags interval or 
number of lags for proceeding with the test. There are many ways to chose lags 
including Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC), Final Prediction Error (FPE), 
Akaike Information Criterion (AIC), Schwarz Information Criterion. The lowest the 
value of AIC or Schwarz SC, better the model. The AIC and FPE should be a better 
choice for smaller sample (Kim and Liew, 2004). In this research lag is determine 
based on the lowest value of AIC.  
 
5.8 Co-integration and Johansen Cointegration Test 
 
Cointegration test is one of the steps in the twosteps Engle-Granger test to examine 
the existence of a long-run equilibrium relationship between variables. In order to test 
for the existence of any long-run relation among the variables we employ the bounds 
testing approach to cointegration. This involves investigating the existence of a long-
run relationship using the following unrestricted errorcorrection model. The F test is 
used to determine whether a long-run relationship exists between the variables 
through testing the significance of the lagged levels of the variables. When a long-run 
relationship exists between the variables, the F test indicates which variable should be 
normalised (Narayan and Smith 2004). 
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 This test was conducted to examine the co-integration between variables. However, 
pre-condition for conducting the Johansen co-integration test is that the data need to 
be non-stationary at level or original data and it will become stationary at 1
st
 
difference or second difference. Meaning the data must be non-stationary or co-
integrated in a same order. If the variables are stationary it will introduce restricted 
co-integrating vectors (Hjalmarsson, and Österholm, 2007).  The null hypothesis (H0) 
is that there is no co-integration between variables and alternative hypothesis (Ha) is 
that there is co-integration between variables. If the probability value (p-value) is less 
than 0.05 means that can reject H0 and accept Ha. If there is co-integration mean there 
is long run relationship between variables. Once the result shows that there is co-
integration can proceeding with the Vector Error Correction (VEC) test.  
5.9 Error Correction (ECM) Test 
ECM would be conducted if there is single independent variable. However, if there is 
more than one independent variable than the Vector Error Correction Model would be 
conducted. If the data is stationary, then Error Correction (VEC) test conducted at 
lags with the lowest AIC value. The normal VEC model as in equation (5.6) below: 
                                                                                                              (5.6) 
Brooks, (2013):p.338. 
In the e-views, need to select the dependant variable and independent variables and 
open as VAR. If the data is non-stationary, need to choose unrestricted VAR and 
select VEC if the data is stationary. Put the endogenous variables, lag intervals and 
without trend then click OK, it will display the VEC result. Once getting the result, 
the e-views system will display the value of coefficient, standard error and the t-
statistics. Since VEC result in the e-views does not display the probability value (p-
value).  
The estimate equation will display the result of each variable including the t-statistics, 
standard error and p-value. If the value of the coefficient is between -1 and 0 and the 
probability value is less than 5 per cent, it means that there is long-run relationship 
between the variables. Ordinary least square test was conducted to estimate the 
equation. Second step is to create one period lag of the residual to estimate in the 
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Error Correction Model. Then need to estimate again the model using the one period 
lag of residual.   
5.10 Wald Test 
The wald test conducted to investigate short run relationship between variables. The 
result of the wald test t-statistics would be compared with the McKinnon (1991), 
critical values for cointegration test. If the t-statistic value of the wald test is higher 
than the critical value and within the range of the McKinnon (1991), critical value for 
cointegration then, there is short-run causality between the variables.  The Granger 
causality test was specified by Granger (1969). The objective is to test between two 
variables and predict causality of (Yt-1) the pastime series influencing the past and 
present of another variable (Xt-1). It also includes the length of the lagged vector (Lx) 
of Xt and the length of the lagged vector (Ly) of Yt (Hiemstra and Jones; 1994, 1644). 
The Granger causality function illustrated by Gujerati (2004:697) is as below: 
          
 
              
 
   
     (5.7) 
 
and  
 
          
 
              
 
   
     (5.8) 
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CHAPTER 6 
ISLAMIC BANKING AND MACROECONOMIC 
VARIABLES NEXUS IN MALAYSIA: AN EMPIRICAL 
ANALYSIS 
 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Malaysia, along with many other countries, has instigated the principles of Islamic 
finance in its banking system since the establishment of its first Islamic bank in 1984. 
The banking system of Malaysia accommodates Islamic and conventional banks 
through its dual banking system under the supervision and regulation of Bank Negara 
Malaysia (BNM). 
 
Since Islamic banks operating in the dual banking system, the question arise that do 
Islamic banks and conventional banks financing and investment contributes to the 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and investment?. If the Islamic banks contributes to 
the GDP growth and investment, is the amount of the contribution is significant 
knowing that market  of the Islamic banks in Malaysia is less than 30 percent and the 
remaining market share is control by the conventional bank. To answer these 
questions this chapter aims to measure the growth function of the Islamic banks and 
conventional banks in Malaysia.  
 
This study employed model used by Al-Hallaq (2005) which investigates impact of 
Islamic banks on the economic growth in Jordan.  In the case of Islamic banks in 
Jordan, it measures the direct and indirect effects of Jordan Islamic Banks on the 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita in Jordan from 1980 to 2000. A similar 
model is employed in this research to examine the connection between Islamic banks 
and economic growth in Malaysia using quarterly data from year 1997 to 2013.  
 
In this study there are four equations under the growth function model. The growth 
function is measured using GDP with total financing and investment of the 
Conventional banks (TFCB) or Islamic banks (TFIIB) with gross fixed capital 
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formation (GFCF) and trade balance (TB) the vector error correction (VEC) model to 
identify the long run relationship between variables.  
 
In 2014, the total amount of Islamic Bank financing was less than 30 per cent of the 
total financing of the conventional banks in Malaysia. It is undeniable fact that there 
are many other factors that contributes to the growth of GDP and investment. 
However, this study explores that how far the Malaysian banking system particularly 
Islamic and conventional banks contributes to the economic growth particularly the 
GDP and vice versa. 
 
6.2 ECONOMIC GROWTH AND ISLAMIC BANKING: A LITERATURE 
REVIEW 
 
Financial development is also considered to be a factor that contributes to economic 
growth, and banking is one of the main components in the financial sector. Banks can 
influence growth by raising the savings rate which also attracts more capital that can 
be channelled into firms through loans and financing. Since most banks are very 
conservative and stringent in providing financing, they only provide loans to 
creditworthy firms which implement projects and programmes that will accelerate the 
economic growth (Johnson, 2013).    
 
Research by Johnson (2013) revealed that there are three main categories that have 
potential effect on economic growth namely, legal origin, financial development and 
Islamic banking. The legal system will provide a positive economic environment for 
investment, protection of property rights, capital access and capital accumulation, 
saving capacity and productivity growth which are vital for economic growth. Levine 
(1998) found that the legal component is one of the external factors of the banking 
development and growth.   
 
Previous studies using the economic growth model to analyse the impact of banking 
systems on economic growth include Bagehot (1873), Schumpeter (1912), Gurley and 
Shaw (1955), Goldsmith (1969) and MacKinnon (1973) employed different methods 
and techniques to assess the essential role of the financial sector in economic 
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development and growth. Their findings were that there is relationship between 
financial development and economic growth (Levine, 2003). Studies by Brunner and 
Meltzer (1963) as well as Tobin and Barnard (1963) found that bank loans play a vital 
role in determining the efficacy of the monetary policy. Moreover, King and Levine 
(1993a) found that financial intermediation can be used to predict the long run rates of 
economic growth (Levine and Zervos, 1998: 537) 
 
Studies by Zuvekas (1979), Boyd and Prescott (1986), Rajan and Zingales (1998), 
Branson (1989), Greenwood and Jovanovic (1990), Allen (1990), Bencivenga and 
Smith (1991), Pango (1993), King and Levine (1993), Levine (1997), Solow (2001), 
Cetorelli and Gambera (2001), Loayaz and Rancierie (2001), Hoggarth et al. (2002), 
Kasyap et.al. (2002), Barth et al. (2004), Levine (2005), Dehejia and Lleras-Muney 
(2007), Hoxha (2009), as well as Mitchener and Wheelock (2010) provide evidence 
for the significant effect and the relationship between the role of financial 
intermediaries and economic growth (Levine, 2003).  
 
Among others, studies by Grossman and Weiss (1983), Rotemberg (1984), Lucas 
(1990) and Fuerst (1992) support the vital role of the bank and its reaction against the 
monetary policy. The monetary equilibrium models developed by Fuerst (1994) and 
Labadie (1995) were consistent with this indispensable role of banks. By providing a 
different perspective, Bernanke and Mark, (1995) Bernanke and Blinder (1988), 
Domac and Giovanni, (1998), Garretsen and Swank (1998), Guender (1998) Gertler 
and Gilchrist (1993) and Suzuki (2001) examined the institutional variables such as 
banks liability and loans (reflecting bank assets) to measure the response of 
macroeconomic variables such as GDP, unemployment rate and inflation and its 
impact on the monetary policy (Sukmana and Kassim, 2010: 8).  
 
Theoretically, Islamic finance is also able to contribute to economic development 
because financing is either assets based or assets backed and tied to the real economy, 
prohibition of investing in immoral activities and harmful products and services 
increase the productivity level, and promotion of socio-economic justice by 
prohibition of riba eliminates injustice in society. (Mavrakis, 2009). In practice, most 
financing of Islamic banks is short term in nature and heavily relies on mark-up 
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financing (cost plus profit) rather than profit and loss sharing (Aggarwal and Yousef, 
2000).  
 
Financial sectors are able to promote economic growth if financial resources are 
channelled towards productive projects and programmes. Previous studies conducted 
on the financial sector and economic growth found that there are three possibilities. 
First, finance is the determinant of economic growth known as supply-leading. 
Second, the financial sector follows economic growth or demand-following and third 
there is bi-direct causality between the financial sector and economic growth. Supply-
leading means financial institutions are created to stimulate the economic growth. 
Demand-following is when a financial institution appears as a result of economic 
development. A study on Islamic banking in Indonesia revealed that it is neither 
supply-leading nor demand-following but there is a bi-directional relationship.   
(Abduh and Omar, 2012).  
 
Research by Demirguc-Kunt et al. (2012), found that the relationship between 
economic growth and banking decreases when the financial market deepens and the 
securities market supersedes the banking system. This is because when real GDP 
increases private credit also increases. In sum, financial development can stimulate 
economic growth (Demirguc-Kunt et al., 2012).   
 
Recent study on economic growth and Islamic banking was conducted by Al-Oqool,  
Okab and Bashayreh (2014), which investigates relation between Islamic banks 
development and economic growth of Jordan and Islamic bank time and saving 
deposit with the real GDP for a period of 1989-2012 using the VEC model. The study 
found that there is bi-directional long run causality between real GDP and Islamic 
banking growth which reflect positive contribution of the Islamic banks in Jordan but 
there is no short term causality between the real GPD and Islamic bank’s growth. 
However, there is unidirectional relation between real DGP and total time and saving 
deposit of Islamic bank which reflect excess of the liquidity.  However, not many 
studies have been conducted on the effect of investment and financing by Islamic 
banks on the GDP growth in Malaysia. 
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In the Malaysian context, Tang (2000, 2002), Vaithilingam et al. (2003), Azali 
(2003), Ibrahim (2005), and Kassim and Abdul Majid (2008) provide empirical 
evidence on the importance of the banking sector in transmitting monetary policy in 
Malaysia. 
 
A comparable study on the connection between Islamic banks and economic growth 
in Malaysia was conducted by Furqani & Mulyany (2009). The study employed co-
integration test and vector error correction (VEC) model to identify if there was any 
influence on the economic growth of the financial system and vice versa in the long 
run. The co-integration method was employed to determine the integration between 
each variable, while VECM method was applied to establish the long term 
relationship between variables. The findings of the study reveal that there is a 
bidirectional relationship between the growth of Islamic banks and the growth of 
fixed investment in Malaysia. When the GDP increases, it causes growth in the 
Islamic banks but not vice versa (Furqani and Mulyany, 2009: 59). 
 
A study by Abu Bakar et al. (2010), on bank financing utilized two sets of dependent 
variables, which included total financing growth to earnings ratio and fixed rate 
financing growth in earning asset growth. The independent variables were real GDP 
growth, money supply growth (M3), bank reserves growth, bank capital growth and 
loan loss provision growth in the earnings growth ratio. The result was that Islamic 
bank financing was not influenced by the expansion and contraction of money supply 
(M3). The panel data method was utilized to analyse the Islamic banks’ financing 
behaviour, based on the yearly data from 1998 to 2008, by using generalized least 
square method (Abu Bakar: 2010:11). In a nutshell, the financial sector plays an 
important role in the economic growth and vice versa. 
 
6.3 MODELLING AND EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
The model was constructed based on published paper by Al-Hallaq. Said, (2005) the 
“the Role of Islamic banks in Economic Growth: The Case of Jordan” in a book 
edited by Munawar Iqbal & Ausaf Ahmad, entitled Islamic Finance & Economic 
Development. Al-Hallaq used two stages least square method but in this case the 
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Vector Error Correction (VEC) Model would be employed because the researcher 
want to examine the long run association between the variables.  
 
6.3.1 Empirical Model 
There were two model employed al Hallaq, one is the growth function and second is 
the investment function. The model constructed in this study was based on the growth 
function model used by Al-Hallaq (2005) as below: 
 
                                                          (6.1)
    
where: 
GDPt : refers to the real per capita income as a proxy for economic growth 
TCBt-1 : total credit by conventional banks 
RE t-1 : net transfers from abroad 
I t-1 : volume of investment  
U t1 : error term 
 
In case of Malaysia, the model was slightly modified due to the unavailability of the 
time series data for net transfer from abroad and the volume of investment, gross 
fixed capital formation (GFCF) was used as a proxy to represent aggregate 
investment; and trade balance (export minus import) was utilize to signify net transfer 
from abroad. The VEC growth function model constructed in the functional form is as 
below: 
 
Model 1- VEC Growth Function Model (Conventional Banks)  
 
                      
 
                
 
              
 
                           (6.2) 
 
 
Model 2- VEC Growth Function Model (Islamic Banks)  
 
 
                       
 
                
 
              
 
                                    (6.3) 
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where: 
GDP : Gross domestic product as a proxy for economic growth 
TFCB : Total financing and investment of the Conventional Banks  
TFIIB : Total financing and investment of Islamic Banks  
GFCF : Gross fixed capital formation as a proxy for investment  
TB : Trade balance as proxy for net transfer from abroad  
T : Time (quarterly data) 
 
The model 1 aims to analyse the relationship between GDP and GFCF, TB and total 
financing and investment of the conventional bank. Macroeconomic variable was 
represented by GDP. The model 2 aims to examine GDP association with GFCF, TB 
and total financing and investment of the Islamic banks.  
6.3.2 Defining Variables and Data Sources 
 
There are three dependent variables namely GDP, TFCB and TFIIB. The rest will be 
inter-changeably used as depicted in the model 1 and model 2 above. A detailed 
definition of the dependent and independent variables and sources of data are depicted 
in Table 6.1. 
Table 6.1: Definition of Variables and Sources of Data 
Summary  
of Macro Economic 
Variables 
Definition of Variables 
 
Source of Data 
GDP  Value of the growth domestic product 
(at constant price) 
BNM 
GFCF Gross fixed capital formation as a 
proxy for investment 
DOSM 
TFCB Percentage of total financing of 
conventional bank 
BNM 
TFIIB Percentage of total financing and 
investment of Islamic banks (TFIIB)  
against total credit by conventional 
banks (TFIIB including purchasing of 
passenger cars, residential and non-
residential property, fixed assets other 
than land and buildings, personal use, 
credit card, purchase of consumer 
durables, construction, working capital 
and financing of other purposes) 
BNM 
TB Trade balance (export minus import) Department of 
Statistics of Malaysia 
(DOSM) 
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6.4 DATA ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS 
 
The data were transformed to a logarithm to avoid an abnormal amount of 
autocorrelation and multi-colinearity between variables. Furthermore, by transforming 
the data into logarithm, it was easier to compare the distribution and the normality of 
the data against the original data. 
6.4.1 Histogram 
 
The histogram depicted in Figure 6.1 shows the distribution of the data before and 
after it was converted into a logarithm for all variables.  
 
Figure 6.1: Distribution of Data before and 
after being transformed into a Logarithm 
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The GDP data was skewed toward left and after transforming to logarithm it seems 
like normally distributed with some outliers in the data. Similarly, for the GFCF data 
it was skewed toward left and after changing to logarithm become like normal 
distribution pattern. For Trade Balance (TB), the original data is like normal 
distribution pattern but skewed toward right after transforming to logarithm because 
the data contain the positive and negative values as well.  
 
The TFIIB data skewed to the left initially because at the beginning there was only 
one Islamic bank in the industry. However, when the data were converted into a 
logarithm, the amount of financing and investment of all Islamic banks was ordinarily 
distributed for the whole period. For TFCB data, there is not much change after 
changing data to logarithm.   
 
The RIR data shows it is relatively having normal distribution shape before it is 
transformed to log data. Therefore, the original data were utilized rather than 
converting it to a logarithm because the original data were close to the normal 
distribution pattern. 
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6.4.2 Scatter Plot 
 
The scatter plot shows the distribution of GDP data against the independent variables. 
The regression line shows whether the distribution of data is along the regression line 
or deviates from it. The scatter plot data indicate the positive or negative relationship 
of the independent variables with the dependent variables. Figure 6.2 shows a scatter 
plot with the linear regression line. The result shows that all variables have a positive 
regression line with LOG TB. 
 
Figure 6.2: Scatter Plot of LOG GDP with Other Variables 
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6.4.3 Descriptive Statistics 
 
Table 6.2 depicts the mean, median, standard deviation, skewness, kurtosis and 
jarque-bera for all variables. 
Table 6.2: Descriptive Statistics of all Variables 
VARIABLES/ 
DESCRIPTIVE 
LOGGDP LOGGFCF LOGTFCB LOGTFIIB LOGTB 
Mean  11.76685  10.28545  12.64083  11.95880  9.834914 
Median  11.78424  10.25598  12.66124  12.17910  9.942013 
Standard 
Deviation  0.407556  0.339958  0.231758  1.139299  0.641534 
Skewness -0.017340  0.179297 -0.122311 -0.482308 -2.587352 
Kurtosis  1.685691  2.225574  1.437507  2.225320  10.77747 
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Jarque-Bera  4.753677  2.002895  6.878366  4.209186  239.9830 
Probability  0.092844  0.367347  0.032091  0.121895  0.000000 
 
The data show that the highest mean is for LOG TFCB followed by LOG TFIIB and 
LOG GDP, while the lowest mean is for LOG TB. The highest standard deviation is 
for real interest rate or LOG TB. The data are negatively skewed except for the LOG 
investment of Islamic (LOG GFCF).  The highest value of the Jarque-Bera is 239 for 
LOG TB and the lowest is 2.0 for LOG GFCF. This indicates that the data of all 
variables are not normally distributed because of the big gap between the values of the 
jarque-bera of all variables. 
6.4.4 Unit Root Tests 
 
A unit root test was conducted to identify whether the data were stationary or non-
stationary. Table 6.3 shows the result of the unit root test at level, first difference and 
second difference data using the ADF and Phillip-Perron (PP) test. 
Table 6.3: Unit Root Test for Individual Variables 
Variables Stage Augmented Dickey Fuller Test Phillip-Perron Test 
 
Level 
1
st
 
Difference 
2
nd
 
Difference 
Level 
1
st
 
Difference 
2
nd
 
Difference 
GDP Intercept 0.9988 0.0001 0.0000 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Trend and 
intercept 
0.4840 0.0002 0.0000 0.6490 0.0000 0.0001 
None 1.0000 0.0033 0.0000 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
GFCF Intercept 0.9981 0.0482 0.0000 0.9939 0.0000 0.0001 
Trend and 
intercept 
0.0340 0.0008 0.0000 0.6639 0.0000 0.0001 
None 0.9996 0.0089 0.0000 0.9897 0.0000 0.0000 
TFCB 
 
Intercept 0.8112 0.0000 0.0000 0.7473 0.0000 0.0001 
Trend and 
intercept 
0.9430 0.0000 0.0000 0.8089 0.0000 0.0001 
None 0.9662 0.0000 0.0000 0.9074 0.0000 0.0000 
TFIIB Intercept 1.0000 0.9230 0.0000 1.0000 0.9947 0.0000 
Trend and 
intercept 
1.0000 0.3523 0.0000 1.0000 0.5847 0.0001 
None 1.0000 0.8898 0.0000 1.0000 0.9989 0.0000 
TB Intercept 0.0783 0.0000 0.0000 0.0890 0.0000 0.0001 
Trend and 
intercept 
0.4065 0.0000 0.0000 0.0785 0.0000 0.0001 
None 0.6250 0.0000 0.0000 0.6641 0.0000 0.0000 
None 0.0604 0.0000 0.0000 0.1175 0.0000 0.0000 
Note: All tests are at maximum lag. Data in bold is p-value  
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The result of the unit root test shows that the data were non-stationary at the level, 
where both the ADF and PP tests show that the p-value is not below 0.05 per cent. 
However, the data were stationary at 1st difference for all variables except for 
variable TFIIB. When the test was run at 2nd difference, the result shows that data are 
stationary for all variables with p-value below 0.05 per cent implying that there is no 
autocorrelation. Hence, in order to achieve the best result test will be conducted using 
second difference data. In this case, the null hypothesis (H0) is that there is unit root 
and the alternative hypothesis is that there is no unit root.  Since the p-value at 2
nd
 
difference is less than 0.05 per cent for variables, therefore can reject H0 and accept 
Ha. 
6.4.5 Lag Structure Test 
 
As discussed earlier, there are many ways to determine the lags interval. In this 
research number of lags was determined based on the lowest value of Akaike 
Information Criteria (AIC).  Table 6.4 indicates the lowest value of the AIC is at lag 
6.  
Table 6.4: Lag Structure for Model 1 
 
Dependant Variable: GDP 
LAG LOGL LR FPE AIC SC HQ 
0 -3511.746 NA 7.71e+41 113.4757 113.6815 113.5565 
1 -3075.094 774.7049 1.89e+36 100.5514 101.9924* 101.1172 
2 -3015.120 94.79882 9.01e+35 99.77805 102.4541 100.8287 
3 -2956.190 81.74114 4.68e+35 99.03839 102.9496 100.5740 
4 -2899.958 67.11532 2.88e+35 98.38575 103.5320 100.4063 
5 -2852.621 47.33704 2.70e+35 98.02004 104.4014 100.5255 
6 -2787.886 52.20584* 1.77e+35* 97.09309* 104.7096 100.0835* 
  * indicates lag order selected by the criterion 
 LR: sequential modified LR test statistic (each test at 5 per cent level) 
 FPE: Final prediction error  
 AIC: Akaike information criterion  
 SC: Schwarz information criterion  
 HQ: Hannan-Quinn information criterion 
 
Table 6.5: Lag Structure for Model 2  
Dependant Variable: GDP 
 
 Lag LogL LR FPE AIC SC HQ 
0 -2686.548 NA   5.80e+32  86.79187  86.92911  86.84576 
1 -2363.401  594.1737  2.89e+28  76.88390  77.57008  77.15331 
2 -2327.614  61.18504  1.54e+28  76.24560*   77.48071*  76.73053 
3 -2302.645  39.46606  1.17e+28  75.95630  77.74035   76.65676* 
4 -2286.901  22.85468  1.22e+28  75.96455  78.29753  76.88053 
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5 -2261.946   33.00425*  9.64e+27  75.67569  78.55762  76.80721 
6 -2243.251  22.31401   9.60e+27*   75.58874  79.01960  76.93578 
 
Table 6.5 shows the lowest value for the AIC for model 2 is at lag 2. Therefore, the 
test conducted for model 2 was at lag 2.  
 
6.4.6 Two Step Engle-Granger Test  
 
Two steps of Engle-Granger test involved estimations of the model and conducting 
unit roo test for the residual of the model to identify whether there is unit root or not 
in the residual. If there is no unit root in the residual means the residual is stationary 
and can proceed to do the Johansen cointegration test to identify whether there is 
cointegration in the equation. If there is cointeration, the second step is to conduct the 
vector error correction test including the residual (or error term) in the model.   
 
i) Estimation of Model 1 and Model 2 
 
Result in Table 6.6 shows that the value of the coeffeient is -38090. While the r-
squared value is 96 per cent and the Durbin Watson value is at 1.1.  The test was done 
without testing the unit root test in the residual and with assumption the the data is 
stationary. If the model is spurious often the r-squared value is higher than the Durbin 
Watson value. In this case, the Durbin value is higher than the r-squared value. 
However, unit root test was conducted to identify whether there is unit root or not in 
the residual. If there is unit root means, the model is suporious and not suitable for 
estimation.   
Table 6.6: Estimation of the Equation 6.2 (Conventional Bank) 
Dependent Variable: GDP  
 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
TFCB 0.003934 0.039484 0.099630 0.9209 
GFCF 4.186872 0.215524 19.42652 0.0000 
TB 2.157861 0.189299 11.39921 0.0000 
C -38090.53 5885.800 -6.471598 0.0000 
R-squared 0.969839     Mean dependent var 139465.5 
Adjusted R-squared 0.968426     S.D. dependent var 55861.46 
S.E. of regression 9926.111     Akaike info criterion 21.30075 
Sum squared resid 6.31E+09     Schwarz criterion 21.43131 
Log likelihood -720.2254     Hannan-Quinn criter. 21.35248 
F-statistic 685.9931     Durbin-Watson stat 1.149463 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
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Table 6.7 shows that the value of the coeffeient is 8719. While the r-squared 
value is 98 per cent and the Durbin Watson value is at 1.4.   
However, the unit root test will be conducted to identity unit root in the 
residual for further estimation. 
 
Table 6.7: Estimation of the Equation 6.3 (Islamic Bank) 
 
Dependent Variable: GDP  
 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
TFIIB 0.112150 0.010729 10.45340 0.0000 
GFCF 2.102055 0.213788 9.832414 0.0000 
TB 1.722457 0.094980 18.13489 0.0000 
C 8719.715 5092.720 1.712192 0.0917 
R-squared 0.988858     Mean dependent var 139465.5 
Adjusted R-squared 0.988336     S.D. dependent var 55861.46 
S.E. of regression 6033.045     Akaike info criterion 20.30491 
Sum squared resid 2.33E+09     Schwarz criterion 20.43547 
Log likelihood -686.3671     Hannan-Quinn criter. 20.35665 
F-statistic 1893.385     Durbin-Watson stat 1.490763 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
 
 
6.4.7 Residual Testing  
 
Most of the time, the time series data is non-stationary and after transforming to 
logarithm or 1
st
 difference the data will be stationary. Stationary data means the data 
has no unit root. Sometime the result is spurious because there is unit root in the data 
or if the residual is not normally distributed. Table 6.8 shows the result of the 
Augmented Dicky Fuller Test for the residual of model 1-equation (6.2) of the 
conventional bank. The result for intercept, trend and intercept and no trend and 
intercept at level shows that the test statistic value is greater than the test critical 
values at 1 per cent, 5 per cent and 10 per cent respectively. The p-value for all tests 
also less than 0.05 per cent which indicates that the null hypothesis can be rejected. In 
this case the null hyphothesis is that there is a unit root in the residual. The value of 
the coefficient of the residual is negative and the Durbin Watson value at 2, which 
indicate that the model is not sprious and the residual is stationary.  
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Table 6.8: Result of the Residual Test of Model 1-Equation 6.2 
 
Intercept t-Statistic   Prob. 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -5.262692  0.0000* 
Test critical values: 1% level  -3.531592  
 5% level  -2.905519  
 10% level  -2.590262  
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
U(-1) -0.586001 0.111350 -5.262692 0.0000 
C 185.4465 1080.121 0.171690 0.8642 
R-squared 0.298783     Mean dependent var 195.9081 
Adjusted R-squared 0.287995     S.D. dependent var 10477.74 
F-statistic 27.69593     Durbin-Watson stat 2.023008 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000002    
Trend and Intercept 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -5.372642  0.0002* 
Test critical values: 1% level  -4.100935  
 5% level  -3.478305  
 10% level  -3.166788  
U(-1) -0.616764 0.114797 -5.372642 0.0000 
C -1929.609 2235.716 -0.863083 0.3913 
R-squared 0.311335     Mean dependent var 195.9081 
Adjusted R-squared 0.289814     S.D. dependent var 10477.74 
F-statistic 14.46673     Durbin-Watson stat 1.996878 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000007    
No Trend and Intercept   
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -5.302145  0.0000 
Test critical values: 1% level  -2.599934  
 5% level  -1.945745  
 10% level  -1.613633  
U(-1) -0.586036 0.110528 -5.302145 0.0000 
R-squared 0.298465     Mean dependent var 195.9081 
Adjusted R-squared 0.298465     S.D. dependent var 10477.74 
Durbin-Watson stat 2.022019    
* Siginificant at 0.05 per cent 
 
 
 
Result in Table 6.9 shows the Augmented Dicky Fuller Test at level for residual of 
model 2-equation (6.3) of the Islamic bank. The result for intercept, trend and 
intercept and no trend and intercept at level shows that the test statistic value is 
greater than the test critical values at 1 per cent, 5 per cent and 10 per cent 
respectively. This indicates that the residual is stationary and the null hypothesis can 
be rejected which means there is no unit root in the residual. The value of the 
coefficient of the residual is negative and the Durbin Watson value is close to 2, 
which indicate that the model is not sprious and the model is reliable for estimation.  
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Table 6.9: Result of the Residual Test of Model 2-Equation 6.3 
 
Intercept t-Statistic   Prob. 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -3.685993  0.0066* 
Test critical values: 1% level  -3.538362  
 5% level  -2.908420  
 10% level  -2.591799  
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
U(-1) -0.784289 0.212776 -3.685993 0.0005 
C 226.4766 686.4404 0.329929 0.7427 
R-squared 0.492705     Mean dependent var 
-
133.0603 
Adjusted R-squared 0.448206     S.D. dependent var 7282.660 
F-statistic 11.07214     Durbin-Watson stat 1.999162 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
Intercept and Trend 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -3.584921  0.0392 
Test critical values: 1% level  -4.110440  
 5% level  -3.482763  
 10% level  -3.169372  
U(-1) -0.819216 0.228517 -3.584921 0.0007 
C -403.2005 1588.935 -0.253755 0.8006 
R-squared 0.494454     Mean dependent var 
-
133.0603 
Adjusted R-squared 0.440288     S.D. dependent var 7282.660 
F-statistic 9.128556     Durbin-Watson stat 2.000618 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000001    
 
* Siginificant at 0.05 per cent 
 
 
6.4.8. Johansen Co-integration Test 
 
To identify co-integration in the data, Johansen co-integration test was conducted at 
lag 6 for Model 1 and at lag 2 for Model 2.  The table 6.10 shows summary results of 
the trace test with restricted intercepts-no trends, unsrestricted intercepts-no trends 
and inrestricted intercepts-restricted trends. The result of the Johansen co-integration 
test in Table 6.10 both for trace and maximum eigenvalue indicates that there is at 
least one (1) co-integrating equation. In this case, can reject the H0, and accept Ha 
which means there is co-integration between variables in the model 1.  The null 
hypothesis (H0) is that, there is co-integration between the variables in the original 
data. The alternative hypothesis (Ha) is that there is no co-integration between the 
variables in the original data. The trace and maximum eigenvalue test result shows 
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that the p-value is more than 0.05 per cent which means can reject the H0, and accept 
Ha which means that there is co-integration between variables. 
 
Table 6.10: Johansen Cointegration Test for Model 1  
Series: GDP GFCF TFCB TB (Lags interval: 1 to 6) 
 
Data Trend: None None Linear Linear Quadratic 
Test Type 
No Intercept 
No Trend 
Intercept No 
Trend 
Intercept No 
Trend 
Intercept 
Trend 
Intercept 
Trend 
Trace 1 2 1 2 2 
Max-Eig 1 1 1 2 2 
 Log Likelihood by Rank (rows) and Model (columns) 
0 -2304.273 -2304.273 -2296.424 -2296.424 -2292.849 
1 -2279.689 -2277.591 -2272.110 -2270.577 -2267.771 
2 -2272.296 -2268.126 -2262.652 -2256.243 -2253.702 
3 -2269.053 -2260.912 -2259.207 -2251.413 -2249.143 
4 -2269.042 -2259.139 -2259.139 -2248.041 -2248.041 
 Akaike Information Criteria by Rank (rows) and Model (columns) 
0  78.69748  78.69748  78.57129  78.57129  78.58520 
1  78.15375  78.11772  78.03639  78.01891  78.02529 
2  78.17364  78.10249  77.98860  77.84404   77.82629* 
3  78.32959  78.16105  78.13795  77.98077  77.93913 
4  78.59155  78.39801  78.39801  78.16527  78.16527 
 Schwarz Criteria by Rank (rows) and Model (columns) 
0  82.01951  82.01951  82.03174  82.03174  82.18407 
1  81.75261  81.75119*  81.77367  81.79080  81.90100 
2  82.04934  82.04740  82.00272  81.92737  81.97883 
3  82.48213  82.41741  82.42890  82.37554  82.36850 
4  83.02092  82.96580  82.96580  82.87148  82.87148 
 Trace test indicates 2 cointegrating eqn(s) at the 0.05 level 
 * denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 0.05 level 
 **MacKinnon-Haug-Michelis (1999) p-values  
 Max-eigenvalue test indicates 2 cointegration eqn (s) at the 0.05 level 
 * denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 0.05 level 
 **MacKinnon-Haug-Michelis (1999) p-values  
 
 
 
The test result of the Johansen co-integration in Table 6.11 for trace and maximum 
eigenvalue for conventional bank and Islamic bank of model 2 indicates that there is 
at least one (1) co-integrating equation. In this context, can reject the H0, and accept 
Ha that there is co-integration between variables. 
 
Table 6.11: Johansen Cointegration for Model 2  
Series: GDP TFIIB GFCF TB  (Lags interval: 1 to 4) 
 
Data Trend: None None Linear Linear Quadratic 
Rank or No Intercept Intercept Intercept Intercept Intercept 
No. of CEs No Trend No Trend No Trend Trend Trend 
Trace 3 3 2 2 2 
Max-Eig 2 2 2 1 1 
 Log Likelihood by Rank (rows) and Model (columns) 
0 -2456.221 -2456.221 -2450.870 -2450.870 -2446.149 
1 -2439.714 -2435.979 -2431.186 -2430.450 -2426.804 
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2 -2428.111 -2423.612 -2420.269 -2419.525 -2417.190 
3 -2422.847 -2416.462 -2414.045 -2411.648 -2411.049 
4 -2421.069 -2413.123 -2413.123 -2408.664 -2408.664 
 Akaike Information Criteria by Rank (rows) and Model (columns) 
0  76.56064  76.56064  76.51908  76.51908  76.49689 
1  76.29890  76.21474  76.15957  76.16769  76.14780 
2  76.18805  76.11115   76.06982*  76.10848  76.09816 
3  76.27220  76.16806  76.12447  76.14300  76.15534 
4  76.46367  76.34226  76.34226  76.32811  76.32811 
 Schwarz Criteria by Rank (rows) and Model (columns) 
0  77.63111  77.63111  77.72335  77.72335  77.83497 
1  77.63698  77.58627*  77.63147  77.67304  77.75351 
2  77.79375  77.78376  77.80933  77.91489  77.97148 
3  78.14552  78.14174  78.13160  78.25049  78.29628 
4  78.60461  78.61700  78.61700  78.73666  78.73666 
 Trace test indicates 3 cointegrating eqn(s) at the 0.05 level 
 * denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 0.05 level 
 **MacKinnon-Haug-Michelis (1999) p-values  
 Max-eigenvalue test indicates 2 cointegration eqn (s) at the 0.05 level 
 * denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 0.05 level 
 **MacKinnon-Haug-Michelis (1999) p-values  
 
 
6.4.9 Ordinary Least Square Estimation of Model 1-Equation (6.2)-Conventional 
Bank  
 
The Unit Root test of the residual testing conducted earlier confirmed that the residual 
is stationary at Level. While the test result of Johansen co-integration test indicates 
that at least there is one co-integrating equations for Model 1. In this case, the data is 
estimated again by including the residual with one period lag u(-1) in the model. 
Table 6.12 shows that the coefficient of the error term is negative at 0.22 per cent 
which means that the model has been corrected by 0.22 per cent. The r-squared of the 
equation (6.3) is 48 per cent ase (average), means that this  model explained about 48 
percent of the relationship between variables and there are other factors that also 
influence the GDP growth. The coefficient of the conventional bank is at negative 
0.05 which means when GDP increase, the financing of the conventional bank 
decrease by 0.05 percent and when GDP growth decrease, the financing of the 
conventional bank increase by 0.05 per cent. However, the p-value of the TFCB is not 
less than 0.05 per cent which indicates that there is no long  run relationship between 
the GDP growth and the TFCB. On the other hand, there is long run relationship 
between the GDP growth with GFCF and Trade Balance (TB) because the p-value is 
less than 0.05 per cent.  
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Table 6.12: Ordinary Least Squares Estimates of Equation (6.2) 
Dependent Variable: D(GDP) 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
D(TFCB) -0.054294 0.064055 -0.847621 0.3999 
D(GFCF) 1.682355 0.285405 5.894628 0.0000 
D(TB) 0.894520 0.131522 6.801283 0.0000 
U(-1) -0.224236 0.072895 -3.076157 0.0031 
C 1877.890 640.5796 2.931548 0.0047 
R-squared 0.489876     Mean dependent var 2825.463 
Adjusted R-squared 0.456965     S.D. dependent var 6860.526 
S.E. of regression 5055.583     Akaike info criterion 19.96607 
Sum squared resid 1.58E+09     Schwarz criterion 20.13060 
Log likelihood -663.8633     Hannan-Quinn criter. 20.03117 
F-statistic 14.88479     Durbin-Watson stat 1.698485 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
 
 
Table 6.13 shows that the coefficient of the error term is negative 0.22 and the p-value 
is less than 0.05 for GFCF and Trade Balance (TB) which indicates that there is long 
run relationship between the GDP with GFCF and TB. The speed of adjustment in the 
model is at -0.008. Since the p-value is not significant at 5 per cent, the null 
hypothesis cannot be rejected that there is no long-run relationship between GDP with 
TFCB.. 
 
Table 6.13: Ordinary Least Squares Estimates of Equation (6.3) 
 
Dependent Variable: D(GDP) 
 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
D(TFIIB) 0.114783 0.057497 1.996328 0.0503 
D(GFCF) 1.337212 0.235474 5.678812 0.0000 
D(TB) 0.973228 0.131264 7.414295 0.0000 
U(-1) -0.444554 0.115995 -3.832542 0.0003 
C 544.7443 909.2076 0.599142 0.5513 
R-squared 0.549246     Mean dependent var 2825.463 
Adjusted R-squared 0.520166     S.D. dependent var 6860.526 
S.E. of regression 4752.292     Akaike info criterion 19.84234 
Sum squared resid 1.40E+09     Schwarz criterion 20.00687 
Log likelihood -659.7183     Hannan-Quinn criter. 19.90744 
F-statistic 18.88686     Durbin-Watson stat 1.677309 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
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6.4.10 VEC Granger Causality/Block Exogeneity Wald Tests 
 
Wald test was conducted to check causality or joint significant between variables. It is 
also to test for weak exogeneity of the independent variables.  The result in Table 6.14 
shows that p-value is less than 0/05 per cent which indicates that the other variables 
are jointly significant in this model.  
 
Table 6.14: Exogeneity Wald Tests of Equation (6.2) and (6.3) 
 
Null Hypothesis: C(1)=0,C(2)=0,C(3)=0,C(4)=0 
Test Statistic Value df Prob. Value df Prob. 
F-statistic  18.88686 (4, 62)  0.0000  3870.511 (4, 64)  0.0000 
Chi-square  75.54744  4  0.0000  15482.05  4  0.0000 
    
Null Hypothesis Summary:     
       Normalized Restriction (= 0) Value Std. Err.  Value Std. Err. 
TFCB  0.003934  0.039484 TFIIB  0.114783  0.057497 
GFCF  4.186872  0.215524 GFCF  1.337212  0.235474 
TB  2.157861  0.189299 TB  0.973228  0.131264 
C -38090.53  5885.800 C -0.444554  0.115995 
 
 
 
6.5 DISCUSSION ON THE FINDINGS 
Three main tests were conducted namely, Unit Root Test, Residual Testing, Johansen 
Cointegration, and OLS estimates. As mentioned earlier, the OLS test was conducted to 
identify the relationships between variables, where the dependent variable was the GDP 
as a proxy for economic growth and the independent variables were total financing and 
investment of the conventional or Islamic banks and other variables include gross fixed 
capital formation (GFCF) and trade balance (TB).  
The result also indicates that the total financing and investment of conventional bank has 
negative relationship with the GDP. For Islamic banks financing and investment, the p-
value in equation (6.3) in table 6.14 is less than 0.05 per cent which indicates that there 
is short term relationship between the GDP growth and total financing ad investment of 
the Islamic banks in Malaysia.  
With regards to the R
2
 value of model 2 is slighty higher (0.54 per cent) than model 1 
(0.48 per cent because Islamic banks’ financing and investment are contributing to the 
economic growth which are either asset based or asset backed.. However, it should be 
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noted that the finding of this study is applicable only in the case of Islamic banks in 
Malaysia and it cannot be generalized to other countries.  
 
6.6 CONCLUSION 
The result in this study reveals that Malaysian Islamic banks’ total financing and 
investment contribute an exceptionally small fraction to the GDP growth compared to 
the conventional banks. This is due to the small market share of the Islamic banks. 
Furthermore, most of the financing and investment are from the capital and equity 
marker rather than money market e to lower market share of the Islamic banks in 
Malaysia. If the Islamic banks control greater market shares, the result may change. The 
finding of this chapter can be summarized as in the Table 6.19 below. 
 
Table 6.15: Summary Findings of Chapter 6 
Test Result Model 1-Growth Model 
Conventional Banks 
Equation (6.2)-
Conventional Bank 
Dependent Variable: 
GDP  
Equation (6.3) 
Islamic Bank  
Dependent Variable: 
GDP 
 
Coefficient Value of C(1) 1877 544 
R
2
 Value 48% 54% 
Adjusted R
2
 45% 52% 
Speed of adjustment -0.22 -0.44 
P-Value 0.3999 0.0503 
Indicator Not Significant Significant at 5% 
Residuals Testing  No Unit Root in the 
Residual 
No Unit Root in the Residual  
Cointegration Equation 2 3 
Result in table 6.15 shows that Conventional banks and Islamic banks influenced by 
the GDP growth and not vice versa. The significant and higher contribution is for the 
total financing and investment of the conventional banks due larger market share 
compared to the Islamic banks. However, the Islamic banks model is better than the 
conventional banks mode because of the higher value of the R
2
 and adjusted R
2
. 
Although the speed of adjustment is positive and high but the analysis shows that 
there is not present of heteroskedascity in the models. This also implied that equation 
(6.3) and (6.5) can be excluded in future research and the equation (6.4) and (6.6) is 
good and reliable in explaining the relations between the variables for future research.  
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Lastly, it should be noted that the result of the finding can only be applied for the 
Malaysian case due to the fact that there is a dual banking system in Malaysia. 
However, there is immense potential for the Islamic banks to grow and contribute to 
the GDP growth and investment in Malaysia. Furthermore, there are many other 
additional factors that influence economic growth and investment in Malaysia. 
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CHAPTER 7 
 
SEARCHING FOR THE NEXUS BETWEEN INTEREST RATES 
AND ISLAMIC BANK FINANCING IN MALAYSIA 
 
7.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter examines the causality effect and co-integration of the Islamic banks 
with the conventional inter-bank money market, savings and investment.  In addition, 
in establishing the problematic issues for this study Chong and Liu’s (2009) model is 
also utilised to examine the short- and long-term relationship between conventional 
deposit rates and Islamic investment rates.  
Chong and Liu (2009) provided evidence that there is causality between conventional 
interest rates and Islamic profit rates which, they concluded, is due to the fact that 
Islamic bank financing is not based on profit and loss sharing (PLS). They consider, 
therefore, that their result implies that Islamic banks are not interest free, but interest 
based. This brings to the fore the existential issue as to the realities and operations of 
Islamic banking, as their study indicates that Islamic banks are not very different from 
conventional banks in practice, in particular making reference to the lack of PLS, 
which is supposed to be the strength of Islamic finance. Their statistical survey of 
Islamic financing indicates that only 0.1 per cent of Islamic bank financing in 
Malaysia is based on the PLS mode, and the bulk of financing was based on deferred 
payment sale (49 per cent) and leasing (24 per cent), others (17 per cent) and cost-plus 
(7 per cent) (Chong and Liu, 2009). 
Although Chong and Liu’s (2009) finding shows that remarkably low PLS financing 
is actually practised in the Islamic banks, it should not be concluded that Islamic 
banks are similar to conventional banks and should be subjected to similar regulations 
as conventional banks. The main argument is that under the business transaction 
(muamalah), PLS is only one of the principles. There are other principles of 
muamalah such as a deferred payment sale (al bay muajjal) leasing (ijarah), 
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mudarabah, murabahah, istisna
11
, al-bay salam, and others. Cost plus (murabaha) is 
equally a valid principle and in line with the teachings of Islam. Furthermore, it is 
acceptable in Islam to utilize all the instruments available within the principles of 
muamalah. There is also no requirement in Islam for principles to be used more or 
less. This implies that Islamic banks are not limited to providing financing and 
investment based on profit and loss sharing as long as it does not involve the element 
of riba (interest), gharar (doubt) and maisir (gambling).  Despite this form oriented 
position, it should be identified that Islamic moral economy foundations of Islamic 
finance prioritises PLS due to its economic and social development serving nature. 
This study, hence, aims to revisit the problematic issues identified by the relationship 
between conventional finance and Islamic banking with an attempt to locate, if there 
is one, the relationship between the conventional inter-bank money market, savings 
and investment, and Islamic banking. 
 
7.2 THEORY AND PRACTICE OF ISLAMIC BANKS IN MALAYSIA 
The main objective of the establishment of Islamic banks is to eliminate riba, as most 
fuqaha agree that the bank interest rate is equivalent to riba. There are scholars who 
believe that Islamic economics can be achieved by removing interest rates from the 
conventional economy and by adding zakat. In addition, the four main characteristics 
of Islamic banks are: risk sharing; asset backed or asset based; no exploitation; and 
financing of non-sinful activity (El-Hawary et al., 2004). In-terms of risk sharing, the 
main difference is that conventional banks are based on interest rates while Islamic 
banks centre upon profit and loss sharing (Ariff, 1989).   
With regards to the asset backed and asset based, there are some differences in these 
two concepts. For the asset based financing, the source of payment comes from the 
originator’s cash flow and the asset stays on the balance sheet of the originator. The 
beneficial owner has no right to dispose the asset and the recourse is only to obligor 
and not to the asset. While for the asset backed financing, the source of payment 
comes from the income generated by the asset and the asset is separated from the 
                                                 
11
 Istisna means manufacturing, making or constructing something. It is a contract of sale in 
which a supplier of the goods or services is asked to supply goods of definite specifications at 
agreed rates, place and time of delivery. The price of the goods is paid in advance, but the 
goods are manufactured and delivered at a later date (Borhan 2002). 
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originator balance sheet. The beneficiary has the legal ownership and right to demand 
compensation and payment and dispose the asset in case of default (Hidayat,2013).     
It should be noted that Islamic banking is a modern concept, and therefore removing 
interest rates from modern Islamic banking is not an easy task, as Islamic banks are 
based on the conventional banking model which is governed by the conventional 
national monetary policy where interest rates are the main mechanism to control the 
money supply and inflation. Hence, the modern Islamic banks have no other choice 
but to benchmark against the interest rates of the conventional banks to compete in the 
market. 
Most fuqaha have agreed on benchmarking the interest rates of the conventional 
banks to determine the profit and return rates of Islamic banks. The effects of 
benchmarking include the high cost of funds incurred by the Islamic banks. This is 
because: 
 
(i) All sales and financing contracts of Islamic banks become expensive because 
the profit rates are marked up against the conventional rates; 
 
(ii) Islamic banks cannot offer profit rates lower than the conventional bank rates 
because the movement of the rates is determined by the conventional monetary 
policy. This is supported by a study by Chong and Liu, in which Islamic bank 
deposit rates are pegged against the conventional deposit rates (Chong & Liu, 
2009) 
 
(iii) Islamic banks are open to risk where depositors may shift their deposits to the 
conventional banks when the rates of the Islamic banks are lower and vice 
versa. This is highlighted in a study by (Bacha, 2004). 
Even though most of the Islamic banks’ products are Shari’ah compliant, the true 
spirit of Islamic finance cannot be achieved because the Islamic banks’ profit rates 
follow the rates of the conventional banks. A hadith, narrated by Abu Hurairah 
radiallahu anhu mentions that a time will come where it will be terribly difficult to 
avoid riba. The closest meaning of the hadith is stated as (Chapra, 1985: 236):  
From Abū Hurayrah: The Prophet, peace be upon him, said: “There will 
certainly come a time for mankind when everyone will take ribā, and if he does 
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not do so, its dust will reach him.” (Abū Dāwūd, Kitāb al-Buyū‘, Bābfīijtinābi 
al-shubuhāt; also in IbnMājah). 
The hadith above reflects on what is happening in the industry. Even though, there is 
an effort by the Islamic banks to remove riba, it cannot be completely achieved 
because the Islamic banks’ costs are calculated according to the base lending rate 
(BLR) and the profit rates.  
It is also important to stress that many Muslim scholars agree that riba is not only 
related to increased (double or multiple) amounts of money charged by the lender, but 
whether the amount charged is justifiable as long as the transaction shall not contain 
the elements of exploitation, oppression, unfairness and uncertainty (Azahari, 2009). 
In practice, however, Islamic banks’ reference to riba is justified on the grounds that 
they are relatively new, compared to conventional banks which have already been in 
operation for more than 200 years. 
This, as mentioned, brings up the existential question as to whether an Islamic bank is 
similar to a conventional bank. In substantiating this question, Khan (2010) states that 
Islamic banks, despite being in operation for more than three decades, are still far 
from their ideals; a condition, which Asutay (2007; 2012) terms ‘social failure of 
Islamic banking’.  
 
Table 7.1: Type of Financing by the Islamic Banks from 2006 to 2012 
Concept of 
Financing 
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Bai Bithaman Ajil 40.7 37.0 33.0 32.1 33.7 32.1 1.9 
Ijarah Thumma 
Al-Bai 
29.3 30.2 30.4 29.2 27.3 25.9 23.4 
Others 20.7 18.5 16.1 15.2 18.2 19.9 19.9 
Murabahah 7.2 11.4 15.2 17.2 14.6 15.4 17.2 
Ijarah 1.0 1.4 2.7 3.0 2.5 2.1 2.0 
Istisna 0.7 0.9 1.3 1.1 1.0 0.7 0.4 
Mudharabah 0.2 0.1 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.1 
Musharakah 0.2 0.4 1.1 1.8 2.5 3.8 5.1 
Total Financing 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Source: Compiled from Malaysia Monthly Statistical Bulletin (2013) 
 
In theory, Islamic banks are different from conventional banks as their products are 
Shari’ah compliant and not necessarily based on the PLS mode of financing. 
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However, convergence in Islamic banking has meant that they have moved to debt-
based products as well. As can be seen in Table 7.1, in the Malaysian case, the highest 
percentage of Islamic banks’ total financing in 2006 was al-bay bithaman ajil, and the 
lowest was mudarabah. Musharakah or PLS accounted for only about 0.2 per cent of 
the total financing, and in 2012, the amount of PLS only increased to 5.1 per cent. 
Most of the financing is allocated through al bay bithaman ajil, followed by ijarah 
thumma al-bay and others. Table 7.1 also shows that the percentage of al-bay 
bithaman ajil financing decreased from 40.7 per cent in 2006 to 3 per cent in 2012. 
This was due to the increase in financing of murabahah, which escalated from 7.2 per 
cent in 2006 to 17.2 per cent in 2012 using the concept of tawarruq.  
Since Malaysia practises a dual banking system, Islamic banks have no other choice 
but to benchmark against their conventional counterparts. There are about 16 Islamic 
banks operating with 24 conventional banks, under the supervision of the BNM. To 
enhance the competitiveness of the Islamic Bank, in 1993 BNM allowed the 
establishment of ‘Islamic Windows’ by conventional banks. In 1994, an Islamic inter-
money market rate was established to facilitate short-term facility of funding of the 
Islamic banks and for transmission of monetary policy (Bank Negara Malaysia). 
 
7.3 A SURVEY OF EMPIRICAL STUDIES: LITERATURE REVIEW 
A number of papers have recently been published investigating the authenticity of 
Islamic banking and finance; some of them explored the relationship between Islamic 
banking and interest rates as part of their examination.  This section aims to present a 
review of some of these studies. 
In an early study, Haron and Shanmugam (1995) investigated the effect of profit rates 
on Islamic banks’ deposits. They utilized the Pearson correlation method and first 
order autoregressive model and found that there was a negative relationship between 
profit rates and rates of return on deposits of Islamic banks. Subsequently, Haron and 
Ahmad (2000) studied the effect of conventional interest rates and rates of profit on 
funds deposited in Malaysian Islamic banks, which provided evidence of the 
relationship between rates of return on investment with the amount of deposit placed 
in Islamic banks. They confirmed the perception that customers are more profit-
oriented rather than religion-oriented when choosing Islamic banks, because there is a 
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negative relationship between the interest rates of conventional banks and the amount 
of deposits in Islamic banks. The findings also support earlier research conducted on 
the same subject in Jordan, Malaysia, Singapore and Sudan (Haron and Ahmad, 
2000). 
Rosly and Abu Bakar (2003) examined the performance of Islamic and conventional 
banks in Malaysia. Their findings confirm that an Islamic bank that thrives on 
interest-like products is less efficient than conventional banks.  They noted that, while 
the products of Islamic banks are Shari’ah compliant, they are without the true spirit 
of Islam. Most of their credit finance mark-up profits are higher than the interest rates 
of the conventional banks. 
In investigating the interest rate risk for Islamic banks in the dual banking system in 
Malaysia, Bacha (2004) used the monthly data from January 1993 to July 2003. The 
findings show that even though Islamic banks are operating on interest-free principles, 
they are exposed to the interest rate risk. Interest rate risk means the cost of funding in 
Islamic banks becomes higher as the banks have to pay higher rates of profit in order 
to attract new deposits, and in turn customers may switch to conventional banks due 
to profit motivation. 
Kaleem and Md. Isa (2006) analysed the relationship between terms deposits rates for 
one, three, six, nine and twelve months for both conventional and Islamic banks. They 
applied Granger causality technique to identify the relationship between variables. 
The findings indicate that Islamic banks consider the conventional interest rates 
before determining their profit rates and return of term deposits. 
In another study, Bacha (2008) examined the correlation between Islamic interbank 
money market (IIMM) rates and conventional interbank money market rates with 
daily data from October 1998 to April 2007 with 2,328 observations. The findings 
support the evidence of a high correlation. It is evident that the Islamic banks are 
subjected to the interest rate risk and operate close to the cycle of the conventional 
banks. It is true that Islamic banks cannot escape the interest rate risk because they 
have adopted the commercial conventional bank as a model, which is also part of the 
fractional reserve system and credit creation. 
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Chong and Liu (2009), in their study on conventional deposit rates and Islamic 
investment rates, used the Granger causality test to identify the causality effect 
between conventional and Islamic rates, using monthly data from April 1995 to April 
2005 from the Islamic commercial banks, Islamic investment banks and Islamic 
finance companies. Their findings indicate that Islamic deposits are not interest free 
but pegged to conventional deposit rates. 
Abdul Kader and Yap (2009) used monthly data from the years 1999 to 2007 to 
investigate the impact on demand for Islamic financing due to interest rate changes in 
Malaysia. The study found that an increase in the base lending rate would lead to 
demands for Islamic financing and vice versa. The study concurred that Islamic banks 
are open to interest rate risk despite operating without riba, since customers are more 
profit- rather than religion-motivated. 
Among other studies, the final one to be mentioned here is Cevik and Charap (2011) 
who found that the conventional bank deposit rates and profit-loss sharing returns of 
the Islamic banks are correlated and cointegrated in the long term. The correlation 
level is at 91 per cent between conventional deposit rates and PLS investment 
account. The findings also support that conventional bank deposits Granger cause 
return of the PLS account. A study by Hasin and Abd. Majid (2011), shows that 
Islamic banks in Malaysia cannot shun the interest rate despite its operation delink 
with interest rate.  
 
7.4 MODELLING, ECONOMETRIC METHOD AND DATA 
After identifying the model, this study employed a number of econometric methods to 
conduct the research which included descriptive statistics, corelogram test, unit root 
test, Johansen cointegration test, Vector error correction (VEC) model estimates, 
impulse response and residual testing. Specifically, the Johansen Co-integration and 
VEC test was utilised to examine whether the Conventional variable having long and 
short-run association and vice versa. On the other hand, the Johansen cointegration 
and VEC test was aim to investigate whether there is a long-term and short-term 
association between variables. The impulse response function aims to analyse the 
pattern or trend of the correlation between variables.  
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As for data, the interbank money market data in the form of daily data were used from 
1998 to 2013, with 4,822 observations. The data for savings and investment account 
consisted of monthly data from January 1997 to December 2013, with 204 
observations. The following section identifies the chosen models within Vector Error 
Correction (VEC) framework.  The model was constructed based on Chong and Liu 
(2009) paper which was published in the Pacific-Basin Finance Journal. 
7.4.1 Emprical Model 
 
Empirical model in this Chapter is based on a normal VEC model as follow: 
 
                                                                                                               (7.1) 
 
(Chong and Liu, 2009)  
 
Using the above equation, the functional form of the VEC of the conventional and 
Islamic overnight policy rate and for the conventional bank saving deposit rates for 12 
months and Islamic banks profit rates for 12 months is constructed below: 
 
Model 1-Interbank Money Market Rates (Conventional and Islamic) 
 
                                                                       (7.2) 
 
 
Model 2- Saving Rates (Conventional and Islamic)  
 
 
                                                                               (7.3) 
 
where: 
 
COV_ONR: Conventional bank interbank overnight interest rates 
IS_ONR: Islamic bank interbank overnight profit rates  
COV_SIR:  Conventional bank savings deposit rates (12 Months) 
IB_PR: Islamic banks savings profit rates (12 Months) 
t: time (Daily/Monthly or Yearly) 
 
7.5.3 Granger Causality Model for Islamic Bank Rates and Interest Rate  
The Granger causality model in functional form is as below: 
 
                                          (7.4) 
 
                                          (7.5) 
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where: 
Y : Dependent variable 
X : Independent variable 
C : Coefficient of the variable 
T :  Period 
t-1 :  Lag of period 
t-j : Number of lags (number of years) 
μ :  Residual of the model 
 
Based on the model above, the functional form of the Granger causality model of the 
Conventional Bank and Islamic Bank Interbank Money Market Rates, saving rates 
and fixed deposits rates are as in equation of (7.8) and (7.9). 
 
                                                                    (7.8) 
 
                                                                          (7.9) 
 
 
7.5 ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS 
Data analysis involves two parts, namely descriptive and inferential statistical 
analysis. Descriptive statistical analysis includes normality testing by plotting a 
histogram figure and scatter plot, while econometric analysis includes unit root test 
and autocorrelation test along with the Granger causality test, Johansen cointegration 
test, VEC estimates followed by estimating the impulse response function. 
7.5.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Descriptive statistics in this section include mean, median, standard deviation, 
skewness, kurtosis and Jarque-Berra. Table 7.2 shows descriptive statistics for the 
interbank money market rates of the conventional and Islamic banks. 
 
Table 7.2: Descriptive Statistics of the Variables 
Statistics Conventional 
Interbank  
Money Market  
Rates 
Islamic 
Interbank  
Profit Rates 
Conventional 
Bank Saving 
Rates 
Islamic Bank  
Profit Rates 
Mean  2.945803  2.874471  1.983388  1.967828 
Median  2.790000  2.750000  1.590000  1.590000 
Standard Deviation  0.619748  0.537713  1.173765  1.186800 
Skewness  2.444251  1.527255  1.294373  1.263882 
Kurtosis  14.01958  8.714385  3.590396  3.531792 
Jarque-Bera  29198.93  8435.331  59.92647  56.71538 
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Statistics Conventional 
Interbank  
Money Market  
Rates 
Islamic 
Interbank  
Profit Rates 
Conventional 
Bank Saving 
Rates 
Islamic Bank  
Profit Rates 
Probability  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000 
No. of Observations 4822 4822  204  204 
 
Skewness of the Islamic interbank profits rate is 1.5 and lower than the conventional 
bank, which means that the data is positively skewed. The conventional interbank rate 
is also positively skewed to the right but the value is at 2.4, which means that the 
conventional rates are highly volatile compared to the Islamic rates. Table 6.3 also 
depicts descriptive statistics for the conventional and Islamic banks’ one year savings 
rates and fixed deposit rates. Skewness of the Islamic banks profit rates and 
conventional banks’ saving rates is close to 1 which mean the data closed to normal 
distribution.  
7.5.2 Histogram 
The histogram shows the distribution shape of the data before and after changing the 
data into logarithm. It is prepared to investigate whether the data are normally 
distributed or otherwise. If the data are not normally distributed, then the shape of the 
data will be skewed towards the left or right side. Figure 6.1 shows the histogram of 
interbank overnight policy’s conventional interest rates and interbank Islamic profit 
rates. As can be seen from the histogram in Figure 6.1, the data are not normally 
distributed, but are skewed towards the left, and there are some outliers in the data. 
 
 
Figure 7.1: Histogram of the Conventional and Islamic Banks ONR 
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Figure 7.2 shows the histogram of savings rates of conventional banks and profit rates 
of the Islamic banks. The figure 7.2 demonstrated that the data for savings and profit 
rates are skewed to the left. For the saving and profit rates both having outliers at the 
earlier period because Malaysia was facing financial crisis in 1998 and at that time the 
saving rate and profit rates was high to attract saving from the depositors. However, 
the trends changed later, and subsequently the rates of return were lower for both 
conventional banks and Islamic banks.  
 
Figure 7.2: Histogram of Saving Rates of the Conventional and  
Islamic Banks Profit Rates 
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7.5.3 Scatter Plot 
  
A scatter plot is a mathematical diagram, which shows the correlation of the data 
along the regression line. If the data are highly correlated, then distribution of the data 
will be close to the regression line. Figure 6.3 shows a scatter plot of the variables 
with a linear regression line, which indicates that there is a positive correlation 
between the variables. 
 
Figure 7.3: Scatter Plot of CON ONR and IS ONR 
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Figure 7.4 shows a scatter plot with regression line of savings rates of the 
conventional and Islamic bank, which indicates that there is a perfect positive 
correlation between the savings rates of conventional banks and Islamic banks profit 
rates. 
Figure 7.4: Scatter Plot of Conventional Saving rates and  
Islamic Banks Profit Rates for Twelve Months 
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7.5.4 Unit Root Test 
The unit root test examines whether the data are stationary or non-stationary. In 
performing the econometric method test it is important to ensure that the data are 
stationary. Otherwise, data should be transformed into logarithm form or outliers 
should be removed to make the data stationary.  Popular methods in unit root testing 
are the Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) and Phillip Perron (PP) tests.  The unit root 
140 
 
test was conducted using ADF and PP test at individual intercept and trend, at level, 
1
st
 and 2
nd
 difference at maximum lags of 31. The result in Table 7.3 shows that the 
data are stationary at 1
st
 difference and 2
nd
 difference where the probability value is 
significant at 1 per cent. 
 
Table 7.3: Unit Root Test of Individual Variables  
 
Variables  Augmented Dickey Fuller Phillip-Perron 
Stage Level 
1
st
 
Difference 
2
nd
 
Difference 
Level 
1
st
 
Difference 
2
nd
 
Difference 
CON 
ONR 
Intercept 
 
-5.96774 
(0.0000) 
-5.79446 
(0.0000) 
-2.241553 
(0.0000) 
-6.04812 
(0.0000) 
-98.22626 
(0.0001) 
-865.3570 
(0.0001) 
Trend 
and 
intercept 
-14.19458 
(0.0000) 
-14.34933 
(0.0000) 
-14.14849 
(0.0000) 
-6.002904 
(0.0000) 
-100.8843 
(0.0001) 
-864.8419 
(0.0001) 
None -27.90848 
(0.0389) 
-27.90998 
(0.0000) 
27.90987 
(0.0000) 
-1.658909 
(0.0919) 
-97.56630 
(0.0001) 
865.6418 
(0.0001) 
IS ONR Intercept 
 
-3.163927 
(0.0223) 
-13.16526 
(0.0000) 
-24.09108 
(0.0000) 
-3.367895 
(0.0122) 
-67.31305 
(0.0001) 
-461.1766 
(0.0001) 
Trend 
and 
intercept 
-3.095498 
(0.1074) 
-13.19518 
(0.0000) 
-24.09068 
(0.0000) 
-3.289016 
(0.0681) 
-67.32856 
(0.0001) 
-460.9388 
(0.0001) 
None 
 
-1.046606 
(02.669) 
-13.16058 
(0.0000) 
-24.09073 
(0.0000) 
-1.040853 
(02.669) 
-67.31832 
(0.0000) 
-461.2464 
(0.0001) 
COV SIR Intercept 
 
-2.097989 
(0.2458) 
-17.65505 
(0.0000) 
-11.11500 
(0.0000) 
-2.110411 
(0.2409) 
-17.42634 
(0.0000) 
-139.1339 
(0.0001) 
Trend 
and 
intercept 
-1.391088 
(0.8609) 
-17.80082 
(0.0000) 
-11.08415 
(0.0000) 
-1.629149 
(0.7782) 
-17.60209 
(0.0000) 
-148.0047 
(0.0001) 
None 
 
-2.901801 
(0.00038) 
-17.38060 
(0.0000) 
-11.14496 
(0.0000) 
-2.796190 
(0.00053) 
-17.09164 
(0.0000) 
-139.7051 
(0.0001) 
 
IS PR Intercept 
 
-2.091122 
(0.2486) 
-17.76147 
(0.0000) 
-11.07822 
(0.0000) 
-2.106849 
(0.2423) 
-17.52179 
(0.0000) 
-146.7496 
(0.0001) 
Trend 
and 
intercept 
-1.381811 
(0.8636) 
-17.909937 
(0.0000) 
-11.04829 
(0.0000) 
-1.624411 
(0.7801) 
-17.69785 
(0.0000) 
-167.3826 
(0.0001) 
None 
 
-2.928900 
(0.0035) 
-17.478858 
(0.0000) 
-11.10749 
(0.0000) 
-2.812430 
(0.0050) 
-17.17325 
(0.0000) 
-148.9752 
(0.0001) 
 
The unit root test was also conducted to examine the saving and profit rates of the 
conventional and Islamic banks, which was conducted at individual intercept and 
trend, at level, 1
st
 and 2
nd
 difference to identify whether the data are stationary or non-
stationary at maximum lag of 14. The result in Table 7.3 shows that the data are 
stationary at the 1
st
 difference and 2
nd
 difference where the probability value is 
significant at 1 per cent. 
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7.5.5 Lag Structure Test 
 
The lag structure test was conducted to determine the lags interval. In this research 
number of lags was determined based on the lowest value of Akaike Information 
Criteria (AIC).  Table 7.4 indicates the lowest value of the AIC is at lag 8 
conventional and Islamic ONR.  
 
Table 7.4: Lag Structure of Equation (7.2) 
 
Dependant Variable: Cov ONR 
 Lag LogL LR FPE AIC SC HQ 
0 -1692.824 NA   0.006932  0.704123  0.706815  0.705068 
1  12312.83  27993.85  2.06e-05 -5.112933 -5.104857 -5.110097 
2  12321.16  16.64663  2.06e-05 -5.114733 -5.101273 -5.110006 
3  12415.46  188.3304  1.98e-05 -5.152249 -5.133406 -5.145632 
4  12488.79  146.3759  1.93e-05 -5.181051 -5.156824 -5.172543 
5  12580.27  182.5477  1.86e-05 -5.217396 -5.187785 -5.206998 
6  12658.09  155.2221  1.80e-05 -5.248065 -5.213071 -5.235777 
7  12712.08  107.6348  1.77e-05 -5.268832 -5.228454 -5.254653 
8  12753.38   82.31470*   1.74e-05*  -5.284330*  -5.238568*  -5.268260* 
* indicates lag order selected by the criterion 
 LR: sequential modified LR test statistic (each test at 5 per cent level) 
FPE: Final prediction error 
AIC: Akaike information criterion 
 SC: Schwarz information criterion 
 HQ: Hannan-Quinn information criterion 
 
 
Lag structure test result for conventional saving rates and Islamic profit rates as in 
Table 7.5 indicates that the lowest value of the AIC is at lag 2.  
 
Table 7.5: Lag Structure for Equation (7.3) 
Dependant Variable: Cov Saving Rates 
 Lag LogL LR FPE AIC SC HQ 
0 -64.76976 NA   0.006799  0.684818  0.718387  0.698410 
1  543.3507  1197.530  1.39e-05 -5.511290  -5.410582* -5.470514 
2  550.0803   13.11392*   1.35e-05*  -5.539285* -5.371439  -5.471326* 
3  553.1169  5.855237  1.36e-05 -5.529404 -5.294419 -5.434261 
4  553.5813  0.885883  1.41e-05 -5.493141 -5.191018 -5.370815 
5  555.0041  2.685250  1.45e-05 -5.466709 -5.097448 -5.317200 
6  556.2497  2.325103  1.49e-05 -5.438459 -5.002059 -5.261766 
7  558.1464  3.501509  1.52e-05 -5.416886 -4.913348 -5.213009 
8  559.7210  2.874741  1.56e-05 -5.392011 -4.821334 -5.160950 
* indicates lag order selected by the criterion 
 LR: sequential modified LR test statistic (each test at 5 per cent level) 
FPE: Final prediction error 
AIC: Akaike information criterion 
 SC: Schwarz information criterion 
 HQ: Hannan-Quinn information criterion 
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7.5.6 Two Step Engle-Granger Test  
 
i) Estimation of Equation (7.2) and Equation (7.3) 
 
Result in Table 7.6 shows that the value of the coeffeient is -0.230. While the r-
squared value is 91 per cent and the Durbin Watson value is at 0.42.  The test was 
done without testing the unit root test in the residual and with assumption the the data 
is stationary. In this case, the Durbin value is lower than the r-squared value. 
However, unit root test will be conducted for residual to identify whether there is unit 
root or not in the residual. If there is unit root means, the model is suporious and not 
suitable for estimation.   
Table 7.6: Estimation of the Equation (7.2)  
(Conventional Bank and Islamic Overnight Policy Rate) 
 
Dependent Variable: CON_ONR  
 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
IS_ONR 1.105102 0.004715 234.3843 0.0000 
C -0.230781 0.013788 -16.73788 0.0000 
R-squared 0.919339     Mean dependent var 2.945803 
Adjusted R-squared 0.919322     S.D. dependent var 0.619748 
S.E. of regression 0.176033     Akaike info criterion 
-
0.635880 
Sum squared resid 149.3596     Schwarz criterion 
-
0.633192 
Log likelihood 1535.108     Hannan-Quinn criter. 
-
0.634937 
F-statistic 54936.00     Durbin-Watson stat 0.421191 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
 
 
 
Table 7.7 shows that the value of the coeffeient is at -0.000628. While the r-
squared value is at 0.012 per cent and the Durbin Watson value is at 2.7. To 
examine whether the model is spurious or not, the residual test wiil be coning 
of the root in the residual for further estimation. 
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Table 7.7: Estimation of the Equation (7.3)-Conv. Bank and Islamic Saving Rates 
Dependent Variable: Conventional Banks Saving Rate and Islamic Banks 
Profit Rates. 
 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
IS_PR -0.015416 0.009785 -1.575404 0.1167 
C 0.000628 0.007344 0.085535 0.9319 
R-squared 0.012197     Mean dependent var -0.007487 
Adjusted R-squared 0.007283     S.D. dependent var 0.074859 
S.E. of regression 0.074586     Akaike info criterion -2.343926 
Sum squared resid 1.118176     Schwarz criterion -2.311283 
Log likelihood 239.9084     Hannan-Quinn criter. -2.330720 
F-statistic 2.481897     Durbin-Watson stat 2.720610 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.116736    
7.5.7 Residual Testing  
 
Result in Table 7.8 shows the Augmented Dicky Fuller Test at level for equation (7.2) 
ONR of the Cov bank and the Islamic bank. The result for intercept, trend and 
intercept and no trend and intercept at level shows that the test statistic value is 
greater than the test critical values at 1 per cent, 5 per cent and 10 per cent 
respectively. This indicates that the residual is stationary and the null hypothesis can 
be rejected which means there is no unit root in the residual. The value of the 
coefficient of the residual is negative and the Durbin Watson value is close to 2, 
which indicate that the model is not sprious and the model is reliable for estimation.  
 
Table 7.8: Result of the Residual Test of Model 1-Equation (7.2) 
 
Trend 
   t-Statistic   Prob.* 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -13.75604  0.0000 
Test critical values: 1% level  -3.431533  
 5% level  -2.861948  
 10% level  -2.567030  
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
U(-1) -0.180849 0.013147 -13.75604 0.0000 
C -0.002422 0.001275 -1.899794 0.0575 
R-squared 0.337112     Mean dependent var -0.000484 
Adjusted R-squared 0.332794     S.D. dependent var 0.107776 
F-statistic 78.07079     Durbin-Watson stat 2.033210 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
Trend and Intercept 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -13.63072  0.0000 
Test critical values: 1% level  -3.959953  
 5% level  -3.410742  
 10% level  -3.127161  
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
U(-1) -0.180546 0.013246 -13.63072 0.0000 
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C -0.002848 0.002586 -1.101187 0.2709 
R-squared 0.337117     Mean dependent var -0.000484 
Adjusted R-squared 0.332659     S.D. dependent var 0.107776 
F-statistic 75.61688     Durbin-Watson stat 2.033225 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
None 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -13.67400  0.0000 
Test critical values: 1% level  -2.565445  
 5% level  -1.940890  
 10% level  -1.616655  
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
U(-1) -0.179592 0.013134 -13.67400 0.0000 
R-squared 0.336610     Mean dependent var -0.000484 
Adjusted R-squared 0.332429     S.D. dependent var 0.107776 
Durbin-Watson stat 2.032863    
* Siginificant at 0.05 per cent 
 
Sometime the result is spurious because there is unit root in the data or if the residual 
s not normally distributed. Table 7.9 shows the result of the Augmented Dicky Fuller 
Test for the residual of model 1-equation (7.3) of the conventional bank saving rates 
and Islamic profit rates. The result shows that the test statistic value is greater than the 
test critical values at 1 per cent, 5 per cent and 10 per cent respectively. The p-value 
for all tests also less than 0.05 per cent which indicates that there is no unit root in the 
residual.  
 
Table 7.9: Result of the Residual Test of Model 1-Equation (7.3) 
 
Intercept t-Statistic   Prob.* 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -20.62548  0.0000 
Test critical values: 1% level  -3.462737  
 5% level  -2.875680  
 10% level  -2.574385  
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
U(-1) -1.360580 0.065966 -20.62548 0.0000 
C 3.16E-05 0.004907 0.006440 0.9949 
R-squared 0.680210     Mean dependent var -9.55E-05 
Adjusted R-squared 0.678611     S.D. dependent var 0.123024 
F-statistic 425.4102     Durbin-Watson stat 2.048368 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
Intercept and Trend 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -20.67975  0.0000 
Test critical values: 1% level  -4.004132  
 5% level  -3.432226  
 10% level  -3.139858  
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
U(-1) -1.364918 0.066003 -20.67975 0.0000 
C 0.010135 0.009853 1.028615 0.3049 
R-squared 0.682440     Mean dependent var -9.55E-05 
Adjusted R-squared 0.679248     S.D. dependent var 0.123024 
F-statistic 213.8265     Durbin-Watson stat 2.054752 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
None 
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Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -20.67698  0.0000 
Test critical values: 1% level  -2.576460  
 5% level  -1.942407  
 10% level  -1.615654  
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
U(-1) -1.360579 0.065802 -20.67698 0.0000 
R-squared 0.680210     Mean dependent var -9.55E-05 
Adjusted R-squared 0.680210     S.D. dependent var 0.123024 
Durbin-Watson stat 2.048369    
* Siginificant at 0.05 per cent 
 
7.5.8. Johansen Co-integration Test 
 
To identify co-integration in the data, Johansen co-integration test was conducted for 
equation 7.2.  The table 7.10 shows summary results of the trace test with restricted 
intercepts-no trends, unsrestricted intercepts-no trends and inrestricted intercepts-
restricted trends. The result also shows that for trace and maximum eigenvalue there is 
at least two (2) co-integrating equations. In this case, can reject the H0, and accept Ha 
which means there is co-integration between variables in the equation 7.2.  The null 
hypothesis (H0) is that, there is co-integration between the variables in the original 
data. The alternative hypothesis (Ha) is that there is no co-integration between the 
variables in the original data.  
 
Table 7.10: Johansen Cointegration Test for Equation (7.2)  
Series: CONV and IS ONR (Lags interval: 1 to 8) 
Data Trend: None None Linear Linear Quadratic 
Test Type No Intercept Intercept Intercept Intercept Intercept 
 No Trend No Trend No Trend Trend Trend 
Trace 1 2 2 2 2 
Max-Eig 1 2 2 2 2 
 Log Likelihood by Rank (rows) and Model (columns) 
0  12778.83  12778.83  12779.69  12779.69  12782.38 
1  12871.66  12876.62  12877.23  12877.72  12879.81 
2  12873.46  12889.35  12889.35  12891.02  12891.02 
 Akaike Information Criteria by Rank (rows) and Model (columns) 
0 -5.296835 -5.296835 -5.296358 -5.296358 -5.296648 
1 -5.333747 -5.335391 -5.335229 -5.335019 -5.335470 
2 -5.332830 -5.338604  -5.338604* -5.338468 -5.338468 
 Schwarz Criteria by Rank (rows) and Model (columns) 
0 -5.253757 -5.253757 -5.250588 -5.250588 -5.248186 
1 -5.285285 -5.285583* -5.284075 -5.282518 -5.281624 
2 -5.278984 -5.282065 -5.282065 -5.279237 -5.279237 
 Trace test indicates 3 cointegrating eqn(s) at the 0.05 level 
 * denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 0.05 level 
 **MacKinnon-Haug-Michelis (1999) p-values  
 Max-eigenvalue test indicates 2 cointegration eqn (s) at the 0.05 level 
 * denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 0.05 level 
 **MacKinnon-Haug-Michelis (1999) p-values  
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The test result of the Johansen co-integration in Table 7.11 for trace and maximum 
eigenvalue for conventional bank and Islamic bank of model 2 indicates that there is 
at least one (1) co-integrating equation except for no intercept and no trend. In this 
context, can reject the H0, and accept Ha that there is co-integration between variables. 
 
Table 7.11: Johansen Cointegration for Equation (7.3) 
Series: COV_SIR IS_PR Lags interval: 1 to 2 
Data Trend: None None Linear Linear Quadratic 
Test Type 
No Intercept 
No Trend 
Intercept 
No Trend 
Intercept 
No Trend 
Intercept 
Trend 
Intercept 
Trend 
Trace 2 1 1 1 1 
Max-Eig 2 1 1 1 1 
 Log Likelihood by Rank (rows) and Model (columns) 
0  688.9623  688.9623  691.7760  691.7760  692.2750 
1  747.2508  747.6023  750.3225  750.3633  750.7689 
2  750.6520  751.2858  751.2858  752.6661  752.6661 
 Akaike Information Criteria by Rank (rows) and Model (columns) 
0 -6.809623 -6.809623 -6.817760 -6.817760 -6.802750 
1 -7.352508 -7.346023  -7.363225* -7.353633 -7.347689 
2 -7.346520 -7.332858 -7.332858 -7.326661 -7.326661 
 Schwarz Criteria by Rank (rows) and Model (columns) 
0 -6.677690 -6.677690 -6.652844 -6.652844 -6.604851 
1 -7.154609* -7.131632 -7.132343 -7.106259 -7.083824 
2 -7.082655 -7.036009 -7.036009 -6.996829 -6.996829 
 
 Trace test indicates 3 cointegrating eqn(s) at the 0.05 level 
 * denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 0.05 level 
 **MacKinnon-Haug-Michelis (1999) p-values  
 Max-eigenvalue test indicates 2 cointegration eqn (s) at the 0.05 level 
 * denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 0.05 level 
 **MacKinnon-Haug-Michelis (1999) p-values  
7.4.9  Error Correction Model Test 
Since there is long-run co-integration between the conventional ONR and Islamic 
ONR and conventional banks’ saving rates and Islamic banks’ profit rates, the error 
correction model test was conducted. The VEC result of the interbank money market 
rates is illustrated in Table 7.12 which shows that there is at least one cointegration 
between variables which means there is long-term cointegration between variables. 
The table shows the coefficient value, standard errors and t-statistics value. The 
coefficient value is also negative for conventional ONR and zero for Islamic ONR.    
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Table 7.12: VEC Test of Equation (7.2) 
 
Error Correction: Conventional ONR 
 
Islamic ONR 
 
D(CON_ONR) D(IS_ONR) 
CointEq1 -1.296717  0.366045 
  (0.11133)  (0.07933) 
 [-11.6476] [ 4.61403] 
D(CON_ONR(-1)) -0.014798 -0.215897 
  (0.06838)  (0.04873) 
 [-0.21641] [-4.43051] 
D(IS_ONR(-1)) -0.329156 -0.284454 
  (0.09559)  (0.06812) 
 [-3.44353] [-4.17607] 
C -0.000390  0.000167 
  (0.00510)  (0.00364) 
 [-0.07636] [ 0.04605] 
 R-squared  0.665423  0.257327 
 Adj. R-squared  0.660328  0.246017 
 Sum sq. resids  1.030361  0.523215 
 S.E. equation  0.072321  0.051536 
 F-statistic  130.6013  22.75267 
 Log likelihood  244.7697  312.8757 
 Akaike AIC -2.395718 -3.073390 
 Schwarz SC -2.329981 -3.007653 
 Mean dependent -0.000430  0.000110 
 S.D. dependent  0.124089  0.059351 
 
The table 7.13 shows the coefficient value, standard errors and t-statistics value of the 
conventional saving rates and Islamic profit rates. The coefficient value is also zero 
for the conventional bank variable and negative for Islamic bank variable means there 
is long run relationship between the variables.    
 
Table 7.13: VEC of Equation (7.3) 
 
Error Correction: Conventional Saving 
Interest Rate 
 
Islamic  
Profit Rates 
 
D(CON_ONR) D(IS_ONR) 
CointEq1 -1.922544 -1.640623 
  (0.27164)  (0.49779) 
 [-7.07764] [-3.29584] 
D(DCOVSIR(-2)) -0.003826 -0.053215 
  (0.07067)  (0.12950) 
 [-0.05414] [-0.41094] 
D(IS_PR(-2))  0.071313  0.183771 
  (0.07987)  (0.14636) 
 [ 0.89289] [ 1.25560] 
C  0.005515 -0.004247 
  (0.00536)  (0.00982) 
 [ 1.02920] [-0.43248] 
 R-squared  0.692443  0.126021 
 Adj. R-squared  0.684516  0.103496 
 Sum sq. resids  0.932406  3.131231 
 S.E. equation  0.069327  0.127045 
 F-statistic  87.35530  5.594658 
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Error Correction: Conventional Saving 
Interest Rate 
 
Islamic  
Profit Rates 
 
D(CON_ONR) D(IS_ONR) 
 Log likelihood  253.0427  131.9014 
 Akaike AIC -2.470427 -1.259014 
 Schwarz SC -2.371478 -1.160065 
 Mean dependent  0.000662 -0.015616 
 S.D. dependent  0.123428  0.134178 
 
Further testing was conducted to obtain the probability value, as the VEC test result 
would not provide the p-value. To obtain the p-value, estimation needs to be 
conducted using the coefficient value of the VEC model utilizing the OLS test.  
 
7.5.10 Ordinary Least Square Estimation of Equation (7.2)-Conventional Bank and 
Islamic Bank ONR 
 
The Unit Root test of the residual testing conducted earlier confirmed that the residual 
is stationary at Level. While the test result of Johansen co-integration test indicates 
that at least there is one co-integrating equations for Model 1. In this case, the data is 
estimated again by including the residual with one period lag u(-1) in the model. 
Table 7.14 shows that the coefficienluding t value of the error term is negative at 0.18 
per cent which means that the model has been corrected by 0.18 per cent. The r-
squared of the equation (7.3) is 10 per cent ase (low), means that this model explained 
about 10 per cent of the relationship between variables and there are other factors that 
also influence the Conventional ONR. The coefficient of the conventional bank is at 
negative 0.05 which means when GDP increase, the financing of the conventional 
bank decrease by 0.05 percent and when GDP growth decrease, the financing of the 
conventional bank increase by 0.0004 per cent. However, the p-value of the Islamic 
ONR is less than 0.05 per cent which indicates that there long run relationship 
between the Conventional ONR with Islamic ONR. The Durbin Watson values at 2.0 
means there is no autocorelation in the model.  
 
Table 7.14: Ordinary Least Squares Estimates of Equation (7.2) 
Dependent Variable: D(COV_ONR) 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
D(IS_ONR) 0.470911 0.033267 14.15556 0.0000 
U(-1) -0.182930 0.008678 -21.07869 0.0000 
C -0.000443 0.001496 -0.296292 0.7670 
R-squared 0.101916     Mean dependent var -0.000570 
Adjusted R-squared 0.101543     S.D. dependent var 0.109606 
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S.E. of regression 0.103892     Akaike info criterion -1.690307 
Sum squared resid 52.00333     Schwarz criterion -1.686274 
Log likelihood 4077.486     Hannan-Quinn criter. -1.688891 
F-statistic 273.3762     Durbin-Watson stat 2.087569 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
      
 
The coefficient value is -0.0018 and the p-value is more than 0.05 for IS_PR means 
that there is no long run relationship between the CONV Ineterest Rate with Islamic 
Profit Rate. The speed of adjustment in the model is at -1.22. Since the p-value is not 
significant at 5 per cent, the null hypothesis cannot be rejected that there is no long-
run relationship between COV_SIR with IS_PR. 
 
Table 7.15: Ordinary Least Squares Estimates of Equation (7.3) 
 
Dependent Variable: D(COV_SIR) 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
D(IS_PR) -0.154832 0.213408 -0.725521 0.4690 
U(-1) -1.226137 0.216139 -5.672908 0.0000 
C -0.001085 0.005203 -0.208578 0.8350 
R-squared 0.685643     Mean dependent var 2.66E-05 
Adjusted R-squared 0.682483     S.D. dependent var 0.123950 
S.E. of regression 0.069844     Akaike info criterion -2.470366 
Sum squared resid 0.970758     Schwarz criterion -2.421233 
Log likelihood 252.5070     Hannan-Quinn criter. -2.450487 
F-statistic 217.0188     Durbin-Watson stat 2.057846 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
 
 
7.5.11 Wald Test 
 
Wald test here is used to test the joint significance of a subset of coefficients of the 
Conventional ONR and Islamic ONR. These two variables are individually significant 
based on OLS estimates. To investigate whether these variables have short-run 
association or joint significance, Wald test was conducted.  The result in Table 6.16 
shows that p-value is significant at 1 per cent for equation (6.2) and (6.3) means the 
Conventional banks ONR can granger cause Islamic banks Interbank money market 
rates and vice versa.  
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Table 7.16: VEC Granger Causality/Block Exogeneity Wald Test  
 
Test Statistic COV ONR(-1) = IS ONR(-1)-Equation (7.2) 
Value df Probability 
t-statistic -20.06634  195  0.0000 
F-statistic  402.6580 (1, 195)  0.0000 
Chi-square  402.6580  1  0.0000 
Null Hypothesis: C(4)=(5) 
Null Hypothesis Summary:  
Normalized Restriction (= 0) Value Std. Err. 
-5 + C(4) -5.238655  0.261067 
Restrictions are linear in coefficients. 
 
 
7.5.12 Granger Causality Test for Conventional and Islamic ONR-Equation (7.8) 
The Granger causality test was conducted for the Interbank Money Market rates, 
saving account and investment account rates of the Islamic and the conventional 
banks and the saving rates were for one year. The result in Table 7.17 shows that 
conventional ONR does not Granger causes the Islamic ONR and vice versa up to the 
lag 164. At the lag 166, there is one-way causality where the conventional ONR 
Granger causes the Islamic ONR up to the lag 204. After the lag 206, the conventional 
ONR does not Granger causes Islamic ONR and vice versa up to the lag 746. At the 
lag 748, the Islamic ONR is significant at 1% level. This indicates that there is one-
way causality effect where the Islamic ONR Granger causes the conventional ONR up 
to the lag 928. At the lag 930, there is no Granger causality effect between the Islamic 
ONR and conventional ONR and vice versa. The result indicates that the conventional 
ONR Granger causes Islamic ONR at a short period of time. However, the Islamic 
ONR Granger causes the conventional ONR at long-term or at least for a period of 
more than 2 years. 
 
Table 7.17: Granger Causality Test of Equation (7.8) 
Null hypothesis Lag Observation F-
Statistic 
Probability 
ISL_ONR does not Granger Cause CON_ONR 2 4089 161.716 3.E-68 
ONR does not Granger Cause CON_ONR 164 3927 10.2685 4E-197 
CON_ONR does not Granger Cause ISL_ONR   1.48713 8.E-05 
ISL_ONR does not Granger Cause CON_ONR 166 3925 9.82681 4E-189 
CON_ONR does not Granger Cause ISL_ONR   1.38533 0.0010*** 
ISL_ONR does not Granger Cause CON_ONR 202 3889 4.18738 1.E-68 
151 
 
Null hypothesis Lag Observation F-
Statistic 
Probability 
CON_ONR does not Granger Cause ISL_ONR   1.19614 0.0338** 
ISL_ONR does not Granger Cause 
LOG_CON_ONR 
204 3887 3.99406 7.E-64 
CON_ONR does not Granger Cause ISL_ONR   1.17019 0.0538** 
ISL_ONR does not Granger Cause CON_ONR 206 3885 3.70275 2.E-56 
CON_ONR does not Granger Cause ISL_ONR   1.15422 0.0702 
ISL_ONR does not Granger Cause CON_ONR 746  3345  1.25271 9.E-05 
CON_ONR does not Granger Cause ISL_ONR    0.41896 1.0000 
ISL_ONR does not Granger Cause CON_ONR 748  3343  1.24887 0.0001*** 
CON_ONR does not Granger Cause ISL_ONR    0.42064 1.0000 
ISL_ONR does not Granger Cause CON_ONR 924 3167  1.10857 0.0440** 
CON_ONR does not Granger Cause ISL_ONR    0.46869 1.0000 
ISL_ONR does not Granger Cause CON_ONR 928  3163  1.10277 0.0528** 
CON_ONR does not Granger Cause ISL_ONR    0.46951 1.0000 
ISL_ONR does not Granger Cause CON_ONR 930  3161  1.09816 0.0608 
CON_ONR does not Granger Cause ISL_ONR    0.46827 1.0000 
Notes: (***) Significant at 1%;  (**) Significant at 5%. 
7.5.13 Causality Test of the Equation (7.9) 
Table 7.18 shows the Granger causality result of the conventional bank saving rates 
and Islamic banks profit rates of saving account for one year. The result indicates that 
there is no causality effect between the conventional and Islamic banks rates for 
saving account. 
 
Table 7.18: Granger Causality Test of Equation (7.9) 
Null hypothesis Lag Observation F-
Statistic 
Probability 
 
IS_SAVPR_1Y does not Granger Cause 
COV_SAVIR_1Y 
2 166 0.86271 0.4240 
COV_SAVIR_1Y does not Granger Cause 
IS_SAVPR_1Y 
  0.07690 0.9260 
IS_SAVPR_1Y does not Granger Cause 
COV_SAVIR_1Y 
4 164 0.62426 0.6459 
COV_SAVIR_1Y does not Granger Cause 
IS_SAVPR_1Y 
  0.04435 0.9962 
IS_SAVPR_1Y does not Granger Cause 
COV_SAVIR_1Y 
6 162 0.49684 0.8100 
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Null hypothesis Lag Observation F-
Statistic 
Probability 
 
COV_SAVIR_1Y does not Granger Cause 
IS_SAVPR_1Y 
  0.09844 
 
0.9964 
 
IS_SAVPR_1Y does not Granger Cause 
COV_SAVIR_1Y 
8 160 0.42298 0.9058 
COV_SAVIR_1Y does not Granger Cause 
IS_SAVPR_1Y 
  0.11323 0.9987 
IS_SAVPR_1Y does not Granger Cause 
COV_SAVIR_1Y 
10 158 0.33726 0.9695 
COV_SAVIR_1Y does not Granger Cause 
IS_SAVPR_1Y 
  0.08592 0.9999 
IS_SAVPR_1Y does not Granger Cause 
COV_SAVIR_1Y 
12 156 NA NA 
COV_SAVIR_1Y does not Granger Cause 
IS_SAVPR_1Y 
  NA NA 
 
7.5.14 Impulse Response Test of Equation (7.2) 
 
The impulse response test is one of functions of the vector auto regression (VAR) 
model and aims to analyze the dynamics affects when the model receives the impulse. 
Generally, the impulse response reflects the reaction of the dynamic system in 
response to some external changes.  The chart is plotted to display clearer response of 
the impulse function in the model (Lu and Xin, 2010).  
Figure 7.5 shows the left panel is the pattern of the response of the conventional ONR 
to the Islamic ONR and the right panel is the response of the Islamic ONR to the 
Conventional ONR. The result indicates that the Conventional ONR moving closely 
with the Islamic ONR at the end of the period and the Islamic ONR moving parallel at 
the end the period with the Conventional ONR.  
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Figure 7.5: Impulse Response Test of Model 1  
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This indicates that Conventional Islamic ONR following closely the Islamic ONR at 
the end of the period while Islamic ONR is moving parallel with the conventional 
ONR at the end of the period. This happen because both operating in dual banking 
system and subject to the same monetary policy and the conventional rates cannot 
deviates far from the Islamic bank rates otherwise the customers may chose Islamic 
banks for financing if the conventional bank rates is too high compared to the Islamic 
banks. On the other note, the Islamic banks financing rates are always higher than the 
conventional banks because the rate is fixed and Islamic banks do not want to take 
risk when the Overnight Policy Rate (OPR) for Islamic bank is lowered by the Central 
bank, the Islamic banks still be able to make profit and cover their cost of fund for 
financing and investment. 
 
7.6 CONCLUSION 
The literature review on the theory and practice of Islamic banks in Malaysia reveals 
that about 68 per cent of the financing of Islamic banks in 2011 were debt based or 
debt-like. Among other controversial types of financing were al-bay inah, al-bay a-
dayn and tawarruq which were not permissible in the Middle East but permitted by 
Shari’ah scholars in Malaysia for the purpose of enhancing the development of the 
Islamic banking sector in the country.  
The analysis in this study concludes that there is a co-integration between the 
conventional banks and Islamic banks interbank money market rates and conventional 
banks saving rates with Islamic banks profit rates. Statistically, there is enough 
evidence that conventional interbank money market rates and Islamic interbank 
money market rates have long and short-run association because both conventional 
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banks and Islamic banks are operating in a dual banking system and subjected to the 
same monetary policy. The summary findings of the chapter 7 are in Table 7.19. The 
result indicates that model 2 is stable compared to model 1. However, p-value in 
equation (7.2) in model 1 is less than 0.05 per cent which indicate that there is long 
run relationship between the variables.  
Table 7.19: Summary Findings of the Models in Chapter 7 
Test Result Model 1 Model 2 
Cov Banks’ ONR and 
Islamic ONR 
Equation (7.2) 
Cov Banks’ 
Saving rates and Islamic 
Banks Profit Rates 
 Equation (7.3) 
Coefficient Value of C(1) -0.0004 -0.0010 
R
2
 Value 10% 68% 
Adjusted R
2
 10% 68% 
Durbin Watson  2.08 2.05 
Speed of adjustment -0.18 -1.22 
P-Value 0.0000 0.46 
Indicator Significant  
at 1 % 
Not Significant 
 
Residual Testing  No Unit Root in the 
Residual 
Residual is stationary 
No Unit Root in the Residual 
Residual is stationary 
 
An important part of the analysis of the finding is that Islamic banks are subject to 
interest rate risk under the conventional monetary policy and this is in line with the 
findings of Bacha (2004). This implies that if the conventional bank offers higher 
interest rates it could affect depositors’ behaviour for Islamic banking patronising as 
well. Therefore, Islamic banks need to adjust their rates in the long-term. Lastly, the 
result also supports the findings of Haron (2000) that Islamic bank depositors are 
affected by the rates provided by conventional banks. The finding indicates that 
conventional banks saving rates and Islamic banks profit rates have short-run 
association and both rates move in tandem.  
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CHAPTER 8 
 
EXAMINING THE IMPACT OF INTEREST RATE SPREAD ON 
THE ISLAMIC BANK SAVINGS AND INVESTMENT RETURN 
RATES IN MALAYSIA 
 
8.1 INTRODUCTION 
There is a growing amount of literature on the development of Islamic finance and 
banking. Many scholars and modern fuqaha agree that there are differences between 
Islamic banks and conventional banks in terms of their financing modes, as well as 
the products and services they offer. The differences between the Islamic banks and 
conventional banks are that Islamic banks provide loan and finance based mainly on 
the principles of muamalah (business transaction) such as murabahah (cost plus profit 
or mark-up), mudharabah (as a capital provider), musharakah (profit and loss sharing 
investment) and ijarah (leasing). Despite their differences, the similarities are that 
both systems are based on a fractional reserve system and involved in credit creation. 
In addition, as discussed in the previous chapters, having Islamic banks operating 
within a dual banking system and within the existing conventional monetary 
environment, the convergence from Islamic banking to conventional banking is 
inevitable.  Therefore, the result of monetary policy, including developments related 
to the interest rate, is expected to have a direct impact on Islamic banking and finance 
operations. 
This paper, hence, aims to explore the impact of interest rate spread on Islamic banks 
in Malaysia. Since Islamic banks in Malaysia operate with conventional banks under 
the dual banking system, savings and investment return rates of the Islamic banks are 
based on the Islamic interbank money market rates (IIMMR), which is benchmarked 
against the Kuala Lumpur interbank offered rates (KLIBOR). Thus, developments in 
KLIBOR are expected to have a direct impact and effect on Islamic bank return rates. 
This study also aims to investigate the market and macroeconomic related factors that 
affect and determine the Islamic banks’ savings and investment return rates spread in 
Malaysia. In rationalising this empirical paper, it should be noted that, as evidenced 
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from the survey of the empirical papers in a later section, there is no study available in 
the literature which investigates the impact of interest rate spread on Islamic banks’ 
operations in general the case of Malaysia in particular.  Since Islamic bank pricing is 
based on the interest rates, this study utilized savings account return rate and 
investment account return rate as the proxy to analyse its impact on the market and 
macroeconomic determinant variables. 
The following section describes the conceptual definition of interest rate spread, 
reviews the development of Islamic banking in Malaysia under the interest rate based 
monetary policy in comparison with interest rates spread related trends in other 
countries. The methodology section covers models, methods and definition of the 
variables. After presenting the analysis and findings employing Vector Error 
Correction Model for meaningful results. 
 
8.2 CONCEPTUAL DEFINITION OF INTEREST RATE SPREAD 
Tight monetary policy with higher interest rates often results in a decrease in 
economic activity. Easing the monetary policy with lower interest rates may increase 
economic activity. Ploseer and Rowenhorst (1994) note that interest rate spread 
movement may reflect the real business cycle theory (Dotsey, 1998:31). Therefore, it 
is imperative to understand the conceptual definition of interest rate spread. The 
interest rate spread can be described using narrow and wide definition (Mlachila and 
Chilwa, 2002:12). The most common definition of interest rate spread, which is used 
by the World Bank, is the lending rate minus the deposit rate. However, there are 
other definitions known as narrow and wide definitions of the interest rate spread. The 
narrow definition includes: 
 
(i) Interest received only on loans minus the interest paid on deposits; 
(ii) Interest received on loans minus interest paid on deposits; and 
(iv) Interest plus commission received on a loan minus interest and commission paid 
on deposits 
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The wide definition includes the following: 
(i) Interest received minus interest paid/total assets; 
(ii)  Interest received/all interest bearing assets minus interest paid/interest earning 
liabilities;  
(iii) Interest plus commission received/ all interest bearing assets minus interest plus 
commission paid/interest earning liabilities. 
 
8.3 ISLAMIC BANKING IN MALAYSIA AND INTEREST RATE BASED 
MONETARY POLICY 
The majority of Islamic scholars agree that the bank interest rate is riba. The main 
reason for establishing Islamic banks is to abolish riba from the banking system. 
However, despite knowing that riba is haram and not permitted in Islam, the 
monetary policy of all Muslim countries, including Malaysia, is still based on interest. 
The interest rate in modern economies is one of the main instruments of monetary 
policy and it is utilized to influence the economic growth and economic activity.  
Malaysia is one of the countries that practise a dual banking system, and 70 per cent 
of its market share is controlled by the conventional banks. Islamic banks do not 
provide loans and credit based on interest rate, but loans and financing by Islamic 
banks are legitimized by sales and purchase agreement leasing contract as well as 
leasing and buy back contract utilizing the Shari’ah compliance mode of financing 
(al-bay bithaman ajil, ijarah and ijarah thumma  al-bay, murabaha). 
As depicted in Figure 8.1 as a theoretical construct, when economic growth is below 
potential, and the inflation rate is low, the overnight policy rate (ONR) will be 
reduced by BNM. When the ONR is reduced, it will affect the interest rates of the 
banking system. In turn, the banking system may provide more loans with lower 
interest rates, which are expected to stimulate economic activity. However, providing 
more loans without a link to the real sector is meaningless and leads to higher 
inflation. If economic growth exceeds the expected level and inflation rate becomes 
too high, the Central Bank will then increase the ONR which will lead to an increase 
in saving. When interest rates are high, fewer loans will be disbursed because banks 
will be highly selective in approving loans due to the risk of default risk by customers, 
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even though fewer loans are expected to shrink the inflation and economic activity. 
The role of interest rates in Malaysian monetary policy is illustrated in Figure 8.1. 
 
Figure 8.1: Malaysian Monetary Policy 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
OPR-Overnight Policy Rate 
Source: Hashim (2012: 6-7) 
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rate is no longer the mechanism or instrument. There should be a separate monetary 
policy for the Islamic banks otherwise they are directly affected by the interest based 
monetary policy. 
As they are operating and working within the existing conventional monetary 
environment, the structure of Islamic banks is similar to that of the conventional 
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inherited the conventional banking system and their functions are similar to 
conventional banks as intermediaries by taking deposits and providing financing and 
loans to customers. 
Within such an operating environment, the financing rates of Islamic banks are 
extremely dependent on the cost of funds. The major factor that affects the cost of 
fund includes ‘interest rate spread’ which in the case of Islamic banks it is known as 
the ‘profit rate spread’. This paper, hence, explores and examines whether there is a 
relationship between interest rate spread and Islamic banking outcomes as both banks 
work under the same system with the dominance of conventional banking and 
monetary policy. 
Figure 8.2 shows the distribution of financing by Islamic banks in 2012. About 32 per 
cent of the Islamic banks financing was based on al-bay bithaman ajil, 23 per cent on 
ijarah thumma al-bay (leasing and buying back), 20 per cent on credit cards, staff 
financing, share margin financing and others, and 17.2 per cent was based on 
murabaha. Musharakah, mudarabah and istisna financing were less than 5 per cent. 
 
Figure 8.2: Financing of Islamic Banks in 2012 
 
Source: Compiled from the BNM, Monthly Statistical Bulletin, 2013 
In comparison, as identified by Cevik and Charap (2011), by 2011, about 60 per cent 
of the financing were loans and debts, utilizing the Islamic finance principles. The 
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there was a guaranteed profit margin. Furthermore, Islamic banks’ mark-up profit was 
adjusted based on the conventional interest rate. As a result, the pricing of Islamic 
financing is not, in general, a function of real economic activity but based on a pre-
determined interest rate plus a credit risk premium, which was similar to conventional 
bank loans (Cevik and Charap, 2011). 
Islamic banks in Malaysia have been under the regulation and supervision of the 
BNM. The first one was established on 1st March 1983 and started operating on 1st 
July 1983 with an authorized capital of RM500 million and paid-up capital of 
RM79.9 million (Bank Islam Malaysia Berhad, 1984, p. 22). The facility and service 
provided then was current account deposit without distribution of profit known as al-
wadiah account (safe custodianship). 
For savings accounts, under al-wadiah principles, the distribution of profit is at the 
discretion of the bank. It is also known as hibah (gift) or a token of appreciation to the 
depositors for depositing their money with Islamic banks. For current accounts, 
Islamic banks cannot provide profit because the money is not used for investment 
purposes. In Islam, money cannot create money unless it is used as a medium of 
exchange, which involves buying and selling of assets, products and services or for 
the purpose of investment.  
In terms of the investment deposit account, for the duration of one month to five years 
and above, it is based on the al-murabahah (trust financing) principle, and banks are 
obligated to distribute profit to the depositors. Financing and investments are based on 
al-murabahah (trust financing), al-musharakah (joint-venture), al-bay bithaman ajil 
(deferred payment sale) and al-ijarah (leasing). Al-bay bithaman ajil is among the 
most widespread mode of financing utilized by the Islamic banks in Malaysia. In 
2010, 33.1 per cent of the financing was based on al-bai bithaman ajil (deferred 
payment sale), 14.4 per cent were al-murabaha (mark-up cost plus profit) and other 
financing which included credit cards, staff financing, and share margin financing was 
19.6 per cent.  
From 1984 to 1993, Bank Islam Malaysia Berhad dominated the market share of the 
Islamic banking industry as a single Islamic bank. In 1994, the Government decided 
to allow competition in the market by issuing new licenses to the conventional 
commercial banks to offer Islamic bank products and services under the concept of 
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Islamic banking scheme (IBS) known as ‘Skim Perbankan Islam’. In 1999, the second 
full-fledged Islamic bank was established known as Bank Muamalat Malaysia. From 
2002 to 2009, to enhance competition in the industry, more licenses were issued 
allowing conventional banks to offer Islamic banking product and services through 
their branches or subsidiaries. As of December 2012, there have been 16 Islamic 
banks in Malaysia, as depicted in Table 8.1. 
 
Table 8.1: No. of Islamic Banks in Malaysia as of 2012 
CATEGORIES NO. 
Total Local Islamic Banks 9 
Full-fledged Local Islamic Bank 2 
Subsidiary or Branch of Local Conventional banks 7 
Total Foreign Islamic Banks 7 
Subsidiary or Branch of Foreign Conventional Banks 3 
Full-fledged Foreign Islamic Banks in Malaysia 4 
Total Numbers of Islamic Banks 16 
Source: Compiled from the BNM, Monthly Statistical Bulletin (2013) 
In 2004, to facilitate Islamic banks borrowing without involving interest rates 
payment, the Islamic Interbank Money Market (IIMM) was established by the 
government. The objectives were to allow banks that had a surplus to channel funds 
into banks which had a deficit, to serve as a channel of transmission of the monetary 
policy, and to maintain liquidity and stability of funding in the banking system.  
Since 1984, the loans provided by the Islamic banks have been increasing. Figure 8.3 
shows the total loans and total deposits and ratio of total loans over total deposits of 
Islamic banks from 1984 to 2012. Overall, the ratio of total loan is below 80 per cent 
of the total deposits. 
Figure 8.3: Total Deposit, Loans and Operating Ratio of Islamic Banks 
 
Source: Compiled from the BNM, Monthly Statistical Bulletin (2013) 
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The conventional and Islamic bank savings return rates and investment account return 
rates depend on the base lending rate (BLR). Prior to 1983, the interest rates were 
based on the rates of two leading banks. BLR was introduced in 1983, where banks 
were allowed to set their own BLR. The computation of BLR is based on the formula 
below: 
    
               
     
               
Note that IR is the ‘intervention rate’, and SRR is the ‘statutory reserve requirement’ 
set by the Bank Negara Malaysia (BNM). In 1987, no bank was allowed to set its 
BLR percentage higher than the two leading banks’ BLR. From 1991 onwards, the 
computation of BLR was tied to the cost of funds of the banks. In 1995, BLR 
computation was directly linked to the daily average three month interbank rates 
(Abdul Majid, 2010: 4). Prior to 1 September 1998, BLR was calculated using the 
average of KLIBOR rate in lieu of the intervention rate, and administrative charges 
were 2.5 per cent instead of 2.25 per cent. In 1998, due to slow transmission process, 
the three month interbank rate was replaced with a three month intervention rate 
(Domac, 1999: 11). 
In April 2004, the three month intervention rates were replaced with ONR. The main 
feature of ONR is an indicator of the monetary policy stance and the target rate of the 
day-to-day liquidity operation of BNM. Changes in monetary policy would be 
signalled through ONR, which would serve as the primary reference for other 
markets. To minimize the volatility of the ONR, BNM had set 25 basis points as the 
upper and lower limits to facilitate the lending activity (BNM; 2004). Starting from 
2009, the Islamic banks set their own BLR. Figure 8.4 shows that the Islamic banks’ 
BLR set was similar to the conventional BLR. However, from 2011 to 2012 the BLR 
of Islamic banks was slightly higher than that of conventional banks. 
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Figure 8.4: BLR of Conventional and Islamic Banks in Malaysia, 2002-2012 
 
Source: Compiled from the BNM, Monthly Statistical Bulletin (2013) 
Figure 8.5 shows trends in the savings interest rates of conventional banks and 
savings return rates of Islamic banks from 2002 to 2011. The average interest rates of 
conventional banks and savings return rates of Islamic banks were below 2.5 per cent. 
From 2005 to 2011, the average rates were below 1.5 per cent for both banks.  
 
Figure 8.5: Saving Interest Rates of the Conventional Banks 
and Saving Return Rates of Islamic Bank 
 
Source: Compiled from the BNM, Monthly Statistical Bulletin, 2013 
Figure 8.5 also indicates that the Islamic bank savings return rates were slightly 
higher than conventional interest rates from 2003 to 2005. Conversely from 2006 to 
2008, Islamic banks offered lower savings return rates. In addition, as the trend 
shows, in the period from 2009 to 2012 the Islamic banks adjusted their savings return 
rates close to conventional bank interest rates. 
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As the trends shown in Figure 8.5 indicate, the savings return rates of Islamic banks 
were sometimes slightly lower or higher than those of conventional banks, but 
generally the Islamic savings return rates were close to the interest rates offered by the 
conventional banks during the period in question. The findings of Kaleem and Md Isa 
(2003:7) confirm that Islamic banks consider interest rates before adjusting their 
savings return rates. In addition, Haron and Ahmad (2000: 5) found that customers 
who place their deposits either in conventional or Islamic banks in Malaysia are profit 
motivated where there is a negative relationship between conventional banks’ interest 
rates and the amount deposited in Islamic banks. 
Figure 8.6 shows the rate of return for investment accounts for conventional and 
Islamic banks. The rate offered by the conventional banks was almost double that 
offered by the Islamic banks. On average, the fixed deposits’ interest rate of the 
conventional banks was higher than the Islamic banks. This indicates that the 
conventional bank interest rates were more attractive than the Islamic banks’ 
investment return rates. 
Figure 8.6: Commercial Banks 12 Months Fixed Deposit Interest Rates  
and Islamic Banks 12 Months Investment Return Rates  
 
Source: Compiled from the BNM, Monthly Statistical Bulletin (2013) 
Figure 8.7 depicts the Islamic banks’ savings return rates spread and conventional 
banks’ interest rates spread from 2002 to 2012. As the trend shows, Islamic banks 
relatively determined the same amount of net margin spread as the conventional 
banks. There is not much difference between the Islamic banks’ savings return rates 
and the conventional banks’ interest rates. Figure 8.7 also shows the net difference of 
the Islamic banks spread with the conventional banks from 2002 to 2012.  
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Figure 8.7: Islamic Banks Saving Return Rates Spread and  
Conventional Banks Interest Rates Spread 
 
Source: Compiled from the BNM, Monthly Statistical Bulletin (2013) 
Figure 8.8 shows conventional banks’ average fixed deposit interest rates spread 
Islamic banks average investment return rates spread from year 2002 to 2012.  
 
Figure 8.8: The Islamic Banks Average Investment Return Rates Spread and 
Conventional Banks Average Fixed Deposit Interest Rates Spread  
 
Source: Compiled from the BNM, Monthly Statistical Bulletin (2013) 
The net difference of Islamic banks spread was more volatile and did not have similar 
patterns to savings accounts. However, the net spread of the Islamic banks was higher 
than that of the saving account.  
Figure 8.9 shows the average lending rates, savings return rates and net saving return 
rates spread of the Islamic banks from 2002 to 2012, which also highlights that the 
average lending rate of Islamic banks was higher than the savings return rates. The 
data indicate that Islamic banks provided lending at higher rates and gave a smaller 
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amount of the saving deposits profit. The net profit rate spread range was between 3 
per cent and 5 per cent from 2002 to 2012.  
Figure 8.9: Islamic Banks’ Average Saving Return Rates Spread   
 
Source: Compiled from the BNM, Monthly Statistical Bulletin (2013) 
Figure 8.10 shows the average investment return rates of the Islamic banks from 2002 
to 2012. The net spread of investment return rate ranged from 2.5 per cent to 4.1 per 
cent. The average rate of return on investment accounts was below 4 per cent. Hence, 
the rate of return on investment was lower than the savings return rates of the saving 
accounts of Islamic banks as depicted in Figure 8.10. There was no particular 
financial attraction for investors to invest in the Islamic banks because the rate of 
return was very low. Therefore, the sustained patronage can only be explained by 
religious reasons. 
Figure 8.10 also indicates that the Islamic banks were inefficient in managing 
investment deposits compared to deposits received for savings accounts. The 
investors received a lower return when investing in Islamic banks compared to 
conventional banks, because investment return rates of the Islamic banks was lower 
than the savings return rates.  
Figure 8.10: Islamic banks Average Lending 
and Investment Return Rates Spread 
 
Source: Compiled from the BNM, Monthly Statistical Bulletin (2013) 
4.85 4.65 4.59 4.53 4.54 
5.06 4.98 5.16 
4.06 3.84 3.75 
0.0 
1.0 
2.0 
3.0 
4.0 
5.0 
6.0 
7.0 
8.0 
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Average Lending Rate 
Islamic Banks Profit Rate  
2.8 3.0 2.9 2.7 
3.3 3.1 
3.5 
4.1 
3.6 
3.2 
2.8 
0.00      
1.00      
2.00      
3.00      
4.00      
5.00      
6.00      
7.00      
8.00      
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Average Lending Rate 
Islamic Banks Rates of Return on Investment 
167 
 
In summary, the data reveal that Islamic banks in Malaysia gained higher savings 
return rates spread than conventional banks. However, the investment return rates 
offered by Islamic banks were benchmarked against the fixed deposit rates of the 
conventional banks. Further empirical analysis is presented in the following section to 
examine the impact of interest rates spread on the Islamic banks in Malaysia. In 
comparison to the conventional banks, Islamic banks which charged higher return 
rates of financing and loans became uncompetitive in the market in the period 
covered. From a customer’s point of view, Islamic banks were often perceived as 
more expensive than conventional banks. From the market perspective, higher interest 
rates’ spread was seen as an indicator of the Islamic banks inefficiency. From the 
macroeconomic perspective, it reflected the monetary policy stance set by the Central 
Bank, which affected the pricing of Islamic banks. 
 
8.4 EMPIRICAL STUDIES IN INTEREST RATE SPREAD: A LITERATURE 
SURVEY 
While the existing empirical literature on interest rate spread indicates mixed findings, 
a study on the interest rate spread is crucial, because it reflects the monetary policy 
stance of the country and contains useful information about its financial development. 
According to Bernanke (1990: 66), interest rate spread is immensely informative 
because it not only contains information about default risk but it is also a measure of 
monetary policy. 
There are many factors that determine the interest rate spread of banks. A study by 
Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga (1999), which employed bank level data for 80 
countries from 1988 to 1995, suggests that differences in banks’ profitability and 
interest margins were determined by many factors including bank characteristics, 
macroeconomic environment, taxation system, deposit insurance regulation, financial 
structure and institutional indicators. Their findings also show that in developing 
countries foreign banks had higher margins and profit compared to the local banks.  
They also found that interest rate spread became higher in the small market where 
banks passed the burden of corporate tax to their clients. Their results indicated that 
bank characteristics might be influenced by the number of players in the industry, 
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percentage of market share of the participants, ownership structure and control, and 
the regulatory framework. 
There is no doubt that the macroeconomic environment may influence the 
performance of the banking industry. For example, when the macroeconomic 
environment is not stable, and the economic growth is exceptionally low or negative, 
it may affect the return on investment and banks may charge high lending rates due to 
uncertainty and high risk of default in payment by the borrowers. It may also affect 
the level of non-performing loans of the banks and reduce their margins and 
profitability. 
In searching for the determinants of interest spread, taxation system can also be 
considered, as it can widen the interest spread by increasing withholding taxes, stamp 
duties, transaction taxes, value added taxes, profit taxes, license fees and statutory 
reserve requirement. Studies by Barajas et al. (1996) and Demirguc-Kunt and 
Huizinga (1997) found a positive relationship between high interest rate spread and 
high levels of taxation on intermediation. 
A study by Friedman and Kutner (1992:472) in the case of the USA found that spread 
between the Treasury bill rate and commercial paper rates contains highly significant 
information about the movement of real income in the future. An increase in the 
interest rate spread may discourage savings and investment, and it may also affect the 
depositor or the borrower or both (Khawaja and Ud-Din, 2007). 
Ho and Saunders (1981: 594) show that interest rates spread is higher for smaller 
banks and lower for larger banks in the case of the USA. This is because larger banks 
are more competitive nationally and globally compared to smaller banks which 
operate in an uncompetitive environment.  
In the case of OECD countries, Browne and Tease (1992: 5) found that interest rate 
spread is one of the best predictors of output compared to other financial variables. 
Studies have shown that a higher interest rate spread is caused by banks’ 
characteristic of maximizing savings return rates in a certain market. In addition, 
research by Saunders and Schumacher (2000: 16-17), in the case of seven OECD 
countries, namely France, Germany, Italy, Spain, Switzerland, the UK and the US, for 
the period of 1988 to 1995, found that a bank’s net interest margin (NIM) was 
169 
 
affected by regulatory taxes, reserve requirements, cost of bank equity, market 
structure and interest rates volatility.  
The NIM might be lowered to allow competitive interest rates by banks; the amount 
of reserve requirements could affect the NIM paid by them. If a bank’s capital ratio 
was high, it might impose a higher burden on banks, and it would be reflected by the 
NIM amount the banks paid. It should also be noted that interest rate volatility at the 
macro level may affect the NIM of banks. In relation to this, Saunders and 
Schumacher (2000: 16-17) also found that an increase of 1 per cent in the macro level 
interest rates causes an increase of 2 per cent in the NIM of the banks. This indicates 
that macroeconomic factors influence the interest rate policy and the monetary policy 
has the positive effect on the NIM of banks. 
Randall (1998: 36), in the case of Eastern Caribbean Countries, using a behavioural 
model, found that 53 per cent of the spread was due to the operational cost. While the 
reserve requirement accounted for only about 6 per cent of the interest rate spread, the 
remaining 41 per cent were influenced by the return on equity. 
There are two factors that contribute to the bank interest rates spread namely, market 
related factors and macroeconomic determinants. The market specific variables are 
market share, operating costs, capital to asset ratio and loan to asset ratio (Abreau, 
2001: 3). For example, Afanasieff et al. (2002: 26) use panel data from 142 banks in 
Brazil for the period of February 1997 to November 2000; they found that 
macroeconomic variables were more prominent than market factors in describing the 
behaviour of the bank interest rates spread. However, they noted other unidentified 
factors which account for the higher spread trend in the country. 
In relation to macroeconomic variables, studies by Mlachilla and Chilwa (2002) as 
well as Brock and Franken (2003), in the case of Malawi and Chile respectively, 
suggest that the macroeconomic variables that affected the interest rates spread 
included inflation, money market rates, real interest rates and the GDP growth. In the 
case of Ukrainian banks, it was found that the macroeconomic factors that affected the 
banks’ net margin comprised inflation, GDP growth and real interest rate. In most 
cases, when spread is utilized as a proxy for macroeconomic forecasting, the result is 
expected to be positive (Mariscal and Howells, 2002: 577). 
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In case of Malaysia, Ghazali and Ali (2002) used the Granger causality test to explore 
the impact of open market interest rates on commercial bank interest rates spread. The 
result of the study indicates that changes in the open market rates affected changes in 
the interest rate spread and deposit rates of the commercial banks in Malaysia. 
However, so far there is no agreed model for analysing the consequences of the 
macroeconomic impact of the interest rate spread (Brock and Franken, 2003:9). 
Studies in the Columbia, and by Jayaraman and Sharma (2003: 80), in the case of Fiji, 
suggest that wide interest rates spread might adversely affect the economic growth 
and reduce the private investment.  
Other studies, such as Doliente (2003: 15), in the case of Southeast Asia banking 
system including Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines and Thailand found that bank 
specific factors that determined the interest rate spread were mainly financial factors 
such as collateral, liquid assets, loan quality, operating expenses and capital. 
A study by Soulgoub, on the 30 largest banks in Ukraine, employing data from 2000 
to 2005 indicates that macroeconomic factors like higher inflation rate affected the 
interest rate margin, which implies that bank profits would be higher when the real 
interest rates increased. While the bank or financial variables such loan quality, 
liquidity risk, the significance of off-balance sheet activities, share of earnings of total 
assets were included in the analysis, the effect of these variables on the bank profit 
margin was relatively small. Undoubtedly, banks preferred higher interest rates 
because they gave them higher profits (Soulgoub, 2006: 2). 
Grenade (2007), investigated the main factors influencing interest rates spread in the 
Eastern Caribbean Currency Union from 1993 to 2003. The determinants of the 
interest rates spread were divided into four categories namely, regulatory, bank 
specifics, market power variables and rate of growth of GDP as a proxy of economic 
activity Grenade (2007: 24-25). Regulatory variables referred to savings deposits and 
reserve requirements, while bank variables included operating cost and provision of 
loan losses. The market power variables were the level of interbank competition and 
rate of GDP growth as a proxy of economic growth. The result shows that interest 
rates spread impacted by the high level of market concentration, regulated savings 
deposit rates, and high operating costs of non-performing bank loans. 
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Crowley (2007) studied the case of English-speaking African countries, and found 
that higher interest rate spread was associated with lower inflation, large number of 
banks, greater public ownership of banks, poor corporate governance, weak 
regulatory framework, property rights, and higher reserve requirement. 
Fulawewo and Tennant (2008) examined the determinants of spread between banks’ 
lending return rates and deposit return rates from 1988 to 2005 for 33 Sub-Saharan 
African countries. They found that other macroeconomic variables such as discount 
rates, Treasury bill rates and government domestic borrowing could influence the 
interest rates spread. 
Norris and Floerkemeier (2007) employed panel data set to examine the interest rate 
spread and net interest margin in Armenia from 2002 to 2006. The test result 
highlights that bank-specific characteristics and market structure played a pivotal role 
in the variation of interest rates spread and margins. The factors that affected interest 
rates spread included bank size, return on an asset, liquidity and overall market 
concentration measured market in deposits. 
Beck and Hesse (2009) analysed the high interest rates spread and margins in Uganda 
using data from 1999 to 2005. The study explored four different approaches in 
explaining spread and margin, namely market structure, macroeconomic risk and the 
nature and the size of the financial system. The variables used to analyse the high 
spread were bank size, exchange rate depreciation, real Treasury bill rate, liquidity 
ratio, market concentration, inflation, GDP growth, institutional development, and 
overhead costs. The findings of the study suggest that risk factor was the main 
determinant of high spread and margins contributed by higher Treasury bill rates, 
institutional deficiencies and differences in the composition of the loan portfolio. 
Maudos and Solis (2009) examined the determinants of net interest income of the 
Mexican banking system and found that there were various factors that contributed to 
its higher interest rate spread. The factors included operating cost, interest rate 
volatility, market risk, inflation rate, quality of management, non-interest income, 
credit risk, transaction cost and the GDP growth. The study also suggests that the 
most significant factors determining the interest rate spread in the case of Mexico 
were the average operating cost and the market power of the banks. 
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Afzal and Mirza (2010) used data from 2004 to 2009 to conduct research on the 
Pakistani commercial banking sector by including macroeconomic and firm level 
variables. They found strong evidence that bank size was the main determinant of 
interest rate spread. Similarly, there were other influential factors that determined the 
interest rates spread such as operational efficiency, asset quality, liquidity, risk 
absorption capacity and the GDP growth. However, no evidence was found that the 
interest rate volatility (volatility in Treasury bill yield) and financial development 
indicator (M2 divided by the GDP) affected the interest rates spread in Pakistan. 
Akinlo and Babatunde (2012) conducted a research on interest rates spread in Nigeria 
utilizing data from 1986 to 2007. The bank variables employed in the research 
included cash reserve ratio, the ratio of average capital to average total assets, ratio of 
loans to total deposit, the ratio of average loans to average total assets, the ratio of 
non-interest expenses to average total assets. Other ratios included ratio of 
remuneration to total assets, minimum rediscount rate, gross domestic product 
development stocks, treasury certificates, treasury bills and changes in inflation. The 
findings show that the cash reserve ratio, loans to total deposits and remuneration to 
total assets are positively correlated with the interest rates spread (Akinlo and 
Babatunde, 2012). 
In summary, as stated by Shahzad and Lodhi (2012), empirical studies in this area 
remains inconclusive, because different researchers found different results or 
determinants for the interest rate spread. Based on the previous findings of various 
empirical studies, there were essentially three factors that determined the interest rate 
spread: banks specific, market specific and macroeconomic variables. However, the 
results might vary from one region and country to another due to the different size of 
banks, market share, market structure and macroeconomic environment. 
 
8.5 EMPIRICAL MODEL, METHODOLOGY AND DATA 
As an empirical paper, this section presents the model selection for the conduct of 
empirical analysis in this study as well as the empirical methodology pursued to fulfil 
the research aim. Definition of variables and the sources of data are also presented in 
this section. 
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8.5.1 Empirical Model 
The model was constructed based paper by Shahzad; Lodhi, and Athar (2012) which 
was published in “Actual Problem of Economics”. The basic spread model in the 
functional form is as below:  
                                   (8.1) 
 
where SP the interest rate spread of the bank, Xt is a vector of bank specific variables. 
Yt is the banking industry variables and Zt is the macroeconomic variables and Ɛt is 
the error term while t refers to the time. This model falls under the narrow definition 
of spread where interest rates received on loans is subtracted from the interest paid on 
deposits. Since this study is on Islamic banks, a slight modification was made, with 
the interest rate spread replaced with Islamic bank return rates spread of saving and 
investment.  
The definition of savings and investment spread of Islamic banks is as in equations 
(8.2) and (8.3).  Two models were employed to analyse the spread of Islamic banks. 
The first model included the market related variables as in equations 8.3 and 8.4, and 
the second model was developed with macroeconomic variables as in equation 8.5 
and 8.6.  
Saving Return Rates Spread 
 
                                             (8.2) 
where: 
ISPRSt : Islamic Banks Saving Return Rates Spread 
APRt : Average Saving Return Rates (Yearly Rates) 
ADRt : Average Deposit Return Rates (Yearly Rates) 
t : Time (Yearly Data) 
 
Model 1-Market Determinant Variables  
 
                                                                                             (8.3) 
where: 
BDEVt   : Total Islamic Banks Assets Divided by Total GDP 
RSDPt  : Reserve Requirement Ratio to Total Deposits 
RGDP_PC  : Real GDP Per Capita 
T   : Time (Yearly Data) 
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Model 2-Macroeconomic Variables 
 
                                                                            (8.4) 
 
where: 
GDPt : Growth Domestic Products 
INFt  : Inflation Rates   
RIRt : Real Saving Return Rates 
T_BILLt : Treasury Bill Rates for 12 months 
t : Time (Yearly Data) 
8.5.2 Method 
This study investigates the relationship of profit rate spread (PRS) of Islamic banks 
with market related variables such as the reserve ratio of deposits. The bank 
development variable is measured by total assets of Islamic banks divided by the 
current GDP. The macroeconomic variables in the model are GPD, inflation, 
interbank money market rates, exchange rates, and Treasury bill rates. 
The data analysis method includes a unit root test. As part of the time-series analysis, 
a unit root test was conducted, based on Augmented Dickey Fuller, Phillip Perron, Im, 
Pesaran and Shin W statistic tests. In this test, Xt is stationary if β equal to 0 and Xt is 
non-stationary if β is equal to 1. The auto regression model of the unit root test 
utilised in the estimation is as below (Ngugi, 2001:30). 
 
                                                                                        (8.5) 
 
The data for interest rate spread of the conventional and Islamic banks have relatively 
similar values, and to avoid spurious regression or auto correlation between variables, 
all data were transformed to logarithm (log) with first order difference. The data for 
analysis included the yearly records of Islamic and conventional banks from 1984 to 
2010. 
8.5.3 Defining the Variables 
In the model, there is one dependent variables: IPRS and additional independent 
variables. The summary of the variables, source of data and expected results are 
depicted in Table 8.2. 
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Table 8.2: Summary Definition of Variables and Sources of Data 
Variables 
 
Definition of Variables 
 
Sources of Data Expected 
Sign 
Bank Specific Variables 
ISPRS Average savings return rates of 
lending minus average  saving return 
rates of  the Islamic banks 
BNM Monthly 
Statistical 
Bulletin (MSB) 
+ 
Market Variables  
BDEV Total asset of Islamic banks divided 
by total current GDP of the year 
BNM-MSB + 
RSDP Reserve requirement percentage 
divided by total deposit of the Islamic 
banks 
BNM-MSB + 
RGDP_PC Real GDP per capita is GDP constant 
divided by inflation. Real GDP is 
further divided by a number of 
populations to get real GDP per 
capita 
BNM-MSB +/- 
Macroeconomic Variables 
GDP Growth of GDP (at constant price) BNM +/- 
INF Inflation rate (consumer index price) BNM + 
RIR Real saving returns rates are inflation 
minus nominal saving return rates 
BNM + 
T-bill Treasury bill rates for 12 months BNM + 
 
8.6 ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS 
The analysis was conducted by utilizing descriptive statistics, unit root test, Johansen 
Cointegration Test, Vector Error Correction Model Test and Ordinary Least Square 
estimations within the framework of two steps of Engle-Granger test. 
8.6.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 8.3 depicts descriptive statistics of the Islamic and conventional banks’ spread 
of savings and investment.  
Table 8.3: Descriptive Statistics of the Dependent Variables 
Descriptive Statistics 
Variables 
ISPRS ISIVRS COVIRSI 
 
COVIRSS 
 
 Mean 5.552715 3.846728 3.226667 5.385185 
 Median 5.415833 3.623333 2.860000 5.400000 
 Maximum 7.869163 6.623333 6.050000 7.900000 
 Minimum 4.083333 1.876667 2.160000 4.100000 
 Standard  Deviation 1.081140 1.049072 0.930430 0.908381 
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Descriptive Statistics 
Variables 
ISPRS ISIVRS COVIRSI 
 
COVIRSS 
 
 Skewness 0.531921 0.554262 1.329169 0.668662 
 Kurtosis 2.388710 3.442934 4.343591 3.332076 
 Jarque-Bera 1.693616 1.603145 9.981003 2.136046 
 Probability 0.428781 0.448623 0.006802 0.343687 
As can be seen in Table 8.3, the mean of the Islamic banks’ spread of saving and 
investment is higher than that of conventional banks. Between the Islamic savings 
return rates and investment returns rates, the mean of the former is higher than the 
latter. This suggests that Islamic banks are charging higher lending rates for loans 
compared to financing of investment. 
Table 8.3 shows that the standard deviation of the Islamic spread is almost the same 
as the standard deviation of the conventional banks. This means that spread of Islamic 
banks and conventional banks is close to each other. It should be noted that a higher 
interest rates spread is frequently perceived as an indicator of banks’ inefficiency.  
A study by Afzal and Mirza (2010: vi) in the case of the Pakistani commercial 
banking sector highlighted the factors contributing to intermediary inefficiency which 
include bank size, operational efficiency, asset quality, liquidity risk absorption 
capacity and GDP growth rate. However, there are many additional factors that also 
contribute to the inefficiency of banks such as market share, number of branches, 
market strategy, technology, human resource skills and others. Based on the 
descriptive data in Table 7.3, it is obvious that Islamic banks’ spread is higher than 
that of conventional banks. This implies that the cost of funding of Islamic banks is 
higher than that of conventional banks. 
8.6.2 Unit Root Test 
The Unit Root test was conducted at level, first and second difference at individual 
intercept, trend and intercept and without intercept using Augmented Dickey Fuller 
and Phillip test methods. Table 8.4 depicts that the probability value is not significant 
at level for most of the variables. There are also some variables such as COVIRSS, 
RSDP and GDP where the p-value is not significant at 1
st
 different but significant at 
2
nd
 difference. This indicates that data is stationary at 1st difference except for 
COVIRR, RSDP and GDP but all variables are stationary at 2
nd
 difference. The 
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analysis of data would be by transforming data into logarithm or using or with 2 lags 
difference.  
Table 8.4: Unit Root Test for All Variables 
Variables Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) Phillip Perron (PP) 
Level First 
Difference 
Second 
Difference 
Level First 
Difference 
Second 
Difference 
ISPRS Intercept -1.883521 
(0.3344) 
-5.053221 
(0.0004) 
-7.837729 
(0.0000) 
-1.916552 
(0.3199) 
-5.054046 
(0.0004) 
-12.91059 
(0.0000) 
 Intercept 
and trend 
-2.87841 
(0.1863) 
-4.946858 
(0.0028) 
-7.657014 
(0.0000) 
-2.87841 
(0.1863) 
-4.9508714 
(0.0028) 
-1245748 
(0.0000) 
 None -1.104419 
0.2372 
-5.00405 
(0.0000) 
-8.010278 
(0.0000) 
-1.137838 
0.2254 
-5.004930 
(0.0000) 
-13.34396 
(0.0000) 
BDEV Intercept -2.274562 
(0.1871) 
-5.20820 
(0.0003) 
-6.394931 
(0.0000) 
-2.282599 
(0.1846) 
-6.445532 
(0.0000) 
-13.87369 
(0.0000) 
 Intercept 
and trend 
-3183136 
0.1096 
-5038946 
(0.0025) 
-6.225870 
(0.0002) 
-.3112026 
(0.1244) 
-6.281125 
(0.0001) 
-15.54439 
(0.0000) 
 None -1.565008 
(0.1087) 
-5.285740 
(0.0000) 
-6.557213 
(0.0000) 
1.399264 
(0.1466) 
6.466359 
(0.0000) 
-13.89088 
(0.0000) 
RSDP Intercept 8.650091 
(0.0000) 
-0.783300 
(0.7981) 
-9.167565 
(0.0000) 
-6.041868 
(0.0000) 
.-9.088956 
(0.0000) 
5.858026 
(0.0001) 
 Intercept 
and trend 
-1.809340 
(0.6619) 
-1.767249 
(0.6800) 
-8.378795 
(0.0000) 
-7.461751 
(0.0000) 
-7.859797 
(0.0000) 
-4.823629 
(0.0039) 
 None -1.028386 
(0.0000) 
-1.575051 
(0.1061) 
-8.981709 
(0.0000) 
5.928108 
(0.0000) 
-9.5696893 
(0.0000) 
-6.514187 
(0.0000) 
RGDPPC Intercept -0.675863 
(0.8353) 
-9.728861 
(0.0000) 
-13.45520 
(0.0000) 
-3.760286 
(0.0089) 
-9.728861 
(0.0000) 
-20.74401 
(0.0001) 
 Intercept 
and trend 
-4.860510 
(0.0032) 
-9.707802 
(0.0000) 
13.26184 
(0.0000) 
-4.860678 
(0.0032) 
-9.707802 
(0.0000) 
-26.12855 
(0.0000) 
 None -5228566 
(0.8231) 
-9.631932 
(0.0000) 
13.82300 
(0.0000) 
-2.063640 
(0.0396) 
-9.566520 
(0.0000) 
-20.40531 
(0.0001) 
GDP Intercept 1.322551 
(0.9980) 
-4.202807 
(0.0024) 
-5.372265 
(0.0003) 
-1.790996 
(0.9995) 
-4.910891 
(0.0006) 
-11.78654 
(0.0000) 
 Intercept 
and trend 
-3.49721 
(0.0247) 
-4.596436 
(0.0065) 
-5.753894 
(0.0006) 
-9.800492 
(0.0000) 
-5.500937 
(0.0008) 
-15.58471 
(0.0000) 
 None -6.359163 
(1.0000) 
-0.040971 
(0.6852) 
-5.400545 
(0.0000) 
-6.359163 
(1.0000) 
-1.661175 
(0.0000) 
-11.04492 
(0.0000) 
INF Intercept -3.563862 
(0.0140) 
-7.555362 
(0.0000) 
-5.537761 
(0.0002) 
--3.63543 
(0.0119) 
-7.555362 
(0.0000) 
-16.75661 
(0.0001) 
 Intercept 
and trend 
-3-490590 
(0.0614) 
-7.406110 
(0.0000) 
5.637969 
(0.0007) 
-3.56200 
(0.0531) 
-7.406110 
(0.0000) 
-19.26088 
(0.0000) 
 None -1.35054 
(0.2261) 
-7.704890 
(0.0000) 
-5.691849 
(0.0000) 
-1.605535 
(0.1007) 
-7.704890 
(0.0000) 
-17.19936 
(0.0001) 
T_BILL Intercept -1.570186 
(0.4831) 
-4.554870 
(0.0014) 
-7.150553 
(0.0000) 
-1570186 
(0.4831) 
-4.541078 
(0.0015) 
-11.31090 
(0.0000) 
 Intercept 
and trend 
-2.119597 
(0.5116) 
-4.4727331 
(0.0081) 
-4079586 
(0.0226) 
-2.119597 
(0.5116) 
-4.374307 
(0.0084) 
-10.89106 
(0.0000) 
 None -0.962669 
(0.2912) 
-4.622925 
(0.0001) 
-4.622925 
(0.0000) 
-0.968552 
(0.2888) 
-4.611953 
(0.0001) 
-1169587 
(0.0000) 
RIR Intercept -1.910582 
(0.3223) 
-8.948199 
(0.0000) 
-17.78401 
(0.0001) 
-2.44612 
(0.1408) 
-8.946199 
(0.0000) 
-17.70401 
(0.0001) 
 Intercept 
and trend 
3.976703 
(0.0228) 
-8.887085 
(0.0000) 
-17.32150 
(0.0000) 
-4.035239 
(0.0201) 
-8-887085 
(0.0000) 
-17.32150 
(0.0000) 
 None -1.595857 
(0.1025) 
-8.709148 
(0.0000) 
-1840206 
 (0.0001) 
1.493274 
(0.1240) 
-8709148 
(0.0000) 
-18.40206 
(0.0000) 
Notes: Some variables are significant at 1 per cent and some are significant at 5 per cent. 
P-value is in parenthesis (  ). 
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8.6.3 Lag Structure Test 
 
The lag structure test was conducted to determine the lags interval. In this research 
number of lags was determined based on the lowest value of Akaike Information 
Criteria (AIC).  Table 8.5 indicates the lowest value of the AIC for Model 1 and 
Model 2. The maximum lag test for model 1 and 2 will be at lag 2.  
 
Table  8.5: Lag Structure of Model 1 and Model 2 
Model 1-Equation (8.3) 
Number of Observations:25  
Dependent Variable: ISPR: Independent Variables: BDEV,RSDP, RGDP_PC 
 Lag LogL LR FPE AIC SC HQ 
1 -414.9772 NA    1.12e+10*   34.47817*   35.25826*   34.69454* 
2 -401.1867  18.75507  1.45e+10  34.65494  36.21510  35.08766 
Model 2-Equation (8.4) 
Number of Observations:25  
Dependent Variable: ISPRS: Independent Variables: GDP, INF, RIR, T-BILL  
0 -457.9453 NA   8.36e+09  37.03562  37.27940  37.10323 
1 -354.9471   156.5572*   17092090*   30.79577*   32.25842*   31.20145* 
2 -330.4494  27.43742  23414777  30.83596  33.51748  31.57970 
* indicates lag order selected by the criterion 
 LR: sequential modified LR test statistic (each test at 5 per cent level) 
FPE: Final prediction error 
AIC: Akaike information criterion 
 SC: Schwarz information criterion 
 HQ: Hannan-Quinn information criterion 
 
 
8.6.4 Two Steps Engle-Granger Test  
 
Two steps of Engle-Granger test involved estimations of the model and conducting 
unit roo test for the residual of the model to identify whether there is unit root or not 
in the residual. If there is no unit root in the residual means the residual is stationary 
and can proceed to do the Johansen cointegration test to identify whether there is 
cointegration in the equation. If there is cointeration, the second step is to conduct the 
vector error correction test including the residual (or error term) in the model.  Result 
in Table 8.6 shows that the value of the coeffeient is 5.63. While the r-squared value 
is 43 per cent and the Durbin Watson value is at 1.2.  The test was done without 
testing the unit root test in the residual and with assumption the the data is stationary. 
If the model is spurious often the r-squared value is higher than the Durbin Watson 
value. In this case, the Durbin Watson value is higher than the r-squared value. 
However, unit root test will be conducted for residual to identify whether there is unit 
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root or not in the residual. If there is unit root means, the model is suporious and not 
suitable for estimation.   
Table 8.6: Estimation of the Equation (8.3)  
Dependent Variable: ISPRS  
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
BDEV -0.000987 0.025009 -0.039467 0.9689 
RSDP 1.047782 0.419717 2.496403 0.0202 
RGDP_PC -2.22E-06 1.08E-06 -2.044334 0.0525 
C 5.635462 0.368026 15.31267 0.0000 
R-squared 0.434527     Mean dependent var 5.552715 
Adjusted R-squared 0.360770     S.D. dependent var 1.081140 
S.E. of regression 0.864391     Akaike info criterion 2.682371 
Sum squared resid 17.18497     Schwarz criterion 2.874347 
Log likelihood -32.21201     Hannan-Quinn criter. 2.739456 
F-statistic 5.891307     Durbin-Watson stat 1.211428 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.003885    
 
 
 
Table 8.7 shows that the value of the coeffeient is 3.05. While the r-squared 
value is 84 per cent and the Durbin Watson value is at 1.18.   
However, the unit root test will be conducted to identity unit root in the 
residual for further estimation. 
 
Table 8.7: Estimation of the Equation (8.4) 
Dependent Variable: GDP  
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
GDP -1.03E-06 9.23E-07 -1.113124 0.2777 
INF 0.475914 0.123556 3.851814 0.0009 
RIR 0.462277 0.080150 5.767626 0.0000 
T_BILL 0.001327 0.111424 0.011910 0.9906 
C 3.059894 0.649622 4.710266 0.0001 
R-squared 0.847892     Mean dependent var 5.552715 
Adjusted R-squared 0.820236     S.D. dependent var 1.081140 
S.E. of regression 0.458388     Akaike info criterion 1.443375 
Sum squared resid 4.622634     Schwarz criterion 1.683345 
Log likelihood -14.48556     Hannan-Quinn criter. 1.514731 
F-statistic 30.65847     Durbin-Watson stat 1.184956 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
 
8.6.5 Residual Testing  
 
Table 6.8 shows the result of the Augmented Dicky Fuller Test for the residual of 
model 1-equation (6.2) of the conventional bank. The result for intercept, trend and 
intercept and no trend and intercept at level shows that the test statistic value is 
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greater than the test critical values at 1 per cent, 5 per cent and 10 per cent 
respectively. The p-value for all tests also less than 0.05 per cent which indicate that 
the null hypothesis can be rejected. In this case the null hyphothesis is that there is a 
unit root in the residual. The value of the coefficient of the residual is negative and the 
Durbin Watson value at 2, which indicate that the model is not sprious and the 
residual is stationary.  
Table 8.8: Result of the Residual Test of Model 1-Equation (8.3) 
 
Constant 
   t-Statistic   Prob.* 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -4.593145  0.0014 
Test critical values: 1% level  -3.737853  
 5% level  -2.991878  
 10% level  -2.635542  
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
U(-1) -0.977275 0.212768 -4.593145 0.0001 
C -0.002571 0.011425 -0.225058 0.8240 
R-squared 0.489523     Mean dependent var -0.004950 
Adjusted R-squared 0.466320     S.D. dependent var 0.076536 
F-statistic 21.09698     Durbin-Watson stat 1.994405 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000142    
Constant, Linear Trend  
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -4.509847  0.0078 
Test critical values: 1% level  -4.394309  
 5% level  -3.612199  
 10% level  -3.243079  
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
U(-1) -0.982029 0.217752 -4.509847 0.0002 
C -0.009854 0.025561 -0.385507 0.7037 
R-squared 0.492004     Mean dependent var -0.004950 
Adjusted R-squared 0.443623     S.D. dependent var 0.076536 
F-statistic 10.16944     Durbin-Watson stat 1.996477 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000816    
None   
Lag Length: 0 (Automatic - based on SIC, maxlag=5) 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -4.706232  0.0000 
Test critical values: 1% level  -2.664853  
 5% level  -1.955681  
 10% level  -1.608793  
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
U(-1) -0.979446 0.208117 -4.706232 0.0001 
R-squared 0.488348     Mean dependent var -0.004950 
Adjusted R-squared 0.488348     S.D. dependent var 0.076536 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.985689    
* Siginificant at 0.05 per cent 
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Result in Table 8.9 shows the Augmented Dicky Fuller Test at level for residual of 
model 2-equation (8.4) of the Islamic bank. The result for intercept, trend and 
intercept and no trend and intercept at level shows that the test statistic value is 
greater than the test critical values at 1 per cent, 5 per cent and 10 per cent 
respectively. This indicates that the residual is stationary and the null hypothesis can 
be rejected which means there is no unit root in the residual. The value of the 
coefficient of the residual is negative and the Durbin Watson value is close to 2, 
which indicate that the model is not sprious and the model is reliable for estimation.  
 
Table 8.9: Result of the Residual Test of Model 2-Equation (8.4) 
 
Intercept t-Statistic   Prob. 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -3.685993  0.0066* 
Test critical values: 1% level  -3.538362  
 5% level  -2.908420  
 10% level  -2.591799  
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
U(-1) -0.784289 0.212776 -3.685993 0.0005 
C 226.4766 686.4404 0.329929 0.7427 
R-squared 0.492705     Mean dependent var 
-
133.0603 
Adjusted R-squared 0.448206     S.D. dependent var 7282.660 
F-statistic 11.07214     Durbin-Watson stat 1.999162 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
Intercept and Trend 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -3.584921  0.0392 
Test critical values: 1% level  -4.110440  
 5% level  -3.482763  
 10% level  -3.169372  
U(-1) -0.819216 0.228517 -3.584921 0.0007 
C -403.2005 1588.935 -0.253755 0.8006 
R-squared 0.494454     Mean dependent var 
-
133.0603 
Adjusted R-squared 0.440288     S.D. dependent var 7282.660 
F-statistic 9.128556     Durbin-Watson stat 2.000618 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000001    
* Siginificant at 0.05 per cent 
 
8.6.6 Johansen Co-integration Test 
To examine the co-integration between the variables, the Johansen co-integration test 
was conducted at lag 2. The null hypothesis is that there is no co-integration between 
variables, then the null hypothesis can be rejected. If there is cointegration then the 
null hypothesis cannot be rejected. Table 8.10 shows the test result of the Johansen 
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co-integration test of equation (8.3).  The result shows that there is at least one co-
integration equations for trace and maximum eigenvalue test. Thus it confirms that 
there is co-integration between these variables in the long-run. In this case null 
hypothesis can be rejected.  
 
Table 8.10 Johansen Co-Integration Test of Equation (8.3) 
Series: ISPRS BDEV RSDP RGDP_PC (Lags interval: 1 to 2) 
Data Trend: None None Linear Linear Quadratic 
Test Type 
No 
Intercept Intercept Intercept Intercept Intercept 
 No Trend No Trend No Trend Trend Trend 
Trace 1 1 1 1 1 
Max-Eig 1 1 1 1 1 
 Log Likelihood by Rank (rows) and Model (columns) 
0 -382.9652 -382.9652 -380.9531 -380.9531 -376.9869 
1 -369.8950 -358.0724 -356.5746 -355.8690 -352.3362 
2 -363.3325 -351.5066 -350.8248 -345.5067 -342.9138 
3 -360.4131 -346.9462 -346.8240 -339.8277 -337.2589 
4 -360.3801 -344.3212 -344.3212 -336.9715 -336.9715 
 Akaike Information Criteria by Rank (rows) and Model (columns) 
0  34.58044  34.58044  34.74609  34.74609  34.74891 
1  34.15791  33.25604  33.38121  33.40575  33.36135 
2  34.27771  33.45888  33.56873  33.29223   33.24281* 
3  34.70109  33.82885  33.90200  33.56898  33.43824 
4  35.36501  34.36010  34.36010  34.08096  34.08096 
 Schwarz Criteria by Rank (rows) and Model (columns) 
0  36.15117  36.15117  36.51317  36.51317  36.71233 
1  36.12134  35.26855*  35.54098  35.61460  35.71746 
2  36.63382  35.91316  36.12118  35.94285  35.99160 
3  37.44988  36.72490  36.84713  36.66137  36.57972 
4  38.50648  37.69792  37.69792  37.61512  37.61512 
 
The Johansen co-integration test was conducted at lag 1. Table 8.11 shows the test 
result of the Johansen co-integration test of equation (8.3).  The result shows that 
there is at least two co-integration equations for trace and maximum eigenvalue test. 
Thus it confirms that there is co-integration between these variables in the long-run. 
In this case null hypothesis can be rejected.  
 
Table 8.11 Johansen Co-Integration Test of Equation (8.4) 
 
Series: ISPRS GDP INF RIR T_BILL (Lags interval: 1 to 1) 
Data Trend: None None Linear Linear Quadratic 
Test Type No Intercept Intercept Intercept Intercept Intercept 
 No Trend No Trend No Trend Trend Trend 
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Trace 3 5 2 3 5 
Max-Eig 2 1 1 2 2 
 Log Likelihood by Rank (rows) and Model (columns) 
0 -387.9797 -387.9797 -377.1519 -377.1519 -375.0402 
1 -366.0469 -364.8392 -355.6768 -353.0021 -350.8937 
2 -353.7776 -352.0919 -344.2617 -335.6055 -335.3486 
3 -344.9398 -343.1641 -336.6629 -324.9443 -324.7050 
4 -339.0982 -335.8851 -331.2196 -317.7581 -317.5232 
5 -338.8062 -330.4494 -330.4494 -312.6709 -312.6709 
 Akaike Information Criteria by Rank (rows) and Model (columns) 
0  33.03838  33.03838  32.57215  32.57215  32.80322 
1  32.08375  32.06714  31.65414  31.52017  31.67150 
2  31.90221  31.92735  31.54094   31.00844*  31.22789 
3  31.99518  32.09313  31.73304  31.03555  31.17640 
4  32.32785  32.39080  32.09756  31.34065  31.40186 
5  33.10449  32.83596  32.83596  31.81367  31.81367 
 Schwarz Criteria by Rank (rows) and Model (columns) 
0  34.25725  34.25725  34.03481  34.03481  34.50964 
1  33.79018  33.82232  33.60435  33.51912*  33.86548 
2  34.09618  34.21884  33.97869  33.54370  33.90941 
3  34.67671  34.92092  34.65834  34.10711  34.34548 
4  35.49693  35.75490  35.51042  34.94852  35.05848 
5  36.76112  36.73636  36.73636  35.95785  35.95785 
 
8.6.7  Vector Error Correction Model Test 
Since there is long-run co-integration between variables the error correction model 
test was conducted. The VEC result of equation (8.3) is in Table 8.12. The R2 and R2 
squared value of the equation (8.3) is higher (78 per cent and 48 per cent) 
respectively. Coefficient of the cointegration for equation (7.0) is negative which 
means equation 8.3 is the long-run model.   
Table 8.12: VEC Test of Equation (8.3) 
Error Correction: 
D(ISPRS) 
Equation (8.3) 
CointEq1  0.032512 
  (0.02213) 
 [ 1.46885] 
D(ISPRS) -0.190927 
  (0.19618) 
 [-0.97321] 
D(BDEV)  0.063541 
  (0.02880) 
 [ 2.20640] 
D(RSDP)  0.581953 
  (0.83657) 
 [ 0.69564] 
D(RGDP_PC) -1.31E-06 
  (1.6E-06) 
 [-0.83971] 
C -0.019285 
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Error Correction: 
D(ISPRS) 
Equation (8.3) 
  (0.14692) 
 [-0.13126] 
 R-squared  0.789508 
 Adj. R-squared  0.485465 
 Sum sq. resids  2.590792 
 S.E. equation  0.536531 
 F-statistic  2.596693 
 Log likelihood -7.524986 
 Akaike AIC  1.871738 
 Schwarz SC  2.562908 
 Mean dependent -0.090399 
 S.D. dependent  0.747976 
 
Table 8.13 shows the VEC result of model of equation (8.4). The coefficient value of 
the equations is negative means there is long run association between the variables..   
 
Table 8.13: VEC Test of Equation (8.4) 
Error Correction: D(ISPRS) D(GDP) D(INF) D(RIR) D(T_BILL) 
CointEq1 -0.577836 -20293.38  0.469018 -1.555298  0.217289 
  (0.67993)  (10130.1)  (1.62574)  (1.55297)  (1.16172) 
 [-0.84985] [-2.00328] [ 0.28850] [-1.00150] [ 0.18704] 
D(ISPRS(-2)) -0.360885  8739.691 -0.496437  0.584844 -1.361136 
  (0.51769)  (7712.90)  (1.23782)  (1.18241)  (0.88452) 
 [-0.69711] [ 1.13313] [-0.40106] [ 0.49462] [-1.53884] 
D(GDP(-2))  2.01E-05 -0.067159  2.62E-05 -2.42E-06  2.50E-05 
  (1.5E-05)  (0.22784)  (3.7E-05)  (3.5E-05)  (2.6E-05) 
 [ 1.31128] [-0.29476] [ 0.71745] [-0.06927] [ 0.95796] 
D(INF(-2))  0.257270 -4624.221 -0.217303 -0.371049  0.513795 
  (0.56708)  (8448.80)  (1.35592)  (1.29522)  (0.96891) 
 [ 0.45367] [-0.54732] [-0.16026] [-0.28647] [ 0.53028] 
D(RIR(-2))  0.242274 -8497.934  0.009586 -0.614565  0.337256 
  (0.48197)  (7180.71)  (1.15241)  (1.10082)  (0.82349) 
 [ 0.50268] [-1.18344] [ 0.00832] [-0.55828] [ 0.40955] 
D(T_BILL(-2))  0.179459  2066.021  0.799302 -0.079803  0.463493 
  (0.29100)  (4335.50)  (0.69579)  (0.66464)  (0.49720) 
 [ 0.61670] [ 0.47654] [ 1.14877] [-0.12007] [ 0.93221] 
C -0.830915  25471.14 -0.868570 -0.686140 -0.901934 
  (0.45901)  (6838.74)  (1.09752)  (1.04840)  (0.78427) 
 [-1.81021] [ 3.72454] [-0.79139] [-0.65447] [-1.15003] 
 R-squared  0.609940  0.689317  0.535440  0.651102  0.493601 
 Adj. R-squared  0.252384  0.404523  0.109594  0.331278  0.029401 
 Sum sq. resids  5.429893  1.21E+09  31.04316  28.32623  15.85139 
 S.E. equation  0.672675  10021.99  1.608394  1.536398  1.149326 
 F-statistic  1.705862  2.420411  1.257355  2.035816  1.063337 
 Log likelihood -16.22091 -246.8377 -37.14242 -36.04334 -29.07697 
 Akaike AIC  2.351743  21.56980  4.095202  4.003611  3.423081 
 Schwarz SC  2.940770  22.15883  4.684229  4.592638  4.012108 
 Mean dependent -0.144444  20331.65  0.056250 -0.331250 -0.070522 
 S.D. dependent  0.777975  12987.39  1.704505  1.878802  1.166603 
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8.6.8 Ordinary Least Square Estimation of  Equation (8.3)  
The test result in Table 8.14 shows that the model is moderate where the R
2
 value is 
12 per cent but the R2 adjusted value is low around -0.05 per cent. Furthermore, the 
coefficient value of (C1) is negative which and the despite positive and p-value is not 
significant. This means that not all variables are jointly significant for the dependent 
variables and they may have only short-run relationship. The speed of adjustment is at 
-0.019 which mean the model has been corrected by 0.019 per cent.  
Table 8.14: OLS Estimation of Equation (8.3) 
Dependent Variable: D(ISPRS) 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
D(BDEV) -0.036278 0.027079 -1.339712 0.1954 
D(RSDP) -1.350454 1.373831 -0.982984 0.3374 
D(RGDP_PC) -5.12E-07 7.39E-07 -0.693396 0.4960 
U(-1) -2.064228 3.307291 -0.624145 0.5396 
C -0.183732 0.165925 -1.107320 0.2813 
R-squared 0.124190     Mean dependent var -0.131567 
Adjusted R-squared -0.050972     S.D. dependent var 0.764312 
F-statistic 0.709000     Durbin-Watson stat 2.159972 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.595272    
 
The result in Table 8.15 shows that the model is good where the R
2
 value is 71 per 
cent but the R2 adjusted value is low around 64 per cent. Furthermore, the coefficient 
value of (C1) is -0.08.. The p-value of inflation (INF) and real interest rate (RIR) less 
than 0.05 percent which means that Islamic banks’ spread affected by the inflation 
and real interest rate in the long term.  
 
 
Table 8.15: OLS Estimation of Equation (8.4) 
Dependent Variable: D(ISPRS) 
   
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
          
D(GDP) 3.32E-06 7.25E-06 0.457629 0.6524 
D(INF) 0.401681 0.134435 2.987911 0.0076 
D(RIR) 0.343895 0.104389 3.294377 0.0038 
D(T_BILL) 0.205718 0.129749 1.585512 0.1294 
U(-1) 0.305336 1.760844 0.173403 0.8642 
C -0.080121 0.164408 -0.487328 0.6316 
R-squared 0.719682     Mean dependent var -0.131567 
Adjusted R-squared 0.645914     S.D. dependent var 0.764312 
F-statistic 9.756042     Durbin-Watson stat 1.812637 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000097    
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8.7 CONCLUSION 
Islamic banks are indirectly affected by the interest based monetary policy conducted 
by the central banks in each country. Despite the fact that the Islamic banks’ contracts 
are Shari’ah compliant, the pricing of Islamic banks’ products and services is set 
based on the interest rates of the conventional banks. In searching and examining this 
relationship, the findings in this study indicate that there is a significant relationship 
between Islamic savings return rates with market determinant variables and 
macroeconomic variables. The finding of the study in Chapter 8 can be summarized 
as in Table 8.16 below.  
Table 8.16: Summary Findings of Equations (8.3) and (8.4) 
Test Result  
Islamic banks’ 
Saving Spread 
 Equation (8.3) 
Islamic banks’ 
Saving Spread 
 Equation (8.4) 
Coefficient Value of C(1) 0.003 -0.156 
R
2
 Value 12% 75% 
Adjusted R
2
 -0.05% 51% 
Speed of adjustment -2.064 0.036 
P-Value Not Significant  
Serial Correlation No serial correlation No serial 
correlation 
In short, Islamic banks’ savings return spread is affected by market determinant 
factors are the reserve requirement ratio, real GPD per capita,  and Bank assets (Bank 
Development). While for the macroeconomic determinant factors that affecting the 
Islamic banks’ savings return rate spread are the GDP, inflation rate, real interest rate 
and 12 months rate of the Treasury bill determined by the Central bank. The result 
provides evidence that, statistically the saving and investment return spread of the 
Islamic banks affected by the monetary policy set by the Malaysian Central Bank 
(BNM). However, as mentioned earlier, research in this area is inconclusive due to the 
different size of the banks, market share, market structure, and macroeconomic 
environment, which is an issue in this study as well. In conclusion, Islamic banks are 
also posed to various risk such as market risk, liquidity risk and interest rates risk.  
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CHAPTER 9 
 
CRITICAL REFLECTIONS ON THE FINDINGS, POLICY 
RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION 
 
9.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter summaries and discusses the literature review presented in Chapters two  
and Chapter three and findings generated in Chapter four, Methodology in Chapter 
five and also contextualising them within the empirical analysis presented in Chapters 
six to Chapter eght.  
It should be reiterated that the aim of this study is to explore the implementation of 
monetary policy in an interaction with the Islamic bank financing in the dual banking 
system in Malaysia by exploring the relationship between macroeconomic variables 
and institutional variables of the Islamic banks. For this, the research presented in this 
study is based on testing econometric models developed to investigate the impact of 
monetary policy on Islamic banking operations and vice versa, for which various 
analyses were carried out using Islamic bank specific and macro-economic variables.  
Chapter two reviews the existing literature on monetary policy and Islamic monetary 
policy. Additional input in this chapter compares the differences between 
conventional and Islamic monetary policy.  Chapter three describes the evolution of 
Malaysian monetary policy from the 1970s up to 2012. It also highlights the main 
monetary policy instruments and Islamic finance instrument applied in the Islamic 
banking sector in Malaysia. Chapter four examines, after discussing the developments 
and trends in Malaysian Islamic banking, the performance of Malaysian Islamic banks 
using secondary data mainly from 2006 to 2012. Chapter five, describe the research 
methodology mainly involving the two steps of engle granger test. Chapter Six, being 
the first empirical chapter, investigates the growth function as well as the nexus of the 
conventional and Islamic banks against the selected macroeconomic variables such as 
GDP and gross fixed capital formation (GFCF) and trade balance (TB). 
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 Chapter seven examines co-integration between conventional interest rates and 
Islamic savings and investment return rates and conventional and Islamic interbank 
money market rates. The final chapter (Chapter 8) explores the impact of Islamic 
banks in expanding the interest rates spread through debt-based and debt like 
instruments. 
9.2 REFLECTING ON THE EMPIRICAL FINDINGS  
The first empirical chapter (Chapter 6) explores the relationship between Islamic bank 
financing and investment with macroeconomic variables such as economic growth. 
An analysis was conducted using Al-Hallaq’s (2005) model for the Islamic Bank of 
Jordan but with slight modification with the objective of examining the contribution 
of Islamic financing and investment to GDP growth in Malaysia for the period of 
1997 to 2013. Growth function model was employed for conventional and Islamic 
banks variables plus the macroeconomic variables such as investment, trade balance 
and GDP.  
A preliminary test conducted using GDP shows that the relationship between Islamic 
banks’ total investment and financing with GDP is significant at 5 per cent level..   
The VEC model was used for analysing data for Islamic banks in Malaysia. To avoid 
spurious regression, residual testing was done to check whether there is unit root or 
not in the residual. All residual tesing shows that the data is stationary and there is no 
unit root in the residual. Johansen co-integration also indicates that there is at least 
one or two cointegrating equations for most of the equations.  
The findings of the model indicate that the conventional bank financing and 
investment does not contribute to the GDP growth where the p-value is not 
significant. The statistical result also indicates that Islamic banks may contribute to 
GDP growth if the market share of the Islamic bank is substantial. The findings also 
provide evidence that, statistically, there is a meaningful relationship between the 
growths of the Islamic banks and GDP growth because in Malaysia most financing of 
the goverment project was done by issuing sukuk by the Islamic Banks or Institutions. 
It should be noted that, in the case of the Islamic bank of Jordan, the results indicate 
that statistically the amount of contribution is relatively insignificant at 0.048 per cent 
compared to 0.5 per cent of the conventional banks.  
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As the findings in this study show, the Malaysian case can only be applied in 
Malaysia, and indeed cannot be generalized for other Islamic banks in other countries. 
The result may differ due to size of banks, economic development and economic 
growth level, level of investment, the amount of financing and investment of the 
Islamic banks.  
The subsequent empirical chapter (Chapter 7) examines the co-integration and long 
run relationship between conventional bank or Islamic bank on the the selected 
macroeconomic variables. The model was adapted from Chong and Liu (2009), who 
examined the potential relationship between Islamic bank rates and those of 
conventional banks in Malaysia. Chapter 7 extends the analysis and examines the 
association of saving interest rates of the conventional banks with profit rates of 
Islamic banks. The findings show that Islamic profit rates for 12 months does not 
follow the rates of the conventional banks and vice versa despite moving in tandem.   
The results support the findings of Chong and Liu (2009) for the case of Malaysia. 
However, this does not mean that Islamic bank transactions are interest based and 
should be subjected to the same monetary policy as conventional banks. The Islamic 
banks’ contracts are Shari’ah compliant despite the return rates of savings of the 
Islamic banks following the rates of interest of the conventional banks. The Islamic 
banks may not be able to achieve the objective of the al-maqasid al-shari’ah if it 
continues to determine their profit based on the interest rates of the conventional 
banks. 
In further exploring the model, this study found, by using the VECM test on 
conventional interbank money market rates and Islamic interbank money market 
rates, that in the long run conventional ONR and Islamic ONR moving closely 
together. The findings also indicate that those depositing in Islamic banks may shift to 
conventional banks because they offer higher interest rates for saving compared to 
Islamic banks that need not to gives profit to their customer for saving account. It 
should also be added that the results presented in this study also support the finding of 
Haron (2000) that Islamic bank depositors are affected by the rates provided by the 
conventional banks. 
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The empirical analysis in Chapter 8 aims to examine the determinant factors of 
interest rates spread utilizing market determinant and macroeconomic variables. The 
findings establish that Islamic banks’ overnight interbank return rates are cointegrated 
in long term. directly affected by the statutory reserve requirement ratio set by the 
Bank  Negara Malaysia. The result signifies that Malaysian Islamic banks contribute 
to interest rate spread, as most of the financing and loan by Islamic banks are either 
debt-based or debt-like. However, the findings of this study cannot be generalized to 
other countries because of different size banks, market share, market structure, and 
the macroeconomic environment.  
In taking the analysis even further, Chapter 7 explores the Islamic banks’ contribution 
to interest rates spread. Market and macroeconomic variables were utilized to test the 
relationship between Islamic banks’ return rates for savings and investment. The 
method used in this analysis is based on two steps Engle-Granger approach. The test 
result shows that Islamic return rates of savings and investments are significant with 
the reserve requirement ratio set by the Central bank. Thus, the findings indicate that 
the spread of Islamic banks is higher than that of conventional banks. This suggests 
that the Islamic banks’ cost of funding is higher than the conventional banks. It also 
supports the complaint made by the Islamic Consumer Association of Malaysia in 
2012 that Islamic banks are charging higher profit rates than conventional banks. 
In summary, Islamic bank return rates’ spread of savings and investment are 
uncommonly determined by the Central banks and affected by the rates of the 
Treasury bill, which is priced against the conventional interest rates. As the results 
indicate, the spread of Islamic banks’ rates is higher than that of conventional banks, 
especially for savings account compared to the spread of investment rates. This also 
indicates that, for investors, rates of return on investment offered by banks are not 
attractive because they are not merely giving a lower return to the investors but also 
lower spread to the banks. As the findings indicate, Islamic banks also contribute to 
the interest rates spread by providing loans and financing through utilizing Islamic 
finance principles. This is also due to the fact that Islamic banks prefer to provide 
more loans and debt rather than to finance projects and investments. Since the Islamic 
banks’ spread of savings and investment is not based on market value, but merely 
follows the conventional bank interest rates’ spread, the operations of Islamic banks 
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are considered far from serving the objective of al-maqasid al-shari’ah or human 
well-being. 
9.3 POLICY REFLECTIONS  
Despite being Islamic banks, the operation of Islamic banks follows the conventional 
banking system, as the various empirical evidences have indicated in this study. One 
of the major hindrances for Islamic banks to operate ‘Islamically’ is that they are 
subjected to the same monetary policy of the conventional banks. Islamic banks are 
also managed by bankers who have been trained according to the conventional 
banking system mind-set and they aim to replicate conventional banking operations in 
the Islamic banking sphere. Therefore, even though there is a Shari’ah board at the 
bank or at national level, Islamic banks have been unable to achieve the objective of 
the al-maqasid al-shari’ah, because the foundation is based on conventional banking 
system.  
In summary, the principal policy is governed by the conventional monetary policy and 
managed by bankers with a conventional bank mentality. However, one 
recommendation or measure that may help to increase the value of Islamic banks in 
becoming more Islamic is that it needs to have its own Islamic monetary policy where 
interest rates should not be the main instrument or mechanism in transmitting the 
policy. Accordingly, the calculation of the Islamic banks’ profit needs to be based on 
the market rates. This requires entirely a different mind-set, which aims to consider 
Islamic political economy as a system, rather than Islamic banking as an option. The 
following are some of the reflections on policy developed from the findings of this 
study: 
9.3.1 Monetary Policy for Islamic Banks 
Currently, conventional monetary policy is used to govern the operations of Islamic 
banks. However, this study suggests that in a dual banking system it should have a 
twofold system, where if there is a conventional and Islamic bank then it should have 
an Islamic monetary policy for the Islamic banks. In Malaysia, except for the absence 
of Islamic monetary policy, there is almost a complete setup for the Islamic banking 
industry, which includes an Islamic money market and Islamic capital market. In this 
industry, the objective of the Islamic banking system is to remove riba, maisir and 
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gharar in the transaction. However, if the main policy governing Islamic banks is 
based on interest rates, it is difficult to expect Islamic banks to achieve the objective 
of al-maqasid al-shari’ah.  
9.3.2 Removal of Controversial Mechanism/Products 
Islamic banks should remove all controversial mechanism or products used to 
promote Islamic banks such as al-bay al-inah, tawarruq and al-bay al-dayn: all of the 
controversial contracts should not be offered by Islamic banks. To contextualise the 
issue, it should be noted that some contracts are allowed in Malaysia but not allowed 
in the Middle East. For example, al-bay al-dayn is only offered in Malaysia but not 
practiced in Middle Eastern countries. By allowing al-bay al-dayn contract and 
implementing a fictitious system in awarding tawarruq contracts and al-bay al-inah 
contracts, it is not only tarnishing the image Islamic banking, but Islamic finance and 
Islam as a religion. The Shari’ah scholars should not allow tricks (hilah) or legal 
stratagem (hiyar) to justify the means.  
9.3.3 Calculation of Profit 
Islamic banks should calculate their profit based on the cost of funds; they should not 
include rates of interest or benchmark against conventional banks’ interest rates. It is 
commonly known that Islamic banks’ profit rates are higher than conventional interest 
rates. Various reasons given to justify higher profit rates include: 
(i) Islamic banks are truly new and need to compete with the conventional banks, 
therefore if Islamic bank charges lower profit rates, they may not be able to 
compete with the conventional banks; 
(ii) There is no harm for Islamic banks charging a higher rate of profit as the 
teaching of Islam does not limit the amount of profit charged by the seller to the 
buyer; and 
(iii) There is nothing wrong with paying more or paying a higher price for a halal 
product rather than paying a lower price for non-halal products. For instance, 
hotels may charge a higher price for food and beverages compared to retail 
stores but nobody complains because hotels provide premium service. 
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Similarly, Islamic banks are seen as providing a halal service and Muslims 
should be willing to pay a high premium for halal products.  
In 2011, the first international Islamic interbank benchmark rate was by Thompson 
Reuters based on major Islamic financial institutions including Malaysia. However, 
there was not enough information on how this rate was calculated and determined. 
Thus, Islamic banks needed to disclose the determining profit rates to the public. This 
would earn public confidence on the Islamic banking system; and it should be 
considered an important governance issue in terms of transparency. 
9.3.4 Underlying Assets 
The transactions conducted by Islamic banks using assets as collateral. Therefore, 
among the main differences between the conventional banks and Islamic banks is that 
Islamic bank transactions are either asset based or asset backed. The problem lies 
when it comes to implementation. For instance, for financing personal loan, some of 
the Islamic banks will use a piece of paper which states the land value.  
Depending on the amount of financing, Islamic banks will sell a piece of land to the 
customer at a higher price, and immediately the customer will sell the land to the bank 
at a lower price. The difference of the selling price of the customer and the buying 
back price by the banks is considered as profit for the banks. The same method is 
again applied for further customers applying for a personal loan using the same piece 
of paper, which states the value of the land. This method is not applied coincidentally, 
but it is pre-arranged by the banks with customers. This contract is known as al-bai 
inah. Thus, while the contractual (form) requirement is fulfilled with asset based/asset 
backed nature, in reality the contract is based on a fictitious asset, which is used to 
facilitate the contract to raise funding. Such tricks do not create any economic benefit 
other than increasing transaction cost. Consequently, a serious effort is needed to 
develop Islamic financing based on real assets to have real economy impact. 
9.3.5 Islamic Monetary Policy Link with Ethics (Akhlaq) and other Principles of 
Islam 
Even though there is a lack of discussion about Islamic monetary policy, it should not 
be limited to the activity of the central banks and the commercial banks. The broader 
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context of Islamic monetary policy should include not only the commercial sector 
(tijari) but also the social sector (ijtimai). Furthermore, without eliminating the 
elements of riba, gharar and maysir, and mobilizing Islamic fiscal instruments such 
as zakah, waqf and sadaqah along other institutions, Islamic monetary policy will not 
able to achieve  justice (al-adalah) in terms of distribution of wealth in the society.  
Considering that many of the Muslim scholars and economists were trained in and 
given exposure to the conventional banking system, it was not surprising that modern 
Islamic scholars suggested modifying the existing instruments of monetary policy to 
make them ‘Islamic’ or Shari’ah compliant. The term ‘interest rate’ was changed to 
‘profit rate’ and a ‘fixed deposit rate’ was renamed ‘rate of return’. Most modern 
Muslim scholars believe that the banking system is the best platform to apply the 
principles of Islamic finance and expect to achieve justice by modifying the financing 
terms and contracts of the conventional banks. 
The piecemeal approach of Islamising and mimicking the conventional banks’ 
products and services has not only proven far from reaching social justice and 
developmentalism in an aspirational sense, but has highlighted the fact that Islamic 
banks are closely following conventional banks in their operations by providing more 
loans and financing by utilizing sales principals of Islamic finance rather than asset 
based profit-loss-sharing instruments. The creation of more loans and debts 
contributes to the spread of interest rates in the banking system.  Since the amount of 
debt created in the bank is more than the money supply in the system, it may lead to a 
crisis during a downturn in an economy, because there will be default in payment due 
to less currency in circulation compared to the amount of debt. 
According to Asutay (2007: 2012), there is a social failure of Islamic banks, whereby 
they no longer respond to the needs and aspirations of the Islamic moral economy. 
Conversely, Islamic banking has strengthened the capitalist system by mimicking the 
products and services of conventional banks.  
As mentioned earlier, the objective of the Islamic monetary policy aims at achieving 
social justice in conducting financing and loans. Therefore, Islamic banks should 
provide financing for development projects and should also consider productive 
sectors in their financing rather than mainly focusing on financial sectors and real 
estate sectors.  Islamic banks also shall consider financing project that are 
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environmental friendly and contributes to sustainable development.  Applying the 
Islamic instrument is no longer the issue. Many of the conventional monetary 
instruments are also Islamic and some need modification. As outlined by Chapra 
(1985) that one of the objective of Islamic monetary policy is to ensure equal 
distribution of wealth. However, current monetary policy system unable to do that and 
it requires implementation of prudent fiscal policies. Hence, it is important to stress 
that justice cannot be achieved by establishing more Islamic banks. Thus, to close the 
gap, some scholars suggest that Islamic banks need to be more responsible and 
‘Islamic’ by applying the concept of corporate social responsibility (CSR). They 
propose combining the functions of a social or ethical bank with Islamic banks. 
However, such suggestions still remain within the banking framework.  
CSR is considered to be essential for organizations and society, but the 
implementation should be on a voluntary basis, not enforced by law. Imposition of 
CSR by law indicates that there is something wrong in society because it indicates 
that the organization itself is reluctant to fulfil its responsibility and needs law 
enforcement by the government. The imposition of CSR for Islamic banks indicates a 
problematic issue, as ‘Islamic banks’ in the first place are supposed to be following 
the principles of Islam. The suggestion of having a CSR for Islamic banks again 
reflects that Islamic banks are not ‘Islamic’.  
The suggestion of combining ethical banking or social banking with Islamic banks to 
make them more ‘Islamic’ again is thinking within the banking framework. If Islamic 
banks are truly Islamic, then they automatically become exceedingly ethical and serve 
the community. Most Islamic banks are not serving the community but rather obliging 
their shareholders. Maximizing the wealth of their shareholders is the ultimate goal of 
most Islamic banks. 
However, banks cannot be blamed if they are not ethical and do not serve the society, 
because they are naturally established to make more money through providing loans 
and debt. The objective of the banks is to maximize the wealth of their shareholders 
and they cannot be expected to provide charity or be forced to provide financing in 
areas which are not as profitable for them. Even for microfinance schemes, banks are 
making a lot of money out of poor people. 
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In concluding, justice in society will be established by the elimination of riba in the 
financial system; it cannot be achieved merely by changing the term ‘interest rates’ to 
profit rates and through ‘Islamization’ of conventional bank products and services. 
Furthermore, an Islamic economic system cannot be attained by establishing only 
‘Islamic banks’ but it only can be realised in a society that aims to provide a general 
system of Islamic political economy and achieves homo-Islamicus at a personal level. 
However, it should be noted that such a process has to start somewhere, and therefore, 
Islamization of conventional bank products and services should be considered as a 
good short-term strategy, albeit still far from achieving the objectives of the maqasid 
al-shari’ah as well as the moral economy of Islam. Furthermore, the result of this 
study has shown that even Islamic banks products and services are Shari’ah compliant 
with few exceptions of court cases for some Islamic banks in Malaysia, Islamic banks 
operations are exposed to the interest rates risk where statistically it is proven that 
Islamic money market granger cause the conventional money market and vice versa. 
Islamic banks also affected by rerserve requirement ratio set by the Central Bank. 
Therefore, it is high time to establish Islamic Central bank where its function is not 
only limited to transy miting the monetary policy through various channels by using 
Islamic instruments but also to ensure that equal distribution of wealth by transmitting 
the policy to the right channels and complimented with prudent fiscal policies by the 
government.  
 
9.4 LIMITATIONS AND DIFFICULTIES OF THIS RESEARCH 
The research presented in this thesis falls under the category of quantitative research 
and explanatory research. Among other challenges of the paper-based research is that 
the scope is intensely specific compared to primary data research where the whole 
thesis is depending on the finding from the primary data. Quantitative research is a 
specialized study and requires specific knowledge and skills. As most research on 
monetary policy and management and macro-economic fields employ quantitative 
methods with econometric modelling, this study also opted for econometric modelling 
as a research methodology.  
The availability of statistical data is also a concern in secondary data based 
econometrics and statistical studies such as this one. In some cases, yearly data are not 
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sufficient to explain the relationship, and most researchers prefer quarterly time series 
data or monthly data. A large sample data set is meaningful mainly for prediction and 
estimation of the future trend or pattern. Another problem with time series data is that 
the data may have high autocorrelation or multi collinearity. 
Autocorrelation or multi collinearity may provide spurious regression consequence or 
the result may be biased due to the high correlation among variables. However, there 
are few techniques available to reduce the autocorrelation or multi collinearity within 
the time series data including converting the data to a logarithm, removing outliers, 
using first order difference or second order difference data. 
In conducting this research, it was undeniably intriguing and thought provoking 
learning the econometric techniques from scratch. To develop econometric analysis 
skills, the researcher attended quantitative methods courses as well as undergraduate 
and master’s degree classes at Durham University on econometrics. In addition, 
learning the use of econometric software and relevant techniques to analyse data 
required essential effort to develop such skills from beginners’ level.  
The availability of the comprehensive data of Islamic banks in Malaysia posed a great 
difficulty.  Even though the first Islamic bank was established in 1984, comprehensive 
data on the Islamic banks were only available after the financial crisis in 1997, where 
Bank Negara Malaysia began to compile monthly, quarterly, and yearly data for 
Islamic banks from January 1997.  
Furthermore, there was a limited number of studies and research on the monetary 
policy impact on Islamic banking operations and vice versa. Therefore, there was no 
sample or model to be followed. Although Iran can be considered as an example in 
terms of having an (Islamic) monetary policy, there is not much material available for 
this either. As far as the other limitations of this research are concerned, the researcher 
was unable to conduct interviews with monetary policy makers due to limited time 
and inconclusive debate on certain issues, as this was considered useful in making and 
providing an interpretative understanding of quantitative findings. Among other issues 
which require further research and deliberations are the facts that Islamic bank's 
operations under the fractional reserve system, benchmarking of conventional interest 
as the profit rates, creation of fiat money and monetary policy for the Islamic banks.  
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It should be noted that some Shari’ah scholars have already put their time and effort 
into Islamizing conventional monetary policy instruments and justified the Central 
Bank playing a vital role in an Islamic economy. However, the approach and 
measures taken are still within the conventional banking framework. A comparison 
cannot be conducted, since there was no Central Bank during the early Islamic period. 
At that time, there was a treasury (Baitulmal) which had different objectives to 
modern central banks. 
9.5 SUGGESTION FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
This study employed quantitative method by utilizing econometric techniques to 
analyse the secondary data. In the field of monetary policy, there are numerous 
models available that can be used for future research and advanced econometric 
techniques can also be applied for those who are knowledgeable in the subject of 
econometrics. 
For future research, the qualitative techniques such as conducting structured or semi-
structured interviews can be employed depending on the requirement of the subject. 
As for some issues pertaining to Islamic banks, they could be explained by running 
time series data, while other issues like, ‘why Islamic banks are still subjected to the 
interest based monetary policy’, and ‘why Shari’ah scholars allow controversial 
products like al-bai al-inah, tawarruq and al-bai al-dayn’ can only be answered if 
further research is conducted using qualitative methods. Indeed, combining 
quantitative and qualitative methods is not an easy task, yet it is possible.  
9.6 EPILOGUE  
The aim of this study, as identified in Chapter 1, was to explore and examine the 
relationship between Islamic banking financing and investment and monetary policy 
and outcomes as well as macroeconomic outcomes in the case of Malaysia. In doing 
so, three empirical essays were provided. It can be stated that this study had achieved 
the intended aims and objectives identified in Chapter 1. As the literature review 
chapters (2-4); methodology is in chapter fivae and empirical chapters (6-8) indicates, 
through empirical analysis and discursive approach and methodologies, the identified 
aims, objectives and research questions have been fulfilled and responded to.  
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By conducting a literature review, it was easy to understand the status and identify the 
existing gaps. For example, through the literature review chapter on conventional and 
Islamic monetary policy, the researcher was able to identify the key differences 
between Islamic and conventional monetary policies. In summary, there is a 
substantial gap in philosophy due to their different ontological roots resulting in 
different articulation of conventional and Islamic monetary policy. In other words, the 
former is based on evolution, and the latter is based on certain principles in the 
Qur’an and al-hadith. The mechanism of these two policies is also different, as in the 
conventional monetary policy interest rates and money supply are the main 
mechanisms for determining the monetary policy. The empirical chapters shed much 
light on the interaction and intersection between macroeconomic variables and 
conventional and Islamic banking financing and investment. In particular, this study 
explores the relationship of conventional and Islamic banking variables with the 
economic growth thus add value to the existing knowledge in the field of the Islamic 
finance and banking. 
Overall, the findings show that both conventional and Islamic banks are contributing 
to economic growth, but since the market share of Islamic banks is less than 30 per 
cent the effect of their contribution is minimal. Besides, Islamic bank transactions are 
not based on riba and the contract applied is Shari’ah compliant, but the return rates 
of Islamic banks are still calculated and based on conventional interest rates. 
Furthermore, the findings indicate that Islamic banks contribute to the interest rates 
spread, as more than 60 per cent of Islamic banks’ financing is debt based and debt 
like thus contributing to the spread of interest rates in the financial system.  
It is important to also stress that the findings and critical argument developed in this 
study do not aim to undermine the development and growth of Islamic banking in 
Malaysia, but to ensure that Islamic banks practise the intended objective of al-
maqasid al-shari’ah, as it is believed that not only the form, but also the substance of 
Islamic banking should be ‘Islamic’ as such.  
It is hoped that an authentic Islamic monetary policy can be executed to overcome the 
observed difficulties, as without the implementation of an Islamic monetary policy in 
a holistic approach, avoiding such consequences may not be possible, and hence the 
‘substance’ of Islamic banking will not be realised. To achieve the full fledge Islamic 
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banking system, it is also recommended to establish Islamic central bank where it 
does not used non-Islamic instruments for governing the Islamic banks.  To sum up, it 
is timely that Islamic banking be governed by Islamic monetary policy, where ethics 
and morality become part and parcel of the Islamic banking system. If the system 
continues operating under the same conventional structure, then it will not be able to 
achieve the objectives of al-maqasid al-shari’ah. 
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